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OVERVIEW
The literature review comprises discussion of 4 principal domains. First, literature 
pertaining to diagnostic criteria, clinical features, historical context, prevalence, co- 
morbidity, aetiology and intervention for BDD is reviewed. Second, research on 
cognitive processes and metacognition (beliefs about experiencing particular thoughts 
and mental strategies employed to control particular thoughts) in other disorders is 
discussed, followed by critical appraisal of the minimal existing research on thought 
content and metacognition in BDD. Possible lines of future research are suggested.
The empirical paper describes the aim of the current study, namely exploring 
preoccupation in BDD, by investigating the content of thoughts about appearance and 
metacognition in people with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding 
appearance. A structured interview and questionnaires were employed to investigate 
these aspects of preoccupation in BDD, followed by quantitative analyses and coding of 
descriptive data. The content of the thoughts was found to be similar in the 2 groups, 
but participants with BDD were found to endorse negative metacognitive beliefs 
significantly more strongly, to employ thought control strategies involving punishment 
significantly more frequently and to report significantly lower effectiveness of the 2 
most frequently employed strategies. These findings are related to existing literature, 
and clinical and theoretical implications and limitations are discussed.
The critical appraisal expands upon the discussion of these findings, exploring strengths
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and weaknesses and professional, theoretical and clinical implications further. Future 
directions for research in this area are proposed and both the researcher’s expectations 
and the research process are reflected upon.
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FAK1 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
ABSTRACT
In this literature review, research relevant to thought content and metacognitive aspects 
(beliefs about experiencing particular thoughts and mental strategies employed in an 
attempt to control particular thoughts) of preoccupation in Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
(BDD) is discussed. First, existing literature pertaining to the diagnostic criteria, 
clinical features, historical context, prevalence, associated co-morbidity, aetiology and 
interventions for BDD is examined. Next, research on cognitive processes and 
metacognition in other disorders is explored, focussing particularly on thought content, 
metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies in non-clinical participants, people 
with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), people with Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) and people with depression. The vary limited existing literature on thought 
content and metacognition in BDD is reviewed, after which possible future areas of 
research are suggested.
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U Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD)
1.1) Diagnostic Criteria and Clinical Features
BDD is defined in the DSM-IV as a ‘preoccupation with an imagined defect in 
appearance. If a slight physical anomaly is present, the person’s concern is markedly 
excessive’. In order to fulfil diagnostic criteria, the preoccupation must be associated 
with ‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning’ and should not be ‘better accounted for by another 
mental disorder* (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1994).
The preoccupation is usually focussed on specific concerns, such as facial features or 
hair (Phillips, 1991). Phillips and Diaz (1997) found that skin was the most common 
area of concern for both males and females with BDD, followed by hair and then nose. 
Both Cororve and Gleaves (2001) and Veale (2004) note that the majority of people 
with BDD have multiple concerns simultaneously, while Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope 
and Hudson (1993) state that BDD sufferers have a lifetime average of 4 
preoccupations.
Veale et al. (19%), in a study on beliefs and assumptions regarding appearance, 
hypothesised that the excessive preoccupation with appearance in BDD is coupled with 
the belief that the imagined defect reveals personal inadequacy. They cite being 
unlovable as an example of such inadequacy. Furthermore, Veale (2004) notes that
6
extreme importance is attached to the idea of appearance as a self-defining 
characteristic.
Veale (2004) describes several of the clinical characteristics of BDD, including 
prolonged gazing in mirrors, comparing one’s appearance to that of others, 
camouflaging the perceived defect (with make-up, for example), picking the skin, 
seeking reassurance from others and avoidance of social situations and intimacy. In 1 
study, 80 percent of participants with BDD reported gazing into mirrors (Veale and 
Riley, 2001). Phillips, Hollander, Rasmussen, Aronowitz, DeCaria and Goodman 
(1997) found evidence to suggest that more than 90 percent of BDD sufferers engage in 
compulsive behaviours aiming to examine, improve, or hide the perceived defect.
With regard to quality of life, the shame and secrecy that often surround BDD are 
associated with social isolation and poor quality of life for many sufferers (Phillips et 
al., 1993). Cororve and Gleaves (2001) summarise a number of research studies and 
conclude that BDD is frequently associated with low self-esteem, depression, anxiety 
and self-consciousness. Phillips (2000) found, with regard to mental health related 
quality of life, that BDD sufferers’ mean scores were lower than means for the general 
US population and people with depression, diabetes or a recent myocardial infarction. 
Findings from this study suggest that people with BDD suffer from high distress and 
poor mental health related quality of life. Fear of rejection and self-consciousness can 
become so extreme that some individuals struggle to leave the home at all and Phillips et 
al. (1993) found that up to 30 percent of individuals with BDD are housebound. The
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prevalence of suicide attempts in people with BDD is said to range from 24 percent to 
29 percent (Phillips, McElroy, Hudson and Pope, 1995). Veale et al. (1996), for 
example, found that 24 percent of a sample of 50 people with BDD had attempted 
suicide.
1.2) Historical context
Phillips et al. (1993) mention BDD’s ‘century-long description in the literature’ and 
Neziroglu and Yaryura-Tobias (1993) cite a description of dysmorphic concern written 
by Morselli as early as 1886; ‘a subjective feeling of ugliness or physical defect which 
the subject feels is noticeable to others, although his appearance is within normal limits’. 
Morselli coined the term ‘dysmorphophobia’ to refer to this extreme fear of ugliness and 
the corresponding diagnostic category was first introduced under atypical somatoform 
disorders in the DSM-III in 1980 (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1980).
The specificity of the diagnostic criteria in DSM-III has been drawn into question by a 
number of authors. Furthermore, numerous authors point out the problematic and 
confusing nature of the term ‘dysmorphophobia’. Munro and Stewart (1991), for 
example, remark that the ‘nomenclature is chaotic’ and cite 6 contradictory uses in the 
literature. Newell and Shrubb (1994) find the term misleading, as there is no actual fear 
of physical abnormality and the abnormalities of others are usually tolerated without 
difficulty. In 1987, BDD was given independent diagnostic status in the DSM-III-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1987) as a disorder of irrational conviction,
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rather than a phobia (see Cororve and Gleaves, 2001).
As described above, the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1994) 
classifies BDD as a somatoform disorder, but it should be noted that patients with BDD 
symptoms can be diagnosed with BDD, delusional disorder - somatic subtype or both. 
This double-coding allows for acknowledgement of the delusional nature of the 
preoccupations of a proportion of people with BDD, but Cororve and Gleaves (2001) 
point out that such a classification is potentially problematic. They question both the 
appropriateness of listing BDD as a somatoform disorder and also the difficulty of 
defining a delusion. Phillips (2004) finds the DSM-IV inconsistent with regard to the 
classification of both BDD and other disorders with psychotic features. It is of interest 
that Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Hudson and Pope (1994) found no difference between 
people with delusional preoccupations and those with non-delusional preoccupations in 
terms of demographics, phenomenology, course, co-morbidity, family history or 
treatment response to serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Higher symptomatology and greater 
impairment of functioning were noted in the delusional group, however, suggesting 
perhaps that delusional preoccupations are indicative of a more severe form of BDD.
Phillips (2004) proceeds to suggest a dimensional classification of BDD, whereby 
preoccupation varies with regard to level of insight. This would seem to fit with 
evidence that the preoccupations of many sufferers may shift over time between 
delusion and so-called ‘overvalued idea* (Phillips et al., 1993). Phillips (2004) also 
suggests the addition of an optional ‘with poor insight* specifier for BDD, as has been
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added to the diagnostic description of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in DSM- 
IV (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1994). She also emphasises the likelihood 
of many psychiatric disorders spanning delusional and non-delusional thinking.
13) Prevalence
Estimates of the prevalence of BDD vary. Otto, Wilhelm, Cohen and Harlow (2001) 
suggest a prevalence of 0.7 percent in the general population. Altamura, Paluello, 
Mundo, Medda and Mannu (2001) found BDD in more than 6 percent of male and 
female cosmetic surgery applicants and Sarwer, Wadden, Pertschuck and Whitaker 
(1997) found a similar prevalence in female cosmetic surgery patients (7 percent). 
Phillips and Dufresne (2000) describe a study in which 11.9 percent of 268 people 
presenting for dermatological treatment met diagnostic criteria for BDD.
Studies reporting gender differences in the prevalence of BDD are somewhat 
contradictory. Hollander, Cohen and Simeon (1993) found a higher prevalence of BDD 
in men than in women, but the small size of their sample makes these findings 
somewhat questionable. Rosen, Reiter and Orosan (1995) cite evidence of higher 
prevalence of BDD in females, while Phillips and Diaz (1997) found equal rates of BDD 
across the genders.
Oosthuizen, Lambert and Castle (1998) emphasise that any statements regarding 
prevalence should be considered speculative at this stage. Phillips and Diaz (1997) posit
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that the aforementioned differences in prevalence estimates may be due to referral bias, 
inclusion and exclusion criteria and reported severity of illness. Other authors suggest 
that the shame and secrecy surrounding BDD result in under-diagnosis in the general 
population (Neziroglu and Yaryura-Tobias, 1997). Veale et al. (1996) state that people 
with BDD are particularly difficult to engage and therefore assess, and suggest that 
prevalence rates might represent underestimates.
A number of authors refer to the difficulty in distinguishing between pathological and 
normal concerns in body image disorders, commenting that the unclear boundary may 
be a potential contributor to the variation in prevalence rates (e.g. Grant and Cash, 
1995). Altamura et al. (2001), for example, refer to ‘sub-clinical BDD* and Fitts, 
Gibson, Redding and Deiter (1989) found that 70 percent of students were dissatisfied 
with some aspect of their appearance. Forty percent of the same sample reported being 
preoccupied with that feature. Phillips (1991) remarks that the boundary between BDD 
and normal concerns regarding appearance may be particularly indistinct, because some 
level of concern with appearance is ‘nearly universal*. She adds, however, that ‘there is 
clearly a group of people who are excessively preoccupied, severely distressed, and 
often substantially impaired by their concern about a minimal or non-existent 
deformity*. On a related note, Phillips and Diaz (1997) conclude that, while very mild 
BDD may be closely related to normal appearance concerns, more severe BDD would 
seem to be qualitatively distinct.
Further investigation is required to establish more reliable prevalence estimates and the
11
boundaries between normal concerns regarding appearance and BDD. The 
inconsistencies evident in the existing literature render this line of enquiry highly 
challenging, however.
1.4) Comorbidity and Associated Disorders
Perugi et al. (1997) remark that, ‘where BDD is the primary presenting problem, it is 
almost never found without co-morbidity. Gunstad and Phillips (2003) conclude that 
most people with BDD have at least 1 co-morbid disorder and a mean of 2 lifetime co- 
morbid disorders. Veale (2004), Cororve and Gleaves (2001) and Gunstad and Phillips
(2003) cite numerous studies evidencing co-morbidity with depression, social phobia, 
OCD, substance abuse and personality disorders. Findings regarding co-morbidity have 
been referred to by numerous authors in debate regarding the conceptualisation and 
categorisation of BDD.
Phillips et al. (1995) state that depression is the disorder most often co-morbid with 
BDD and Gunstad and Phillips (2003) found that 80 percent of people with BDD also 
met criteria for major depression. Furthermore, an article on the prevalence of BDD in 
atypical depression found that 13.8 percent of 80 people with atypical depression also 
had BDD (Phillips, Nierenberg, Brendal and Fava, 1996). Certain authors use such 
evidence to support the hypothesis that BDD might be best categorised as a form of 
affective spectrum disorder (see Phillips, Kim and Hudson, 1995).
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Cororve and Gleaves (2001) report that lifetime rates of OCD in BDD range from 8 
percent to 37 percent. Phillips et al. (1995) cite numerous similarities between BDD 
preoccupations and OCD obsessions, but note that BDD has higher co-morbidity with 
major depression and social phobia. Oosthuizen et al. (1998) describe similarities 
between BDD and OCD in terms of symptoms and treatment response to argue for the 
conceptualisation of BDD as an obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorder. Bienvenu et 
al. (2000) state that, ‘certain somatoform disorders (especially BDD) are transmitted in 
families of patients with OCD* and conclude that BDD must therefore belong to the 
OCD spectrum. Rauch et al. (2003) studied regional brain volumes in BDD using 
magnetic resonance imaging technology. They found that people with BDD exhibited 
significant asymmetry in the caudate nucleus, compared to healthy controls. Such an 
abnormality bears resemblance to striatal asymmetries found in people with OCD. 
Reduced hippocampal volumes often found in people with affective disorders were not 
exhibited by people with BDD. The authors concluded, therefore, that the results 
provide additional support for the conceptualisation of BDD as an obsessive-compulsive 
spectrum disorder. Phillips et al. (1995) posit, however, that BDD might be narrowly 
conceptualised as an obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorder and more broadly as an 
affective spectrum disorder. The hypothesised affective spectrum would encompass the 
obsessive-compulsive spectrum. They also raise the possibility that BDD might be 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous and that it is possible therefore that certain 
forms of BDD relate more closely to OCD while other forms resemble other disorders 
more closely.
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Gunstad and Phillips (2003) note the difficulties in differentiating between primary 
social phobia and social anxiety secondary to BDD. They report lifetime rates of co­
morbidity of BDD with social phobia to be 38 percent and note that the onset of social 
phobia usually precedes that of BDD. Hollander and Amowitz (1999) state that BDD is 
the fourth most common co-morbid disorder with social anxiety and add that the 
majority of people with BDD engage in some form of social avoidance. Furthermore, 
Wilhelm, Otto, Zucker and Pollack (1997) found that in 165 people with anxiety 
disorders (social phobia, panic, OCD and generalised anxiety disorder), almost 7 percent 
met criteria for BDD, with co-morbidity rates being highest in those people with social 
phobia.
Personality disorders have also been found to be co-morbid with BDD. Cohen, 
Kingston, Bell, Kwon, Aronowitz and Hollander (2000) report that people with BDD 
have a mean of 2.53 personality disorders, with 87 percent having at least 1. Veale et al. 
(1996) found that 72 percent of their sample had 1 personality disorder, 48 percent had 2 
personality disorders and 26 percent met criteria for 3 personality disorders. Gunstad 
and Phillips (2003) reviewed a number of studies and found rates ranging from 57 to 
100 percent, with avoidant personality disorder being the most common.
One study found that 39 percent of 41 people with anorexia nervosa met diagnostic 
criteria for BDD, but the possibility of selection bias in this sample was noted (Grant, 
Kim and Eckert, 2002). Cororve and Gleaves (2001) explore the notion of BDD and 
eating disorders as variants of Body Image Disorder. Body image according to Cash
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and Pruzinsky (2002) is a two-dimensional construct, incorporating both valence (the 
importance of one’s body image to self-esteem) and value (the level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with one’s body). Cororve and Gleaves (2001) argue that BDD is closer 
to eating disorders than to OCD in terms of primary features, but they also note a 
number of differences including gender prevalence rates. They hypothesise that both 
BDD and eating disorders could be related to OCD, for obsessive-compulsive features 
are common to both disorders.
It is evident that further research is required on the classification of BDD and its 
relationship to other disorders.
1.5) Aetiology and cognitive-behavioural models of BDD
Phillips (1991) comments on a range of theories regarding the etiology of BDD. She 
describes theories ranging from the conceptualisation of BDD as a defence mechanism 
to hypotheses regarding neurotransmitter dysfunction. Cororve and Gleaves (2001) note 
that cognitive-behavioural models of BDD have received most attention and empirical 
support.
Rosen et al. (1995) developed a cognitive-behavioural model of BDD, positing that 
appearance preoccupations begin in adolescence with heightened attention from others 
to bodily changes. Stressful experiences such as bullying may augment the risk of 
developing BDD. Biby (1998) notes that the onset of BDD is likely to be in
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adolescence, when concerns regarding physical and social development peak. Rosen et 
al. (1995) state that these adolescent experiences, ‘trigger dysfunctional assumptions 
regarding the normality of appearance, which in turn have implications for personality, 
self-worth and acceptance’. They proceed to hypothesise that the rehearsing of negative 
self-statements regarding appearance might lead to such criticisms becoming automatic 
and entrenched in the person’s belief system, that avoidance might prevent habituation 
to one’s own appearance, and that compulsive behaviours only serve to increase longer- 
term anxiety.
Veale et al. (1996) list a number of cognitive and behavioural components of BDD; 
higher aesthetic sensitivity with regard to perception of body image, demand for 
perfection and symmetry in appearance, self-focussed selective attention, affective and 
physiological symptoms, excessive checking behaviour and avoidance. They suggest 
that core beliefs regarding rejection and the importance of appearance develop from 
biological predisposition, early childhood experiences and cultural factors. Selective 
attention to the perceived defect coupled with a heightened awareness of body image 
and bodily imperfections leads to hypervigilance for minor physical changes. It is 
hypothesised that the discrepancy between perceived body image and the perfection 
demanded results in negative affect. The discrepancy is magnified by beliefs about the 
importance of appearance, and biased interpretations of incoming information ensue. 
The heightened focus on a distorted internal body image leads to assumptions that others 
hold a similar view of that person’s appearance, which in turn result in avoidance and 
camouflage. These behaviours serve to reinforce the dysfunctional beliefs and selective
16
attention.
Veale (2004) elaborates this cognitive-behavioural model further, hypothesising that 
people with BDD view themselves as aesthetic objects, rather like people with social 
phobia are said to regard themselves as social objects. He posits that a trigger (the sight 
of oneself in a mirror, for example) activates a distorted internal body image. Excessive 
self-focussed attention increases awareness and distortion of the image, and when 
combined with existing values, beliefs and rules regarding the importance of appearance 
contributes to negative appraisal of the distorted image. The negative appraisal 
increases the self-focussed attention on the image and also leads to mood changes, 
safety behaviours and rumination, all of which serve to increase the self-focussed 
attention and negative appraisal of the image.
Limited research has been conducted on mood changes in BDD. Veale (2004) states 
that internal shame, disgust, external shame, anticipatory social anxiety, depression and 
hopelessness are just some of the affective states associated with BDD. Phillips, 
Siniscalchi and McElroy (2004) found that people with BDD had higher scores than 
other psychiatric patients on measures of depression, anxiety and anger/hostility.
In terms of safety behaviours, camouflage, avoidance and mirror-gazing are often 
mentioned in the literature. Veale and Riley (2001) found that 80 percent of people with 
BDD mirror-gaze and are motivated to do so by the hope of looking different, the desire 
to know exactly how they look, the belief they will feel worse if they do not gaze and
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the desire to camouflage the perceived defect. They also found evidence to suggest that 
mirror-gazing is reinforced intermittently; on occasion the person with BDD will feel 
better after checking, but on the majority of occasions, he or she will feel worse 
afterwards. Furthermore, the person with BDD is rewarded temporarily as he or she 
believes that the reflection they see is exactly how they look to others, but when he or 
she leaves the mirror, the focus of attention shifts to the distorted internal image. In 
addition, research conducted with non-clinical participants has confirmed that prolonged 
mirror-gazing causes one’s reflection to distort. The ensuing confusion inevitably 
results in uncertainty and anxiety for the person with BDD.
With regard to rumination, Veale (2004) states that the preoccupation in BDD can be 
explained in part by the fixing of one’s attentional capacity on a distorted internal body 
image and the negative appraisal of that image. He adds, however, that little is known, 
‘.. .about other cognitive processes that contribute to the nature of the preoccupation and 
the similarities or differences to a worry or an obsession. For example, the process 
might include metacognitions, comparisons with an ideal internal image or with other 
individuals, and anticipatory worry about future events’.
Research on comparing in people with BDD is somewhat lacking, but Veale, 
Kinderman, Riley and Lambrou (2003) found evidence to suggest that people with BDD 
are more concerned than control participants with failure to meet their own ideals, but 
that there was no difference with regard to meeting the perceived ideals of others. The 
authors employed ideas from self-discrepancy theory, suggesting that disorders such as
18
depression, social anxiety, eating disorders and paranoia result from discrepancies 
between the ‘actual self (the individual’s representation of attributes that someone 
(either oneself or another person) believes the individual possesses) and either the 
‘should or ought self (the individual’s representation of attributes that someone (either 
oneself or another person) believes the person should or ought to possess) or the ‘ideal 
self (the individual’s representation of attributes that someone (either oneself or another 
person) would ideally hope that the person would possess). They based their 
conclusions on evidence that people with BDD exhibit larger discrepancies between 
how they believe they actually look and how they would like to look or believe they 
should look than control participants. No significant discrepancies were evidenced, 
however, between how people with BDD believe they actually look and how they 
believe others see them or how others would ideally like them to look. These findings 
would suggest that people with BDD are more likely to compare their perceived actual 
appearance to an internal ideal, rather than to the appearance of other people. Veale
(2004) mentions an unpublished study which used a modified dot probe procedure to 
investigate comparing in people with BDD. Evidence was found to suggest that people 
with BDD might compare themselves to people that they consider more attractive than 
themselves. In light of these somewhat contradictory findings, it seems likely that the 
object of comparison varies amongst people with BDD. Evidently, comparing in BDD, 
along with other aspects of the preoccupation such as metacognition, requires further 
empirical investigation.
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1.6) Treatment
Phillips and Dufresne (2000) state, ‘We know of no more difficult patients to treat than 
those with BDD’. Interventions for BDD include cosmetic surgery, dermatological 
treatments, medication and psychological therapy.
The literature on cosmetic surgery for people with BDD is littered with anecdotes of 
poor outcomes and cases where discontent has escalated as far as violence towards the 
surgeon (see Phillips, Grant, Sinisalchi and Albertini, 2001). Phillips et al. (2001), for 
example, reviewed surgical and non-psychiatric treatments for 289 individuals with 
BDD and found that just 7.3 percent of treatments led to both a decrease in concern with 
the treated body part and overall improvement in BDD symptomatology. In their study, 
76.4 percent of people with BDD had sought intervention from either a cosmetic 
surgeon or a dermatologist, while 66.0 percent had received treatment from 1 or both of 
these professionals. Twenty-three percent of people with BDD in that same study had 
undergone cosmetic surgery. Veale et al. (1996) found similar rates (26 percent of their 
sample of people with BDD had undergone cosmetic surgery), while in a study by 
Hollander et al. (1993), 40 percent of people with BDD had received surgical 
intervention. Veale et al. (1996) found that 81 percent of people with BDD who had 
undergone non-psychiatric intervention for BDD were either dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied.
In terms of medication, Cororve and Gleaves (2001) note that there is good evidence for
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the prescribing of serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRIs), particularly fluvoxamine and 
clomipramine (Phillips and Dufresne, 2000). Phillips (2001) states that ECT has been 
found to be ineffective and that there is little evidence for insight-oriented or supportive 
psychotherapy delivered in isolation.
Cororve and Gleaves (2001) reviewed cognitive-behavioural interventions for people 
with BDD and concluded that the most effective involved exposure (both in vivo and 
imaginal exposure to hierarchies of body parts or avoided situations), response 
prevention and cognitive restructuring. Many of the programmes reviewed also 
included self-monitoring, skills training, psychoeducation and reverse role-play.
Wilhelm, Otto, Lohr and Deckersbach (1999) studied the effect of CBT conducted in 
groups. The intervention involved 12 weekly sessions lasting 90 minutes and comprised 
psychoeducation, cognitive therapy, the scheduling of enjoyable events, exposure and 
response prevention. Participants were 13 people with BDD. Significant improvements 
were evidenced over treatment in terms of reduction in BDD and depression symptoms. 
Attrition was relatively high in this study (31 percent) and no control group was 
involved, so it is only possible to draw conclusions regarding association, as opposed to 
causality. Furthermore, no follow-up was conducted.
Neziroglu, McKay, Todaro and Yagura-Tobias (1996) investigated CBT for 17 people 
with BDD and co-morbid Axis II disorders. Daily sessions lasting 90 minutes were 
conducted over 4 weeks, involving exposure and response prevention and the
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challenging of beliefs about appearance. It is unclear as to whether the CBT was 
conducted on an individual or group-basis. Twelve of 17 participants evidenced more 
than 50 percent improvement on an interview measure of BDD symptomatology and 
there was a statistically significant difference overall between pre-intervention and post- 
intervention scores. Again, no control group was used and no follow-up assessment 
conducted, rendering any conclusions regarding the effectiveness of CBT somewhat 
tentative. The authors found no association between number of personality disorders 
and outcome, but went on to highlight the need for research on prognostic variables.
Veale et al. (1996) conducted a pilot randomised controlled trial of CBT, involving 19 
participants with BDD, who were allocated either to a 12 session course of individual 
CBT, or to a waiting list. The intervention involved the targetting of overvalued 
ideation, avoidance and checking behaviour. Techniques included exposure (no 
camouflage in social situations) and response prevention (teaching people not to ask for 
reassurance and training relatives not to respond). Attentional training was also 
incorporated, involving external focussing and terminating rituals according to external 
criteria, rather than feelings. People were helped to develop beliefs including the idea 
that beauty is subjective. No significant pre-post differences were evidenced in the 
waiting list control group, but statistically significant differences were found on both 
interview-based and self-report measures of BDD symptomatology and depressed mood 
in the treatment group. The authors emphasise the need for a larger randomised 
controlled trial, comparing CBT with other psychological and pharmacological 
interventions. No follow-up assessment was included in the study.
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Rosen et al. (1995) investigated cognitive-behavioural body image therapy for BDD. 
Participants were 54 people with BDD, who were randomly assigned to CBT or no 
treatment. The intervention involved 8 group sessions, each lasting 2 hours, comprising 
modification of thoughts regarding body dissatisfaction and beliefs about appearance, 
exposure and reduction of checking behaviours. By the end of therapy, 82 percent of 
the treatment group no longer fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for BDD, compared to 2 
percent of the waiting list control group. Seventy-seven percent of the treatment group 
maintained these gains at a follow-up assessment 4 months after the end of treatment. 
This follow-up was provided to people in the treatment group only, as those in the no­
treatment group were offered therapy, after pre-post treatment measures had been 
administered. The authors point out that a significant minority of participants continued 
to experience symptoms at follow-up, a finding which points towards the need for a 
longer follow-up period in future studies. Again, this therapy format needs to be 
compared to other interventions, both psychological and pharmacological.
Cororve and Gleaves (2001) acknowledge that large effect sizes have been found in a 
number of controlled and uncontrolled studies of cognitive-behavioural interventions for 
BDD symptoms and associated features, including depression, body image, self-esteem, 
avoidance and anxiety. Neziroglu and Khemlani-Patel (2002), summarising research 
studies on CBT for BDD, conclude, however, that the literature suggests no difference 
between the efficacy of any one particular strategy over any other. Cororve and Gleaves 
(2001) proceed to note that the inconsistencies in the literature, including number of
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sessions per week, length of treatment and inclusion and exclusion criteria, render 
comparisons across studies somewhat difficult. Furthermore, they emphasise the 
significant numbers of sufferers who either fail to respond to treatment or continue to 
experience some symptoms after treatment. Most of these interventions appear to be 
relatively short interventions with little or no follow-up. Evidently, there is a need for 
further research to address all these areas of criticism, with a view to developing more 
effective interventions for BDD.
In spite of these weaknesses in existing research, the draft NICE guideline for 
interventions for OCD and BDD suggests that those people with milder BDD should be 
treated with low intensity CBT (including exposure and response prevention), while 
those with moderate to severe impairment should receive either a course of serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) or high intensity CBT. A combination of CBT and SSRIs 
should be offered to those with severe impairment (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, 2005).
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2) Cognitive Processes and Metacognition
While a number of the cognitive-behavioural interventions for BDD in the 
aforementioned outcome studies target thoughts and beliefs regarding appearance, it is 
of interest that none to date has focussed specifically on the cognitive processes 
involved in the BDD preoccupation and the so-called ‘meta’ level of cognition 
(knowledge, beliefs, processes and strategies that appraise, monitor or control cognition 
(see Wells, 2000)). This omission comes as little surprise, however, when one notes the 
fact that little attention has been paid to incorporating such elements in the cognitive- 
behavioural models of BDD developed to date, upon which interventions are based (see 
above). Lack of consideration of metacognition is posited by some authors (e.g. Purdon 
and Clark, 1999) as an explanation of why significant numbers of people fail to respond 
or relapse following CBT for other psychological disorders. It is useful to review 
research on cognitive processes and metacognition in other disorders, before considering 
the possible application of this line of research enquiry to BDD.
2.1) Cognitive Processes
With regard to cognitive process, distinctions have been made in the literature between 
worry, obsessional thoughts and rumination. Studies aiming to differentiate between 
OCD and GAD, according to the nature of cognitions (e.g. Wells and Morrison, 1994; 
Tallis and Desilva, 1992; Turner, Beidel and Stanley, 1992) conclude that worry and 
obsessional thoughts are similar in many ways, in that they are repetitive, distressing
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and difficult to control. Wells and Morrison (1994) add, however, that worry is more 
verbal, less image-based, more realistic, more voluntary and longer lasting than 
obsessional thoughts. With regard to the distinction between worry and rumination, 
Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) note that the content of worry differs from that of 
rumination, in that worry tends to focus more on future threat, while rumination is more 
concerned with past failures and losses. It is uncertain as to whether the preoccupation 
in BDD more closely approximates worry, obsessional thoughts or rumination.
2.2) Metacognition
Wells (2000) acknowledges these differences between worry, obsessional thoughts and 
rumination, but is keen to emphasise that, ‘Whilst the content of the thought is 
undoubtedly important in determining the nature of psychological disturbance, how 
people think is an important dimension that has implications for psychological disorder 
and recovery’. Purdon and Clark (1999) emphasise further the limitations of traditional 
cognitive theory with its focus on the content of cognition. Papageorgiou and Wells 
(1999) note, ‘It is not only the content of thought but also the process and metacognitive 
dimensions of particular types of thinking that may be implicated in problem 
maintenance’. Furthermore, Purdon and Clark (1999) state that the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy may be enhanced through the teaching of strategies aiming to retrain 
metacognitive regulation and monitoring processes.
Flavell (1979) defines metacognition as, ‘any knowledge or cognitive process that is 
involved in the appraisal, monitoring or control of cognition’. He divides metacognition
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into 2 components: metacognitive knowledge (beliefs about factors affecting the course 
and outcome of cognitive enterprises) and metacognitive regulation (control processes). 
Consideration of these 2 aspects of how people think has certainly informed recent 
cognitive-behavioural models and interventions for a number of disorders, including 
OCD, GAD and depression. It is useful to outline existing research on cognitive 
processes and metacognition in the understanding and treatment of these related 
disorders, before considering the potential implications of such ideas for a cognitive- 
behavioural conceptualisation of BDD.
2.2.1) Metacognitive knowledge /  beliefs
A role for metacognitive beliefs and thought appraisals is posited by researchers in a 
number of disorders, including OCD, GAD and depression. Metacognitive beliefs 
include negative beliefs (about the potentially negative consequences of having 
particular thoughts and of not being able to control those thoughts, e.g. ‘If I think a 
certain thought, it will come true’ or ‘If I do not control my thoughts, I will go crazy’) 
and positive beliefs (about the advantages of engaging in particular cognitive processes, 
such as worry, e.g. ‘Worrying helps me solve problems4)
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2.2. l.i) OCD
Rachman and de Silva (1978) found preliminary evidence to suggest that approximately 
80 percent of the population experience cognitive intrusions and that the content of 
normal and abnormal intrusions is similar. They concluded from their research that the 
two types of intrusions differ in terms of frequency, duration and intensity. Purdon and 
Clark (1993) ask why normal thoughts become a major preoccupation for a minority of 
individuals and hypothesise that beliefs about thoughts might be influential. Salkovskis 
(1999), explaining his theory of OCD, posits that the difference between normal 
intrusive cognitions and obsessional intrusive cognitions lies ‘not in the occurrence or 
even the (un)controllability of the intrusions themselves, but rather in the interpretation 
made by obsessional patients of the occurrence and/or content of the intrusions’.
A number of studies lend support to the hypothesised importance of beliefs and 
appraisals in understanding the maintenance of OCD. Purdon and Clark (1993), for 
example, found evidence in a sample of 293 students to suggest that obsessional 
individuals hold dysfunctional beliefs regarding the need to control thoughts and posit 
that an inflated sense of responsibility plays a significant role in OCD. Freeston, 
Rheaume and Ladouceur (1996) propose 5 groupings of beliefs and appraisals, relevant 
to the understanding of OCD, based on clinical experience and research literature: 
overestimating the importance of thoughts and their derivatives; exaggerated 
responsibility for events beyond the control of the individual; the need to seek a perfect
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state of absolute certainty; overestimation of the probability and severity of the 
consequences of negative events; and beliefs that anxiety caused by thoughts is 
unacceptable or dangerous.
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) developed a questionnaire (the ‘Metacognitions 
Questionnaire’ (MCQ)) from transcripts of semi-structured interviews with students and 
cognitive therapy sessions for people with anxiety. The MCQ consists of 5 subscales 
designed to measure beliefs about worry and intrusions. The instrument has been shown 
to be psychometrically reliable and valid. The authors administered the MCQ along 
with other questionnaires to 104 students, in order to test the hypothesis that positive 
(e.g. the belief that thinking particular thoughts can help find solutions and avoid 
catastrophe) and negative (e.g. beliefs regarding particular thoughts being uncontrollable 
or dangerous and beliefs about responsibility, superstition and punishment) 
metacognitive beliefs would be positively associated with measures of proneness to 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Their predictions were confirmed.
In a study by Wells and Papageorgiou (1998), particular negative metacognitive beliefs 
(regarding both the uncontrollability of particular thoughts and the dangers associated 
with those thoughts) were found to be predictive of obsessional thoughts in 120 non- 
anxious participants. Positive metacognitive beliefs were shown to predict obsessional 
checking, while negative metacognitive beliefs regarding danger and lack of control 
were predictive of washing rituals. These associations remained significant after 
controlling for the overlap between worry and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. These
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findings indicate that particular metacognitive beliefs are associated with specific 
symptoms.
Emmelkamp and Aardema (1999) used questionnaires in a sample of 305 non-patients 
to investigate the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and specific obsessive- 
compulsive behaviours. They found that metacognitive beliefs regarding the fusion of 
thought and event (e.g. the belief that thinking about an event means it has happened or 
will happen) and beliefs about the consequences of having particular thoughts predict 
obsessional rumination, after depression is controlled for. They also found thought- 
event and thought-action fusion (e.g. the belief that thinking about doing something 
means one will perform that action) to be significantly predictive of compulsive 
checking.
On the basis of such findings and clinical experience, Wells (2000) posits 3 domains of 
metacognitive belief regarding obsessive thoughts that might be of relevance to 
understanding the maintenance of OCD: thought-event fusion (see above); thought- 
action fusion (see above); and thought-object fusion (e.g. the belief that objects can 
become contaminated with thoughts, feelings and memories). He notes that 
metacognitive beliefs regarding rituals and neutralising responses are also relevant. 
These include positive (e.g. the belief that the performing of rituals prevents unwanted 
events from occurring) and negative metacognitive beliefs (e.g. the belief that one could 
lose control or that one’s rituals could take over).
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While evidence certainly exists for the effectiveness of CBT for OCD, the number of 
people who fail to respond or relapse after treatment is noted in the draft NICE guideline 
for interventions for BDD and OCD (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2005). 
Wells (1997) emphasises the variability in the findings of outcome research on OCD 
and the absence of metacognitive elements from therapy programmes studied might help 
explain this variability. The need for systematic trials of metacognitive interventions for 
OCD is evident.
2.2.1.ii) GAD
Worry, like obsessions, has been found in both non-patient and clinical groups and the 
content of worry would seem to be similar in both groups. Craske, Rapee, Jackel and 
Barlow (1989), for example, found that the most common worry themes in both people 
with GAD and non-anxious control participants pertained to life circumstances. 
Turner, Beidel and Stanley (1992) note that cognitive processing variables, such as 
thought appraisals including perceptions of uncontrollability, might differentiate normal 
from pathological worry. The causes of the maintenance of worry remain somewhat 
elusive. Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky and DePree (1983), for example, question why 
worry maintains despite containing elements one would expect to result in extinction. 
Matthews (1990) also asks why worry persists, despite it being a negative experience 
associated with negative thoughts and images, loss of mental control and negative affect. 
Wells (1995) developed a metacognitive model of GAD, involving 2 levels of worry; 
so-called ‘Type I worry* (concerns about external daily events and non-cognitive
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internal events, such as bodily sensations) and ‘Type II worry’ (a meta-level of worry 
about the nature and occurrence of thoughts). He suggests that metacognitive beliefs 
(Type II worry) might maintain GAD.
The hypothesised role of Type II worry (metacognitive beliefs) in the maintenance of 
GAD finds support in numerous research studies. A questionnaire study by Borkovec et 
al. (1983), for example, provides evidence that ‘worriers’ can be distinguished from 
‘non-worriers’ by appraisals of uncontrollability of cognitive intrusions, once worrying 
is initiated. Craske et al. (1989) found that people with GAD and non-anxious control 
participants were differentiated by perceptions of reduced control on the part of the 
GAD group. Furthermore, Borkovec and Roemer (1995) found that people with GAD 
endorsed positive reasons for worrying more strongly than control participants.
Freeston, Rheaume, Letorte, Dugas and Ladouceur (1994) developed a questionnaire 
entitled ‘Why Worry?’ to investigate reasons for the maintenance of worry. They 
administered the questionnaire to 216 students, who were subsequently divided into 3 
groups: those not meeting criteria for GAD; those meeting somatic criteria for GAD; 
and those meeting somatic and cognitive criteria for GAD. Evidence was found to 
suggest that 2 types of belief might inadvertently perpetuate worry, but the associative 
rather than causal nature of the study findings should be noted. One group of beliefs 
centred around ideas that worrying can facilitate avoidance of negative outcomes and 
minimise the effects of negative events, by decreasing guilt and avoiding 
disappointment. A second group of beliefs pertained to the positive effects of worrying,
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including increasing control and finding solutions.
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) found a positive correlation between both positive 
and negative metacognitive beliefs and worry proneness and anxiety in 104 students1. A 
study by Wells and Papageorgiou (1998) of 120 community volunteers showed that 
particular negative (regarding uncontrollability and danger) and positive metacognitive 
beliefs were significant predictors of worry, after statistical controls for the overlap 
between worry and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Papageorgiou and Wells (1999) 
found evidence in a sample of 54 students that greater anxiety was significantly 
associated with greater metaworry. All 3 studies suggest that metacognitive beliefs are 
associated with worry and anxiety.
Wells and Carter (1999) found that so-called ‘Type II worry’ (metacognitive beliefs) is a 
stronger and more reliable predictor than ‘Type I worry’ of pathological worry in non­
patients. Wells (2000) mentions another unpublished study, in which people with GAD 
report significantly higher levels of negative metacognitive beliefs regarding worrying 
than people with panic disorder, social phobia or no history of any anxiety disorder. 
There was no significant difference with regard to positive metacognitive beliefs 
however.
1 See page 29 for further details of the study.
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Wells (1999) acknowledges that existing cognitive-behavioural interventions for GAD 
are effective, but notes the limitations of such approaches, specifically that only 50 
percent of patients show ‘high endstate functioning’. He feels that these limited effects 
might be explained in part by the absence of consideration of metacognition in such 
approaches. Wells (2000) states that single case evaluations demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a metacognitive approach to GAD, but there is clearly a need for more 
systematised research, including a comparison of standard CBT and metacognitive 
approaches.
2.2.1 .iii) Depression / Rumination
The question of why rumination persists remains somewhat challenging, given that a 
positive association has been evidenced between the number of ruminative responses 
engaged in and length of depressed mood episode (Noelen-Hoeksema, Morrow and 
Fredrickson, 1993). Furthermore, experimental and prospective studies have shown that 
rumination (compared to distraction) maintains and exacerbates both induced and 
naturally occurring depressed mood (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen- 
Hoeksema and Morrow, 1993). Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) posit a model of 
rumination and depression, in which positive metacognitive beliefs fuel the selection of 
rumination as a coping response to particular stressors. Once rumination has begun, 
negative metacognitive beliefs about ruminating become activated and this leads to the 
experience of depression.
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A number of research studies support the role of metacognitive beliefs in explaining the 
maintenance of rumination and distinguishing normal and pathological rumination. 
Papageorgiou and Wells (2004), for example, cite findings from an unpublished study, 
suggesting that pathological rumination is distinguished from normal rumination by 
process and metacognitive dimensions, rather than by content. Watkins and Baracaia 
(2001) noted the similarities between worry in GAD and rumination in depression and 
predicted that rumination might be associated with particular metacognitive beliefs. 
They found that 80 percent of their sample of 61 people who identified themselves as 
suffering from rumination reported at least 1 perceived benefit for rumination. They 
proceeded to find evidence that high ruminators held beliefs about the positive benefits 
of rumination significantly more strongly than low ruminators.
Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) interviewed 14 people with recurrent major depression 
and found that all participants reported both advantages (positive metacognitive beliefs) 
and disadvantages (negative metacognitive beliefs) regarding rumination. These 
included beliefs about the function of rumination as a coping strategy and beliefs 
regarding the uncontrollability, harm and interpersonal and social consequences of 
rumination. The findings from this study were used to develop 2 instruments: the 
Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS: Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001) and the 
Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale (NBRS: Papageorgiou, Wells and Meina, in 
preparation). Both the PBRS and the NBRS have been found to correlate significantly 
with rumination and depression in non-patients (Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001) and
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people with major depressive disorder (Papageorgiou et al., in preparation).
The above findings on the connection between metacognitive beliefs, rumination and 
depression would point towards the incorporation of a metacognitive focus into 
interventions for depression. McMillan and Fisher (2004), summarising reviews of 
interventions for depression, state that cognitive therapy is an, ‘efficacious treatment for 
mild to moderate depression’ and also has relapse prevention effects. They note, 
however, that between 25 and 50 percent of people with depression continue to relapse, 
nevertheless. Furthermore, Roth and Fonagy (1996) comment that a large proportion of 
people with depression fail to respond fully to CBT or relapse after treatment. 
McMillan and Fisher (2004) hypothesise that the incorporation of cognitive processes in 
these interventions might improve treatment outcomes. Wells and Papageorgiou (2004) 
also suggest that therapeutic advantage might be gained by focussing on the rumination 
process.
Teasdale (1999), discussing metacognitive approaches (specifically, so-called 
‘mindfulness’) to depressive rumination, notes that teaching people to relate to thoughts 
in a detached manner (as ‘events in the mind’) has a long history in Buddhism. 
Teasdale describes a group-based relapse prevention programme for people who have 
recovered from depression, the components of which are based on mindfulness 
principles. He cites studies providing preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of this 
approach for panic, GAD and psoriasis and also mentions unpublished data from a 
clinical trial which point towards the potential benefits of mindfulness training for
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depression. The details of the trial are not provided and there is clearly a need for 
further research in this area.
2.2.1 .iv) Hypochondriasis
Bouman and Meijer (1999) investigated whether hypochondriasis is characterised by 
general or content-specific metaworries. They administered the aforementioned MCQ 
and a hypochondriasis-specific measure of metacognition to 3 groups: people with 
hypochondriasis; matched healthy controls; and psychology students. Results showed 
that hypochondriasis was best predicted by negative metacognitive beliefs regarding 
danger and uncontrollability of thoughts about illness and cognitive self-consciousness. 
Wells (2000) encourages cautious interpretation of these findings owing to 
heterogeneity of the sample, but nonetheless, it would seem that the study provides at 
the very least preliminary evidence of the relevance of metacognitive beliefs to the 
maintenance of hypochondriasis. Focus on disorder-specific metacognitions would 
seem to be indicated for future research.
2.2.1 .v) Summary of research on metacognitive beliefs
In summary, existing research findings on OCD, GAD and depression suggest that there 
are differences between clinical and non-clinical groups, with respect to metacognitive 
beliefs. Preliminary evidence indicates the effectiveness of approaches focussing on 
metacognitive beliefs, but empirical trials are necessary.
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2.2.2) Metacognitive regulation (thought control strategies)
Rather like metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive strategies of thought control have been 
implicated in models of understanding the maintenance of a number of disorders, 
including OCD, GAD and depression. A number of studies suggest that attempted 
suppression of thoughts in non-clinical participants can inadvertently lead to an 
immediate or delayed increase in the frequency of those thoughts (e.g. Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter and White, 1987). Wells and Davies (1994) note the possibility that, 
‘some strategies, but not others, are counterproductive in their effects’, given that little is 
known regarding the techniques people use to suppress unwanted thoughts. They 
proceed to emphasise the necessity of exploring thought control attempts that ‘might be 
involved in the transformation of normal intrusive thoughts into pathological varieties’. 
Wells (2000) elaborates upon this theory, explaining that if thought control is used to 
avert some kind of catastrophe, then the non-occurrence thereof might be wrongly 
attributed to the use of the thought control strategy. Thought control is thereby 
negatively reinforced and no opportunity is given for disconfirmation of the underlying 
belief. Ladouceur et al. (2000) note that contemporary models of intrusive cognition, 
‘attribute an important role to what people do with their thoughts’, in terms of effortful 
cognitive strategies employed in response to thoughts.
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2.2.2A) OCD and GAD
Salkovskis (1999), writing about OCD, posits that metacognitive beliefs and 
interpretations regarding responsibility link cognitive intrusions to so-called neutralising 
behaviours (thought control strategies). He hypothesises that people not suffering from 
OCD seek to control their thoughts to a lesser degree, because lack of control is not 
associated with negative consequences. He adds that any attempt made by people with 
OCD to reduce the frequency of such intrusions not only contributes to the maintenance 
of negative beliefs, but also increases the likelihood of further intrusions, thereby raising 
the level of preoccupation.
Wells (1997) emphasises the role of thought control strategies in his metacognitive 
model of GAD (see above for more details). He suggests that negative appraisals of the 
consequences of prolonged worrying motivate attempts at not worrying, which 
inadvertently increase the frequency of the unwanted thoughts that trigger the worry. 
Beliefs regarding the uncontrollability of worry are thereby reinforced.
A number of studies on the use of thought control strategies in non-clinical participants 
have implications for the understanding of OCD and GAD. Freeston, Ladouceur, 
Thibodeau and Gagnon (1991), for example, administered questionnaires to 125 
students, in order to identify styles of response to intrusive cognitions and relate these 
styles to a number of thought dimensions. They found that 92 percent of participants
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reported employing effortful strategies in response to intrusive thoughts. Cluster and 
factor analyses identified 3 broad groups of strategies: minimum attention (involving 
self-reassurance or no further action); sustained attention (involving thinking the thought 
through and seeking reassurance with another person); and escape or avoidance 
(including thought replacement, removal of the thought by a mental or physical action, 
distraction with surroundings or activities and thought stopping). The dominant style of 
response varied; 26 percent of participants reported a dominant style of minimum 
attention, 34 percent reported sustained attention and 40 percent reported escape or 
avoidance. Compared with the ‘minimum attention’ group, the ‘sustained attention’ and 
‘escape/avoidance’ groups were found to be significantly more anxious and reported 
that the intrusive cognitions were more difficult to remove. Furthermore, participants 
who used escape or avoidance as a dominant strategy reported more sadness, worry, 
guilt and disapproval than participants using ‘minimum attention’ strategies. Within- 
participant analyses revealed that, compared to minimum attention strategies, sustained 
attention strategies were associated with significantly more varied and more frequently 
triggered thoughts. Escape/avoidance strategies were reported to be significantly less 
effective at removing thoughts and associated discomfort, than minimal attention 
strategies.
Freeston and Ladouceur (1993) administered a questionnaire to 534 hospital out-patients 
and escorts. They aimed to replicate and extend an earlier study (Freeston et al., 1991), 
which related dimensions of cognitive intrusions to dominant response style. They 
divided participants into 4 groups according to 2 dimensions of thought appraisal
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(probability of the thought coming true (high or low) and disapproval of the thought 
(high or low)). Evidence was found that the dominant strategy was related to appraisals 
of probability and disapproval. Specifically, high probability and low disapproval 
appraisals were associated with greater use of ‘sustained attention’ strategies, while low 
probability and high disapproval appraisals were associated with greater use of 
‘escape/avoidance’ strategies. The authors emphasise that these findings may well have 
implications for conceptualisations of OCD and GAD.
Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher and Blais (1995) conducted structured interviews with 
53 non-clinical participants, in order to explore whether situation, thought-related or 
emotional factors were related to the use of particular strategies and their effectiveness. 
Strategies used with each person’s most frequent intrusive thought were explored and 
participants identified a mean of 8 different strategies. Seven major types of strategy 
were elicited from the reported repertoires: physical action, thought replacement, 
analysing the thought, talking to others, thought stopping, trying to convince oneself that 
the thought is of little importance and doing nothing. Evidence was found that the 
selection of specific strategies was related to situational factors, sequences of strategies, 
and thought intensity and appraisal. No specific strategy was significantly more or less 
efficient than any other and the mean ratings of the efficiency of the 7 major strategy 
types all fell between 2.0 and 2.7, on a 5-point likert scale (0 = ‘not at all efficient’, 4 = 
‘extremely efficient’). Clinical participants were not included in the study, but the 
authors emphasise the potential importance of the findings to understanding and treating 
disorders such as OCD, especially given the aforementioned universality of intrusive
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thoughts (see Freeston et al., 1991).
Several studies have explored thought control strategies in clinical participants and 
others have compared the strategies of clinical and non-clinical participants. Freeston 
and Ladouceur (1997), for example, used structured interviews to explore the strategy 
repertoires of 29 people with OCD. Each person’s most frequent thought was identified 
and the thought was then evaluated on a number of different dimensions. The repertoire 
of strategies used with that thought was then assessed according to context, intensity of 
thought, typical mood state when strategy was used, mood intensity and immediate 
efficiency of strategy. Participants reported between 6 and 18 different strategies, which 
were associated with low to moderate mean efficacy in terms of successful removal of 
the thought. No control group was included in the study, limiting interpretation of the 
findings.
Rachman and De Silva (1977) compared 8 people with OCD with 124 healthy control 
participants and found preliminary evidence to suggest that while normal and abnormal 
obsessions seem to be similar in content, abnormal obsessions are associated with more 
urges to neutralise. The difference in sample size and resultant reporting of raw scores 
as opposed to statistical calculations make the reliability of these findings somewhat 
questionable, but nonetheless worthy of mention.
Wells and Davies (1994) developed the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ)X to 
2 See Appendix 4 for details o f sub-scale items
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assess individuals’ use of 5 categories of thought control strategy: distraction, 
punishment, re-appraisal, social control and worry. They administered the TCQ to a 
sample of 251 non-clinical participants and found significant associations between 
punishment and worry subscales and measures of emotional vulnerability. Amir, 
Cashman and Foa (1997) administered the TCQ to 55 people with OCD and 27 non- 
clinical participants and found evidence to suggest that people with OCD employ 
strategies involving punishment, reappraisal and social control more frequently than 
non-clinical control participants. Furthermore, non-clinical participants used distraction 
strategies more frequently than people with OCD.
Ladouceur et al. (2000) administered structured interviews to 38 people with OCD, 38 
people with another anxiety disorder (mainly GAD) and 19 non-clinical participants. 
The interview explored strategies employed in response to each person’s most frequent 
intrusive thought, asking questions regarding context, sequence, probability of the 
thought coming true in real life, intrusion intensity, mood state when the thought 
occurred, mood intensity, immediate efficiency of strategy in removing the thought or 
decreasing discomfort, number of times strategy was repeated and length of time 
strategy was used for. Compared to non-clinical participants, people with OCD or 
another anxiety disorder reported significantly more strategies, significantly more 
different types of strategy and significantly greater perseverance of strategy use. People 
with OCD were found to be more likely to engage in both overt and covert compulsions 
and less likely to engage in distracting activities and thought replacement than 
participants in the anxiety disorder and non-clinical groups. The 2 clinical groups
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reported significantly lower efficiency of strategies than participants in the non-clinical 
group. There was no difference in strategy efficiency between the 2 clinical groups, 
indicating that difficulty in controlling intrusive thoughts may be common to different 
types of anxiety disorders. Furthermore, it was found that the people with OCD 
reported a significantly higher proportion of strategies that were linked to the content of 
the original thought, when compared to the anxiety disorder and non-clinical groups. 
This indicates that thought-strategy linkage in terms of content might be specific to 
OCD and not other anxiety disorders.
2.2.2.ii) Rumination / Depression
A number of studies have evidenced a relationship between frequency of negative 
thoughts and thought suppression. Wegner (1994), for example, proposes a theory, 
according to which thought suppression involves both a distraction and a thought 
monitoring process. While the processes are complementary, Enslave (1994) notes that 
the monitoring process can undermine the suppression process, inadvertently increasing 
the frequency and strength of negative thoughts. Support for this theory comes from 
studies evidencing an association between thought suppression and depressed mood 
(e.g. Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz and Sweatt, 2001).
Wenzlaff, Wegner and Roper (1988) found evidence to suggest that the efficacy of 
thought suppression decreases if the type of distraction is emotionally related to the 
original negative thought. They divided participants into dysphoric and non-dysphoric
44
groups and found that dysphoric participants tended to distract themselves with other 
negative thoughts, while dysphoric participants selected distracting thoughts of a 
positive nature. The suppression attempts of the non-dysphoric participants were less 
effective.
Reynolds and Brewin (1998) interviewed 3 groups of participants: people with major 
depression; people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and non-clinical 
participants. The interview focussed on intrusive cognitions, emotional responses and 
the use and effectiveness of coping strategies. The strategies enquired about included 
suppression, neutralising, distraction by engaging in another task, thinking through, 
talking about the intrusions, and writing about the intrusions. The authors found that a 
variety of coping strategies were used by all 3 groups of participants. People with 
depression or PTSD reported significantly higher use of strategies involving distraction 
and suppression than the control group.
Reynolds and Wells (1999) administered the TCQ to people with depression and PTSD 
and found evidence that thought control strategies involving distraction, punishment and 
reappraisal were predictive of depression scores in depressed patients, while use of 
distraction predicted intrusion scores in people with PTSD.
2.2.2.iii) Summary
In summary, findings from research on metacognitive strategy use suggest that people
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with OCD, GAD (or other anxiety disorders), depression and non-clinical participants 
select strategies from a common pool. Evidence suggests, however, that certain 
strategies may be more typical of clinical groups than non-clinical groups and that 
particular strategies may be more counterproductive than others. Further research is 
clearly needed.
23) Cognitive processes and metacognition in BDD
Rather like OCD, GAD, depression and hypochondriasis, BDD is characterised by 
persistent, recurrent thoughts. As discussed above, a number of research studies have 
demonstrated that the content of the thoughts characterising disorders, such as OCD, 
GAD and depression, differs little from that of non-pathological thoughts. Phillips 
(1986) points out that the concerns of people with BDD seem to ressemble ’normal 
concerns’ in terms of their content. She posits that the difference between the two may 
be, ‘largely a matter of degree’ (BDD involving greater preoccupation, distress and 
impairment). Furthermore, Osman, Cooper, Hackman and Veale (2004) compared 18 
people with BDD and 18 non-clinical control participants and found evidence that the 
two groups were equally likely to experience spontaneous images of their appearance. 
Concern about appearance would certainly seem to be a widespread phenomenon, as 
evidenced in a study by Cash, Winstead and Janda (1986), who surveyed 2,000 people 
and found that only 18 percent of the men and 7 percent of the women had little concern 
about their appearance. In light of these findings, it is likely that the content of 
cognitions in BDD is similar to that of people with normal concerns about appearance.
46
This hypothesis demands further investigation, however.
The answer to the question of why such thoughts and images develop into a 
preoccupation for people with BDD (and why the preoccupation does not simply 
extinguish because of its association with negative affect) remains somewhat elusive. 
With respect to OCD, GAD and depression, questions regarding the similarities in terms 
of content between pathological and non-pathological cognitions and the persistence of 
cognitions gave rise to exploration of metacognitive aspects of these disorders. 
Metacognition is given little mention in the literature on BDD, however. Veale and 
Riley (2001) note that mirror-gazing sequences would seem to be designed ‘to prevent 
feared outcomes’, but do not elaborate upon what these feared outcomes and 
metacognitive beliefs might be. Veale (2004) mentions that the cognitive processes 
contributing to the preoccupation might well include metacognitions and proceeds to 
emphasise the need for research on this aspect of BDD
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3) Conclusions and Suggestions for Fu ture  Research
It has become clear from this review that psychologically-oriented research on BDD is 
in its infancy. The relative abundance of literature on diagnostic features, psychiatric 
classification, prevalence and co-morbidity indicates a predominance of psychiatric 
perspectives. Furthermore, many of the findings, particularly on classification are 
somewhat contradictory. While further research on prevalence and co-morbidity in 
BDD might well be useful, the need for psychological research seems rather more 
pressing.
Existing cognitive-behavioural models of BDD are convincing (e.g. Veale, 2004), but 
further research on the various components and maintenance mechanisms within these 
models is required. As Veale (2004) points out, preliminary research evidence supports 
the inclusion of overt safety-behaviours (e.g. checking one’s appearance in mirrors) and 
associated negative affect in such models. Research on the cognitive components of 
proposed models, such as rumination and metacognition, is distinctly lacking, however.
A number of research trials have been conducted on CBT for BDD, but the majority of 
these had small samples and no follow-up. The outcome literature is also rather 
inconsistent, in terms of therapy format and length, therapy components and inclusion 
and exclusion criteria. This renders comparison across studies rather difficult and future 
outcome research should definitely aim for consistency in this respect.
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Research on cognitive-behavioural therapy for BDD and other disorders, such as OCD, 
GAD and depression, has revealed that a proportion of participants either fail to respond 
or relapse following therapy. This fact has given impetus to research on cognitive 
processes and metacognition in OCD, GAD and depression. Research to date indicates 
that thought content is broadly similar in people with such disorders and their non- 
clinical counterparts. Research on metacognitive beliefs and the use of metacognitive 
strategies of thought control suggests that there are significant differences between 
clinical and non-clinical groups in OCD, GAD and depression, which may have 
implications for understanding and treating these disorders.
There is clearly a lack of research on cognitive processes and metacognition in BDD. 
Furthermore, the findings of such research on other disorders are encouraging, 
indicating that research on cognitive and metacognitive aspects of BDD might well be 
informative, for psychological models and interventions for this disorder.
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EMPIRICAL PAPER
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ABSTRACT
Cognitive-behavioural models of Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) posit that 
increased attention on a distorted internal body image, along with beliefs, values and 
rules about the importance of appearance, leads to negative appraisal of that image. 
However, little is known about the content and metacognitive aspects of the 
preoccupation that defines the disorder.
The objective of the current study was to explore preoccupation in BDD, by 
investigating the content of thoughts about appearance and metacognition in 22 people 
meeting DSM-IV criteria for BDD and 22 people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding 
appearance. A structured interview and questionnaires were used to investigate the 
content of the preoccupation and 2 aspects of metacognition (metacognitive beliefs and 
cognitive strategies employed in an attempt to control thoughts about appearance). 
Quantitative analyses were undertaken to test specific hypotheses and descriptive data 
were presented to complement these analyses.
The content of thoughts about appearance was found to be broadly similar in the 2 
groups, but participants with BDD were found to endorse negative metacognitive beliefs 
significantly more strongly, to employ thought control strategies involving punishment 
significantly more frequently and to report significantly lower effectiveness of the 2 
most frequently employed thought control strategies.
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These findings require replication, but have definite implications for cognitive- 
behavioural models and interventions for BDD.
68
1) Introduction
1.1) Body Dysmorphic Disorder
1.1.1) Diagnostic Criteria and Clinical Features
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) is defined in the DSM-IV as a ‘preoccupation with 
an imagined defect in appearance. If a slight physical anomaly is present, the person’s 
concern is markedly excessive’. In order to fulfil diagnostic criteria, the preoccupation 
must be associated with ‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, APA, 1994). Veale (2004) describes the principal clinical characteristics of 
BDD: prolonged gazing in mirrors; comparing one’s appearance to that of others; 
camouflaging the perceived defect (with make-up, for example); picking the skin; 
seeking reassurance from others; and avoidance of social situations and intimacy.
1.1.2) Prevalence
Estimates of the prevalence of BDD vary and Oosthuizen, Lambert and Castle (1998) 
emphasise that any statements regarding prevalence should be considered speculative at 
this stage. Otto, Wilhelm, Cohen and Harlow (2001) suggest a prevalence of 0.7 percent 
in the general population, while rates of BDD in people seeking cosmetic surgery have 
been estimated at 6 percent (Altamura, Paluello, Mundo, Medda and Mannu, 2001).
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Phillips and Dufresne (2000) describe a study in which 11.9 percent of 268 people 
presenting for dermatological treatment met diagnostic criteria for BDD. The variation 
has been attributed to referral bias and research inclusion criteria (Phillips and Diaz, 
1997), under-diagnosis owing to shame and secrecy (Neziroglu and Yaryura-Tobias, 
1997), the difficulties in engaging and therefore assessing people with BDD (Veale et 
al., 1996) and the often indistinct boundary between BDD and normal concerns 
(Phillips, 1991). Studies reporting gender differences in the prevalence of BDD are 
somewhat contradictory (e.g. Hollander, Cohen and Simeon, 1993; Rosen, Reiter and 
Orosan, 1995; Phillips, 1998). Perugi et al. (1997) remark that, ‘where BDD is the 
primary presenting problem, it is almost never found without co-morbidity. Veale 
(2004), Cororve and Gleaves (2001) and Gunstad and Phillips (2003) cite numerous 
studies evidencing co-morbidity with depression (up to 80 percent), social phobia (38 
percent), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (8 to 37 percent), eating disorders (10 to 
20 percent) and personality disorders (57 to 100 percent).
1.1.3) Aetiology
Phillips (1991) describes theories regarding the aetiology of BDD, ranging from the 
conceptualisation of BDD as a defence mechanism to hypotheses about neurotransmitter 
dysfunction. Cororve and Gleaves (2001) note that cognitive-behavioural models of 
BDD have received most attention and empirical support.
Rosen et al. (1995), for example, developed a cognitive-behavioural model of BDD,
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positing that appearance preoccupations begin in adolescence (with heightened attention 
from others to bodily changes) and trigger dysfunctional assumptions regarding the 
normality of appearance. These assumptions affect personality and self-esteem. 
Negative self-statements regarding appearance become automatic and entrenched in the 
person’s belief system, avoidance prevents habituation to one’s own appearance, and 
compulsive behaviours serve to increase longer-term anxiety.
Veale et al. (1996) suggest that core beliefs regarding rejection and the importance of 
appearance develop from biological predisposition, early childhood experiences and 
cultural factors. The discrepancy between perceived body image and perfectionist ideals 
is magnified by beliefs about the importance of appearance. Biased interpretations of 
incoming information ensue. The heightened focus on a distorted internal body image 
leads to assumptions that others hold a similar view of the person’s appearance. As a 
result, the person resorts to behaviours such as avoidance and camouflage, which serve 
to reinforce the dysfunctional beliefs and selective attention.
Veale (2004) elaborates this cognitive-behavioural model further, hypothesising that 
people with BDD view themselves as aesthetic objects, rather like people with social 
phobia are thought to regard themselves to be social objects. He posits that a trigger 
(the sight of oneself in a mirror, for example) activates a distorted internal body image. 
Excessive self-focussed attention increases awareness and distortion of the image and, 
when combined with existing values, beliefs and rules regarding the importance of 
appearance, contributes to negative appraisal of the distorted image. The negative
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appraisal increases the self-focussed attention on the image and also leads to mood 
changes, safety behaviours and rumination, all of which serve to reinforce the self­
focussed attention and negative appraisal of the image.
1.1.4) Interventions
Interventions for BDD include cosmetic surgery, dermatological treatments, medication 
and cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). The literature on cosmetic surgery for people 
with BDD is littered with anecdotes of poor outcomes and cases where discontent has 
escalated as far as violence towards the surgeon (see Phillips, Grant, Sinisalchi and 
Albertini, 2001). Phillips et al. (2001) reviewed surgical and non-psychiatric treatments 
and found that just 7.3 percent of treatments led to both a decrease in concern with the 
treated body part and overall improvement in BDD symptomatology. Veale et al. 
(1996) found that 81 percent of people with BDD who had undergone non-psychiatric 
intervention for BDD were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. In terms of 
medication, Cororve and Gleaves (2001) note that there is good evidence for the 
prescribing of serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRIs), particularly fluvoxamine and 
clomipramine (Phillips and Dufresne, 2000).
Cororve and Gleaves (2001) reviewed cognitive-behavioural interventions for people 
with BDD and concluded that the most effective involved exposure (both in vivo and 
imaginal exposure to hierarchies of body parts or avoided situations), response 
prevention and cognitive restructuring. Many of the programmes reviewed also
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included self-monitoring, skills training, psychoeducation and reverse role-play (e.g. 
Wilhelm, Otto, Lohr & Deckersbach, 1999; Neziroglu, McKay, Todaro and Yagura- 
Tobias, 1996; Veale et al., 1996; and Rosen et al., 1995).
Cororve and Gleaves (2001) acknowledge that large effect sizes have been found in a 
number of these uncontrolled and controlled studies. Weaknesses of studies to date 
include high attrition (Wilhelm et al. 1999), lack of control group (Wilhelm et al., 1999; 
Nezirgolu et al., 1996), lack of follow-up (Wilhelm et al., 1999; Neziroglu et al., 1996; 
Veale et al., 1996), lack of comparison with other interventions (Wilhelm et al., 1999; 
Neziroglu et al., 1996; Veale et al., 1996; Rosen et al., 1995) and small sample sizes 
(Wilhelm et al., 1999; Neziroglu et al., 1996; Veale et al., 1996). Cororve and Gleaves 
(2001) note the inconsistencies in the literature, including number of sessions per week, 
length of treatment and inclusion and exclusion criteria, rendering comparisons across 
studies somewhat problematic. Furthermore, they emphasise the significant numbers of 
sufferers who either fail to respond to treatment or continue to experience symptoms 
after treatment. In spite of the methodological weaknesses in the research, the draft 
NICE guideline for interventions for OCD and BDD suggests that people with milder 
BDD should be treated with low intensity CBT (including exposure and response 
prevention), people with moderate to severe impairment should receive either a course 
of SRIs or high intensity CBT, and those with severe impairment should be offered a 
combination of CBT and SRIs (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2005).
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1.1.5) Summary
It would seem that psychological perspectives are somewhat lacking in the research 
literature on BDD to date. While psychiatrically-oriented research on issues such as 
classification and co-morbidity are useful, the often contradictory nature of existing 
papers is confusing. In terms of psychological research, existing cognitive-behavioural 
models are certainly convincing, but there is a particular need for validating research on 
cognitive process aspects of those models (see Veale, 2004).
1.2) Cognitive processes and metacognition
While a number of the cognitive-behavioural interventions for BDD in the 
aforementioned outcome studies target thoughts and beliefs regarding appearance, it is 
of interest that none to date has focussed specifically on the cognitive processes 
involved in the BDD preoccupation and the so-called ‘meta’ level of cognition 
(knowledge, beliefs, processes and strategies that appraise, monitor or control cognition 
(see Wells, 2000)). Lack of consideration of metacognition is posited by some authors 
(e.g. Purdon and Clark, 1999) as a possible explanation of why significant numbers of 
people fail to respond to or relapse following CBT for other psychological disorders. It 
is useful to review research on cognitive processes and metacognition in other disorders, 
before considering the possible application of this line of enquiry to BDD.
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1.2.1) Cognitive Processes
With regard to cognitive process, distinctions have been made in the literature between 
worry, obsessional thoughts and rumination. Studies aiming to differentiate between 
OCD and GAD (e.g. Wells and Morrison, 1994; Tallis and De Silva, 1992; Turner, 
Beidel and Stanley, 1992) conclude that worry and obsessional thoughts are similar in 
many ways, in that they are repetitive, distressing and difficult to control. Wells and 
Morrison (1994) add, however, that worry is more verbal, less image-based, more 
realistic, more voluntary and longer lasting than obsessional thoughts. Papageorgiou 
and Wells (2004) note that the content of worry differs from that of rumination, in that 
worry tends to focus more on future threat, while rumination is more concerned with 
past failures and losses. It is uncertain as to whether the preoccupation in BDD more 
closely approximates worry, obsessional thoughts or rumination.
1.2.2) Metacognition
Wells (2000) acknowledges these differences between worry, obsessional thoughts and 
rumination, but is keen to emphasise that, ‘Whilst the content of the thought is 
undoubtedly important in determining the nature of psychological disturbance, how 
people think is an important dimension that has implications for psychological disorder 
and recovery’. Papageorgiou and Wells (1999) note, ‘It is not only the content of 
thought but also the process and metacognitive dimensions of particular types of
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thinking that may be implicated in problem maintenance’. Furthermore, Purdon and 
Clark (1999) hypothesise that the effectiveness of cognitive therapy may be enhanced 
through the teaching of strategies aiming to retrain metacognitive regulation and 
monitoring processes.
Flavell (1979) defines metacognition as, ‘any knowledge or cognitive process that is 
involved in the appraisal, monitoring or control of cognition’. He divides metacognition 
into 2 components: metacognitive knowledge (beliefs about factors affecting the course 
and outcome of cognitive enterprises) and metacognitive regulation (control processes). 
Consideration of these 2 aspects of how people think has certainly informed recent 
cognitive-behavioural models and interventions for a number of disorders, including 
OCD, Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and depression.
1.2.2.i) Metacognitive beliefs
A role for metacognitive beliefs and thought appraisals is posited by researchers in a 
number of disorders, including OCD, GAD and depression. Metacognitive beliefs can 
be both negative (about the potentially negative consequences of having particular 
thoughts and of not being able to control those thoughts, e.g. ‘If I think a certain 
thought, it will come true’ or ‘If I do not control my thoughts, I will go crazy’) and 
positive (about the advantages of engaging in particular cognitive processes, such as 
worry, e.g. ‘Worrying helps me solve problems4)
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1.2.2.i.a) OCD
Rachman and De Silva (1978) found preliminary evidence to suggest that approximately 
80 percent of the population experience cognitive intrusions, in the form of obsessions 
and that the content of normal and abnormal obsessions is similar. Salkovskis (1999), 
explaining his theory of OCD, posits that the difference between normal intrusive 
cognitions and obsessional intrusive cognitions lies ‘...in the interpretation made by 
obsessional patients of the occurrence and/or content of the intrusions’. A number of 
studies lend support to the hypothesised importance of beliefs and appraisals in 
understanding the maintenance of OCD (e.g. Purdon and Clark, 1993; Freeston, 
Rheaume and Ladouceur, 1996; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997; Wells and 
Papageorgiou, 1998; and Emmelkamp and Aardema, 1999). While evidence certainly 
exists for the effectiveness of CBT for OCD, the number of people who fail to respond 
or relapse after treatment is noted in the draft NICE guideline for interventions for BDD 
and OCD (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2005). Wells (1997) emphasises 
the variability in the findings of outcome research on OCD. The absence of 
metacognitive elements from therapy programmes studied might help explain this 
variability. The need for systematic trials of metacognitive interventions for OCD is 
evident.
1.2.2.i.b)GAD/Worry
Worry, like obsessions, has been found in both non-patient and clinical groups and the
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content of worry would seem to be similar in both groups (see Craske, Rapee, Jackel 
and Barlow, 1989). The causes of the maintenance of worry remain somewhat elusive, 
given the associated negative affect which one would expect to result in extinction (see 
Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky and DePree, 1983). Wells (1995) developed a 
metacognitive model of GAD, involving 2 levels of worry; so-called ‘Type I worry’ 
(concerns about external daily events and non-cognitive internal events, such as bodily 
sensations) and ‘Type II worry’ (a meta-level of worry about the nature and occurrence 
of thoughts). He suggests that metacognitive beliefs (Type II worry) might maintain 
GAD. The hypothesised role of Type II worry (metacognitive beliefs) in the 
maintenance of GAD finds support in numerous research studies (e.g. Borkovec et al., 
1983; Craske et al., 1989; Borkovec and Roemer, 1995; Freeston, Rheaume, Letorte, 
Dugas and Ladouceur, 1994; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997; Wells and 
Papageorgiou, 1998; Papageorgiou and Wells, 1999; and Wells and Carter, 1999)
Wells (1999) acknowledges that existing cognitive-behavioural interventions for GAD 
are effective, but notes the limitations of such approaches, specifically that only 50 
percent of patients show ‘high endstate functioning’. He feels that these limited effects 
might be explained in part by the absence of consideration of metacognition in such 
approaches. Wells (2000) states that single case evaluations demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a metacognitive approach to GAD, but there is clearly a need for more 
systematised research, including a comparison of standard CBT and metacognitive 
approaches.
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1.2.2.i.c) Depression / Rumination
The question of why rumination persists remains somewhat challenging, given that a 
positive association has been evidenced between the number of ruminative responses 
engaged in and length of depressed mood episode (Noelen-Hoeksema, Morrow and 
Fredrickson, 1993). Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) posit a model of rumination and 
depression, in which positive metacognitive beliefs fuel the selection of rumination as a 
coping response to particular stressors. Once rumination has begun, negative 
metacognitive beliefs about ruminating become activated and this leads to the 
experience of depression.
A number of research studies support the role of metacognitive beliefs in explaining the 
maintenance of rumination and distinguishing normal and pathological rumination (e.g. 
Papageorgiou and Wells, 2004; Watkins and Baracaia, 2001; Papageorgiou and Wells, 
2001). These findings would point towards the incorporation of a metacognitive focus 
into interventions for depression. Roth and Fonagy (1996) comment that a large 
proportion of people with depression fail to respond fully to CBT or relapse after 
treatment. McMillan and Fisher (2004) hypothesise that the consideration of cognitive 
processes in CBT interventions for depression might improve treatment outcomes and 
Wells and Papaeorgiou (2004) suggest that therapeutic advantage might be gained by 
focussing on the rumination process. There is clearly a need for further research in this 
area.
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1.2.2.ii) Metacognitive regulation (thought control strategies)
Rather like metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive strategies of thought control have been 
implicated in models of understanding the maintenance of a number of disorders, 
including OCD, GAD and depression. A number of studies suggest that attempted 
suppression of thoughts in non-clinical participants can inadvertently lead to an 
immediate or delayed increase in the frequency of those thoughts (e.g. Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter and White, 1987). Ladouceur et al. (2000) note that contemporary 
models of intrusive cognition, ‘attribute an important role to what people do with their 
thoughts’, in terms of effortful cognitive strategies employed in response to thoughts. 
Wells and Davies (1994) note the possibility that, ‘some strategies, but not others, are 
counterproductive in their effects’ and emphasise the necessity of exploring thought 
control attempts that ‘might be involved in the transformation of normal intrusive 
thoughts into pathological varieties’. It is possible that thought control attempts, 
involving the avoidance of particular thoughts, inevitably reduce exposure to those 
thoughts and make extinction far less likely (see Matthews, 1990). Wells (2000) posits 
that if thought control is used to avert some kind of catastrophe, then the non-occurrence 
of this catastrophe might be wrongly attributed to the use of the thought control strategy. 
Thought control is thereby negatively reinforced and no opportunity is given for 
disconfirmation of the underlying belief.
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1.2.2.ii.a) OCD and GAD
Salkovskis (1999), writing about OCD, hypothesises that people not suffering from 
OCD seek to control their thoughts to a lesser degree, because lack of control is not 
associated with negative consequences. He adds that any attempt made by people with 
OCD to reduce the frequency of such intrusions not only contributes to the maintenance 
of negative beliefs, but also increases the likelihood of further intrusions, thereby raising 
the level of preoccupation. Wells (1997), in his metacognitive model of GAD (see 
above for more details), suggests that negative appraisals of the consequences of 
prolonged worrying motivate attempts at not worrying, which inadvertently increase the 
frequency of the unwanted thoughts that trigger the worry.
A number of studies on the use of thought control strategies in non-clinical participants 
have implications for the understanding of OCD and GAD. Freeston, Ladouceur, 
Thibodeau and Gagnon (1991) found that 92 percent of non-clinical participants 
reported employing effortful strategies in response to intrusive thoughts. They divided 
participants into 3 groups according to their dominant strategy: minimum attention; 
sustained attention; and escape/avoidance. Compared to people whose dominant strategy 
involved paying minimum attention to the thought, people whose dominant strategy 
involved either sustained attention to the thought or escape/avoidance from the thought 
were found to be significantly more anxious and reported that the intrusive cognitions 
were significantly more difficult to remove. Furthermore, participants whose dominant 
strategy involved escape/avoidance reported more sadness, worry, guilt and disapproval
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than participants using minimum attention strategies. Within-participant analyses 
revealed that, compared to minimum attention strategies, sustained attention strategies 
were associated with significantly more varied and more frequently triggered thoughts. 
Escape/avoidance strategies were reported to be significantly less effective at removing 
thoughts and associated discomfort, than minimal attention strategies.
Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher and Blais (1995) elicited 7 major strategy types from 
semi-structured interviews with non-clinical participants: physical action, thought 
replacement, analysing the thought, talking to others, thought stopping, trying to 
convince oneself that the thought is of little importance and doing nothing. Evidence 
was found that the selection of specific strategies was related to situational factors, 
sequences of strategies, and thought intensity and appraisal.
Several studies have explored thought control strategies in clinical participants and 
others have compared the strategies of clinical and non-clinical participants. Freeston 
and Ladouceur (1997) used structured interviews to explore the strategy repertoires of 
people with OCD. Participants reported between 6 and 18 different strategies, which 
were associated with low to moderate mean efficacy in terms of successful removal of 
the thought. Rachman and De Silva (1977) compared people with OCD with healthy 
control participants and found preliminary evidence to suggest that while normal and 
abnormal obsessions seem to be similar in content, abnormal obsessions are associated 
with more urges to neutralise. Wells and Davies (1994) developed the Thought Control 
Questionnaire (TCQ) to assess individuals’ use of 5 categories of thought control
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strategy: distraction, punishment, re-appraisal, social control and worry. They found a 
number of significant associations between particular strategy types (worry and 
punishment) and measures of emotional vulnerability in non-clinical participants. 
Evidence has also been found to suggest that people with OCD employ strategies 
involving punishment, reappraisal and social control more frequently than non-clinical 
control participants, while non-clinical participants used distraction strategies more 
frequently than people with OCD (Amir, Cashman and Foa, 1997). Ladouceur et al. 
(2000) administered structured interviews and found that people with OCD or another 
anxiety disorder reported significantly more strategies, significantly more different types 
of strategy and significantly greater perseverance of strategy use than non-clinical 
participants. People with OCD were found to be more likely to engage in both overt and 
covert compulsions and less likely to engage in distracting activities and thought 
replacement than participants in the anxiety disorder and non-clinical groups. The 2 
clinical groups reported significantly lower efficiency of strategies than participants in 
the non-clinical group.
1.2.2.ii.b) Depression / Rumination
A number of studies have evidenced a relationship between thought suppression and 
depressed mood (e.g. Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz and Sweatt, 2001), indicating that 
thought suppression can be counterproductive. Reynolds and Brewin (1998) 
interviewed people with major depression and non-clinical participants. The authors 
found that people with depression reported significantly higher use of strategies
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involving distraction and suppression than the control group. Reynolds and Wells 
(1999) administered the TCQ to people with depression and found evidence that thought 
control strategies involving distraction, punishment and reappraisal were predictive of 
depression scores.
1.2.3 Summary
It would seem that pathological thoughts are broadly similar to non-pathological 
thoughts in OCD, GAD and depression. Existing research findings on OCD, GAD and 
depression suggest that there are differences between clinical and non-clinical groups, 
with respect to metacognitive beliefs. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that 
clinical and non-clinical participants select strategies from a common pool, but that 
certain strategies may be more typical of clinical groups and that certain strategies may 
be more counterproductive than others. Preliminary evidence indicates the effectiveness 
of approaches focussing on metacognitive beliefs, but empirical trials are necessary.
13) Cognitive processes and metacognition in BDD
Rather like OCD, GAD and depression, BDD is characterised by persistent, recurrent 
thoughts. As discussed above, a number of research studies have demonstrated that the 
content of the thoughts characterising OCD, GAD and depression, differs little from that 
of non-pathological thoughts. Concern about appearance would certainly seem to be a 
widespread phenomenon (see Cash, Winstead and Janda, 1986). Phillips (1986) points
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out that the concerns of people with BDD seem to resemble ‘normal concerns’ in terms 
of content. Furthermore, Osman, Cooper, Hackman and Veale (2004) found evidence 
that people with BDD and non-clinical participants were equally likely to experience 
spontaneous images regarding their appearance. In light of these findings, it is probable 
that the content of cognitions in BDD is similar to that of people with normal concerns 
about appearance. This hypothesis demands empirical investigation, however.
The answer to the question of why such thoughts and images develop into a 
preoccupation for people with BDD (and why that preoccupation does not simply 
extinguish because of associated negative affect) remains somewhat elusive. Questions 
regarding the persistence of unwanted cognitions in OCD, GAD and depression gave 
rise to the exploration of metacognitive aspects of these disorders, the results of which 
have been highly informative. Metacognition is given little mention in the literature on 
BDD, however. Veale and Riley (2001) note that mirror-gazing sequences would seem 
to be designed ‘to prevent feared outcomes’, but do not elaborate upon what these feared 
outcomes and metacognitive beliefs might be. Veale (2004) states that the cognitive 
processes contributing to the preoccupation might include metacognitions, and 
emphasises the need for research on this aspect of BDD. It is likely that there would be 
differences between people with BDD and non-clinical participants, in terms of strength 
of metacognitive beliefs and use of metacognitive strategies of thought control.
In summary, research on cognitive processes and metacognition in BDD is clearly 
lacking, while such research on other disorders has been encouraging and informative.
85
Therefore, it seems likely that empirical research on thought content, cognitive 
processes and metacognition in BDD would be prove informative for cognitive- 
behavioural models and interventions for this disorder.
1.4) Aims and research hypotheses
The current study has 2 principal aims:
1) to investigate the content of appearance-related thoughts and images in people with 
BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance.
2) to investigate metacognition (metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies) in 
people with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance.
These aims will be pursued using quantitative analyses, complemented by the 
presentation of coded descriptive data. It is hoped that the descriptive data will allow 
for the capturing of experiences beyond the a priori categories used for the quantitative 
analyses.
Based on the existing research literature on BDD and related disorders, in addition to 
consultation with lead UK clinicians and researchers working with people with BDD3, 5
3 This consultation comprised individual meetings with lead clinicians and presentation and discussion of 
die research proposal at a quarterly meeting o f UK-based BDD researchers.
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main research hypotheses were devised:
1) The content of thoughts about appearance will be similar for people with BDD and 
people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance: there will be no significant 
difference between people with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ about 
appearance as to whether they do or do not report experiencing 6 content-related 
categories of thoughts about appearance*.
2) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, people with BDD will 
endorse both positive and negative metacognitive beliefs significantly more strongly.
3) There will be significant differences between people with BDD and people with 
‘normal concerns’ about appearance, with regard to frequency of use of different types 
of thought control strategy.
4) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’, people with BDD will report 
significantly lower effectiveness of their two most frequently employed strategies (1 
involving avoidance of thoughts and 1 involving engagement with thoughts) at reducing 
the fiequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearanceJ.
5) The most frequently employed engagement strategy would be rated significantly
■* There were 6 content-related categories o f thought about apoearance ('self-critical/attacking tPouents 
past-oriented thoughts, thoughts about the future, thoughts about what other people might think o f one’s 
appearance, comparing thoughts and planning for the future). Participants were asked to rate how often 
they experience each type o f thought.
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more effective than the most frequently employed avoidance strategy, at reducing the 
frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance.
Three subsidiary hypotheses were also devised:
6) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, people with BDD will 
report experiencing significantly more frequent thoughts in the 6 content-related 
categories of thoughts about appearance0.
7) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, people with BDD will 
report significantly higher levels of negative affect associated with thoughts about 
appearance.
8) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, people with BDD will 
report that thoughts about appearance have a significantly greater impact on functioning.
5 See page 170 for further details o f the engagement versus avoidance distinction.
6 See footnote 4.
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2) M ethod
2.1) Participants
Twenty-two participants with a primary diagnosis of BDD and 22 participants with 
‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance were recruited for this study. Owing to the 
complex, somewhat abstract nature of many of the interview questions, it was 
considered necessary to stipulate that only participants speaking fluent English should 
be recruited to the study. Following similar studies on OCD (e.g. Ladouceur et al., 
2000), participants aged less than 18 years or more than 60 years were not recruited to 
the study. Participants in the 2 groups were matched according to gender.
2.1.1) Clinical Participants
Participants for the BDD group were recruited through the Consultant Psychiatrist 
heading a specialist unit in North London and were assessed to ensure that they met 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for BDD, according to the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID: Spitzer, Williams and Gibbons,
1996). Responses to items on the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire - Revised 
(BDDQ-R: Phillips, 2003) (see Appendix 1), administered at the interview appointment, 
provided further validation of this diagnosis. Participants included in-patients, out­
patients and day hospital patients.
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Following convention of research in this field, participants with concurrent dementia or 
organic brain disorder, eating disorder, schizophrenia, substance or alcohol misuse and 
those preoccupied primarily with their weight or shape were excluded by their 
Consultant Psychiatrist prior to referral to the study (Veale et al., 1996; Osman et al., 
2004). Scores on the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI: Derogatis, 1975) and responses to 
an item regarding current and past psychiatric diagnoses on the ‘Personal Details’ 
questionnaire (see Appendix 2) provided additional means of ensuring the exclusion of 
participants with these co-morbid diagnoses. As outlined above, there is high co- 
morbidity in BDD with OCD, social phobia, depression and personality disorder. Any 
attempt to exclude participants with these disorders from the clinical group would render 
recruitment near impossible and would also result in findings of limited clinical 
relevance. Therefore, participants with co-morbid social phobia, OCD, depression or 
personality disorder were not excluded, providing the primary diagnosis was BDD.
Twenty-eight potential participants were referred for the BDD group in the study. One 
participant withdrew prior to the interview, saying she ‘did not feel up to it’. Twenty- 
seven agreed to participate, but 5 of those did not return questionnaires after the 
interview, in spite of telephone calls and reminder letters. The remaining 22 participants 
completed all parts of the study and examination of their BDDQ-R, BSI and ‘Personal 
Details Questionnaire’ responses gave no rise for concern regarding the violation of 
inclusion or exclusion criteria.
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2.1.2) Control Participants
Control participants with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance were recruited' from 
gyms, beauty salons and health clubs in London. There is little precedence in the 
literature on BDD for devising inclusion criteria for comparison groups. Following 
consultation with a number of researchers and clinicians working with people with 
BDD*, selected items from the BDDQ-R were used to screen potential participants. 
These items were used to ensure that control participants did not meet diagnostic criteria 
for BDD, but were nevertheless sufficiently concerned about appearance to constitute a 
reasonably conservative comparison group. It was decided to include only those 
participants who rated themselves either ‘somewhat’ or ‘moderately’ concerned and 
preoccupied with particular features of appearance. Furthermore, anyone stating that 
they were preoccupied with their appearance for more than 1 hour per day was 
excluded. Responses to an item regarding current and past psychiatric diagnoses on the 
‘Personal Details’ questionnaire were examined to ensure that participants with any 
current psychiatric diagnosis or history of an eating disorder were also excluded. It is 
important to note that these criteria are somewhat conservative.
Thirty-three potential control participants expressed interest in the study and completed 
the consent form, BDDQ-R and ‘Personal Details’ questionnaires. Of these 33, 11 were 
excluded prior to the interview: 4 for scoring too highly on the 2 screening items of the
7 See page 100 for further details o f the recruitment procedure.
•~his consultation comprised individual meetings with lead clinicians and presentation and discussion of 
the research proposal at a quarterly meeting o f UK-based BDD researchers.
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BDDQ-R; 3 because their level of spoken English was judged to be insufficient for 
reliable responding to interview questions; and 4 because they scored too low on the 2 
screening items of the BDDQ-R.
2.2) Measures
2.2.1) Self-report Questionnaires
2.2.1.1) Personal Details Questionnaire (see Appendix 2)
Participants were asked to provide details regarding date of birth, level of education, 
ethnicity and first language. They were also asked to provide information regarding any 
present or past mental health problems or psychiatric diagnoses.
2.2.1.2) Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire - Revised (BDDQ-R; Phillips, 2003) 
(see Appendix 1)
The BDDQ-R comprises 9 questions, 7 of which are rated on 5 point Likert scales. 
Those 7 questions include level of concern, level of preoccupation, associated distress, 
impact on functioning and avoidance. The remaining 2 enquire about the length time 
spent preoccupied with appearance each day and the number of times the person checks 
his or her appearance per day. The BDDQ-R is a revised version of the Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire (BDDQ; Phillips, Atala and Pope, 1995) and both
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are based on the DSM-IV criteria for Body Dysmorphic Disorder. The psychometric 
properties of the BDDQ were studied in psychiatric in-patients and the measure was 
found to have a sensitivity of 100 percent and a specificity of 92.5 percent (Grant, Kim 
and Crow, 2001). The psychometric properties of the BDDQ-R have not yet been 
studied.
2.2.1.3) Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996)
The BDI-II comprises 21 items, each of which corresponds to a symptom of depression. 
Each item is rated on a 4 point scale and scores on the 21 items are summed, with higher 
total scores indicating higher symptomatology. A total score of 0 to 13 is considered to 
fall in the ‘minimal range*, 14 to 19 is classified ‘mild’, 20 to 28 is ‘moderate’, and 29 
to 63 is ‘severe’. In terms of psychometrics, the BDI-II has been found to have good 
reliability and validity.
2.2.1.4) Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmund and Snaith, 1983)
The HADS is a 14 item questionnaire, with each item rated on a 4 point Likert scale. 
The HADS comprises 2 subscales (anxiety and depression) and it is possible to score a 
maximum of 21 points per subscale. Scores of 0 to 7 are considered ‘normal’, scores of 
8 to 10 are regarded to be ‘borderline’ and scores of 11 and above are thought to 
indicate clinical caseness (11-14 = ‘moderate’ anxiety or depression; 15-21 = ‘severe’ 
anxiety or depression). The HADS is widely used in both research and clinical contexts
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and has been shown to have good reliability and validity.
2.2.1.5) Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger and 
Borkovec, 1990)
The PSWQ is a 16-item measure, designed to assess tendency to worry in general, rather 
than worrying about specific topics. Items are rated on 5 point Likert scales. Good 
reliability and validity have been demonstrated in clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g. 
Brown, Antony and Barlow, 1992).
2.2.1.6) Body Image Quality of Life Inventory (BIQLI; Cash and Fleming, 2002)
This measure was developed to assess the positive and negative effects of one’s body 
image on 19 aspects of social functioning and well-being. Each of the 19 items are rated 
on a 7 point Likert scale and an overall mean score is calculated for each participant. 
This scale has been shown to have good internal consistency, test-retest reliability and 
convergent validity.
2.2.1.7) Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1975)
The BSI comprises 53 items, which fall into 10 sub-scales, each assessing a different 
aspect of psychiatric symptomatology. Following research convention, the so-called 
Global Severity Index was calculated, which is an index of overall psychological
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distress. The reliability and validity of the BSI have been shown to be good and the 
instrument has been tested in over 400 research studies (Pearson Assessments, 2005).
2.2.1.8) The Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells,
1997) (see Appendix 3)
The MCQ was developed to assess positive and negative metacognitive beliefs 
regarding worry and intrusive thoughts, in addition to metacognitive monitoring and 
cognitive efficiency. The 65 items, rated on 4 point Likert scales, were derived from 
transcripts of interviews with students and therapy sessions for people with anxiety. 
Factor analysis elicited 5 factors: positive beliefs; negative beliefs (uncontrollability and 
danger); cognitive confidence; negative beliefs (superstition, punishment, responsibility 
and control); and cognitive self-consciousness The internal consistencies (Cronbach’s 
alpha) of each of the five factors have been shown to range from 0.72 to 0.87, while test- 
retest reliability coefficients range from 0.76 to 0.89. Participants were asked to 
interpret all items to refer to thoughts about appearance only, rather than other thoughts 
and worries.
2.2.1.9) The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells and Davies, 1994) (see 
Appendix 4)
The TCQ was developed from interviews from people with anxiety disorders and non- 
clinical participants to assess the frequency of use of different types of thought control
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strategy. The measure comprises 30 items, with 6 items in each of the 5 strategy type 
subscales (distraction, social control, worry, punishment and re-appraisal). Items are 
rated on 4 point Likert scales. The internal consistencies (alpha) of each of the 5 factors 
have been shown to range from 0.64 to 0.79, while test-retest reliabilities range from 
0.67 to 0.83. Participants were asked to interpret all items to refer to thoughts about 
appearance only, rather than other thoughts and worries.
2.2.2) Interview Schedule (abbreviated version) (see Appendix 5)
The material reported in this study is from an abbreviated version of the original 
interview schedule. Material from the full interview schedule not included here will be 
reported elsewhere.
The schedule, comprising open questions, probe questions and ratings, was developed 
with the aim of systematically describing the preoccupation in BDD and exploring 
metacognitive aspects of that preoccupation. The researcher aimed to ensure that the 
interview was grounded in a theoretical framework, but also allowed for the capture of 
novel material. This approach has been used to capture features of anxious thinking 
related to intrusive thoughts, OCD and worry (e.g. Ladouceur et al., 2000) and has been 
found to be particularly appropriate where there are existing models and preliminary 
data, but the detailed phenomenology is unknown.
Relevant literature and existing measures were examined to determine the key
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22.2.2) Interview Section 2: Associated negative affect and impact on functioning.
Associated negative affect (sadness; anxiety; guilt; anger; fear; and shame) was 
explored, using 5 point Likert rating scales. Participants were then asked to rate the 
impact of the preoccupation on 4 different aspects of functioning (family life; school / 
study / work; intimate relationships; and social life and leisure activities) using 5 point 
Likert rating scales.
2.2.2.3) Interview Section 3: Metacognitive beliefs
Metacognitive beliefs were explored using a series of open questions, regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of the preoccupation, whether participants thought 
anything bad could happen if they were not preoccupied with appearance and what they 
imagined would happen if they abandoned all thought control attempts or were unable to 
control the preoccupation.
2.2.2.4) Interview Section 4: Thought control strategies
Participants were asked whether they use any mental strategies to try to control or cope 
with thoughts and images about appearance. An open question was then posed, asking 
them to describe these strategies. Responses were classified according to a scoring grid 
developed by the researcher, after consulting existing literature on other disorders and
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clinicians working with people with BDD.
Next, participants were asked to rate on 4 point Likert rating scales how often they 
employ 4 predetermined strategies (mental cosmetic surgery, reviewing evidence, 
planning for the future, talking to others about non-appearance related topics). These 4 
strategies were suggested by professionals working with people with BDD, to 
complement strategies listed in the TCQ.
Professionals working in BDD and anxiety disorders were consulted in order to arrive at 
a classification of coding grid strategy types, TCQ items and the 4 predetermined 
strategies as either ‘enagagement’ (the strategy employed engages with the thought or 
image) or ‘avoidance’ (the strategy employed avoids the thought or image) (see 
Appendix 6 for list of engagement and avoidance strategies). For each participant, the 
most frequently used ‘engagement’ and ‘avoidance’ strategies were identified. Three 
rating scale (5 point Likert) questions were posed regarding the effectiveness of each of 
the 2 strategies at reducing 3 dimensions of the thoughts about appearance (frequency, 
intensity, associated distress).
99
2 3 ) Procedure
2.3.1) Recruitment
2.3.1.1) Clinical Participants
Participants with BDD were informed of the study by their Consultant Psychiatrist and 
given the information sheet (see Appendix 9). With permission, the Consultant 
Psychiatrist then forwarded potential participants’ contact details to the researcher. The 
researcher contacted potential participants by telephone, outlined the study, answered 
any questions and arranged a mutually convenient time to meet.
2.3.1.2) Control Participants
Leaflets and posters were placed in gyms, health clubs and beauty salons, with the 
agreement of the manager of each establishment. Potential participants contacted the 
researcher by telephone or email. After outlining the study and providing an 
opportunity for questions, the researcher sent potential participants the information 
sheet, consent form (see Appendix 10), BDDQ-R and ‘Personal Details’ questionnaire. 
Upon receipt of the completed documents, the researcher contacted participants by email 
or telephone and arranged a mutually convenient meeting time.
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2.3.2) Interview appointment
At the beginning of the interview appointment, brief introductions were made, the aims 
and procedure of the study were explained by the researcher and participants were given 
the opportunity to ask questions.
The consent form, ‘Personal Details’ questionnaire and BDDQ-R were administered to 
participants in the BDD group. Control group participants had usually completed these 
before the meeting. Next, the BSI, BIQLI, BDI-II, HADS and PSWQ were completed 
by all participants.
Sections 1 to 3 (‘Content of thoughts and images’, ‘Associated negative affect and 
impact of thoughts about appearance on functioning’ and ‘Metacognitive beliefs’) of the 
interview schedule were administered. Participants then completed the MCQ, after 
which section 4.1 (open question regarding mental thought control strategies) of the 
interview was administered. The TCQ was then completed, followed by the remainder 
of section 4 (questions regarding the effectiveness of thought control strategies).
Participants were then debriefed, given the opportunity to ask further questions and 
thanked for their participation.
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour 50 minutes.
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All interviews were audiotaped and relevant sections were then transcribed by the 
researcher.
2.4) Ethics
The necessary approval was obtained from the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental 
Health NHS Trust Local Research Ethics Committee and the ethics committee of the 
specialist unit in North London (see Appendix 7).
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3) Results
In order to ascertain whether parametric or non-parametric tests were most appropriate, 
the distributions of all variables for each group were examined for normality (skewness 
and kurtosis) at a significance level of 0.05. A number of variables were associated with 
significant skew and/or kurtosis (see Appendix 8). The histograms of those variables 
were examined to give further indication of the extent of non-normality. In light of the 
fact that parametric tests are reasonably robust to deviations from normality (see 
Howell, 1997) and the conservative approach adopted to other aspects of the analysis 
(see below), it was decided not to transform these variables.
Equality of Variance (Levene’s Test of the Equality of Variances) was examined for all 
variables and in cases where the variances were found to be significantly different, 
‘equal variances not assumed’ statistics were reported, wherever possible.
The analysis of the interview data is somewhat challenging, given the exploratory nature 
of the study. The potential for multiple hypothesis testing raises problems with Type I 
error. Furthermore, the selection of a relatively conservative control group might well 
have reduced the power of the study. The researcher acknowledges the potential 
problems associated with high rates of Type I error and the dangers of a non- 
conservative, post-hoc approach to data analysis. Therefore, a relatively conservative 
analysis strategy has been selected, aiming to increase power and decrease the number 
of tests, thereby achieving as optimal a balance as possible between Type I and Type II
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error.
First, after examination of correlation matrices and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, items 
measuring aspects of a single broad phenomenon (e.g. thought content items; negative 
affect items; impact on functioning items; and items concerning effectiveness of thought 
control strategy at reducing various thought dimensions) were treated as repeated 
measures variables. It could be argued that it would have been more appropriate to 
consider these items additive scales, but this would have resulted in reduced power and 
precluded the examination of differences, where appropriate, for individual items. 
Treating such variables as repeated measures increases the denominator for comparative 
analyses, thereby increasing power. Second, tests of main or interaction effects were 
only conducted, if there was an a priori rationale (i.e. in many cases, only 1 of several 
potential tests of main effects was conducted), thereby minimising Type I error. Third, 
multiple analyses were conducted to test simple main effects, where appropriate.
Multiple analyses inevitably increase Type I error and there is much debate around this 
issue (see Feise, 2002). It could be argued that attempts to correct for this potential 
increase in Type I error rate are inappropriate for this data set for 2 reasons: attempts 
have already been made to protect against Type I error by treating aspects of broad 
phenomena as repeated measures variables, by testing for overall interactions and by 
ensuring that only tests of a priori hypotheses are conducted; and the inevitable increase 
in Type II error rates (if adjustments were made to control for Type I error) could be 
problematic, particularly given the relatively small sample sizes. One might equally
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argue that a Bonferroni procedure is appropriate (Dunn, 1961), which corrects for 
increases in Type I error rate, by dividing the probability of a Type I error (alpha) by the 
number of comparisons made. Jaccard and Wan (1996) point out that this method of 
correcting for Type I error can become overly conservative. They suggest a modified 
Bonferroni procedure which keeps the overall Type I error rate per group of analyses at 
5 percent, but uses rank ordering of significance levels. This method is less 
conservative than the standard Bonferroni method (see Simes, 1986). It would seem 
that this modified Bonferroni procedure represents a sensible compromise between 
ignoring potential increases in Type I error rate and being overly conservative and 
thereby increasing Type II error rate. Therefore, the modified Bonferroni procedure will 
be used to correct for multiple analyses where appropriate.
Responses to open questions on thoughts, metacognitive beliefs and thought control 
strategy types were classified according to coding grids developed by the researcher, 
after examination of relevant literature and consultation with clinicians working with 
people with BDD. Numbers and percentages of participants in each group who gave 
particular categories of response are reported. Each thought, belief or strategy type 
reported was assigned to just one category according to the researcher’s judgement, as 
the assigning of items to multiple categories would be likely to result in unnecessary 
complexity. It was hoped that this approach would inform the assessment of the face 
validity of a priori response categories and capture experiences beyond the 
predetermined categories. Comparative analyses were not performed on this data, as the 
number of thought, belief or strategy categories reported by each person is partly
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dependent on the wordiness of responses.
3.1) Sample Description
3.1.1) Demographics
Participants comprised 14 females and 8 males with BDD, and 14 females and 8 males 
with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance. The mean age of the participants with 
BDD was 33.91 years (standard deviation = 11.36), while the mean age of the ‘normal 
concerns’ participants was 25.55 years (standard deviation = 4.07).
The majority of participants in both groups identified as ‘White - British’ or ’White - 
Other’ (17 participants in the BDD group (77.27%) and 16 in the control group 
(72.73%)). In the BDD group, 1 participant identified as ‘Black - African’ (4.55%), 1 as 
‘Asian - Other’ (4.55%) and 3 as ‘Other’ (13.63%). In the ‘normal concerns’ group, 5 
participants identified as ‘Asian - British Pakistani’, ‘Asian - British Bangladeshi’ or 
‘Asian - Other’ (22.72%) and 1 participant identified as ‘Other’ (4.55%).
With regard to education level, participants were asked to identify the highest level of 
qualification they had. In the BDD group, 1 participant (4.55%) had no qualifications, 9 
participants (40.91%) had attained GCSEs, 5 (22.72%) had A Levels, 6 (27.27%) had an 
Undergraduate degree and 1 (4.55%) a Postgraduate degree. In the ‘normal concerns’ 
group, 3 participants (13.64%) had attained A-Levels, 11 (50.00%) an Undergraduate
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degree and 8 (36.36%) a Postgraduate degree.
Age and education level will be controlled for in all statistical analyses as it is possible 
that the group differences with respect to these variables could confound findings.
3.1.2) Clinical characteristics
With regard to clinical characteristics, the mean group scores (and standard deviations) 
on the following self-report measures are presented in Table 1: BDDQ-R; BIQLI; BSI; 
BDI-II; HADS (anxiety); HADS (depression); PSWQ.
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Table 1: Mean (and standard deviations) scores for participants with BDD and control participants on self- 
report questionnaire measures
SCALE BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP
BDDQ-R 29.36 (4.37) 13.23(2.51)
BIQLI -1.72(0.63) 0.51 (1.06)
BDI-II 29.95(11.55) 8.50 (8.07)
HADS (anxiety) 14.14(3.62) 7.27 (3.49)
HADS (depression) 9.77 (4.67) 3.05 (3.26)
PSWQ 62.32(15.09) 45.64 (10.42)
BSI 1.73(0.70) 0.52 (0.40)
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With regard to published norms, the BDD group mean score on the BDI-II falls within 
the ‘severe depression’ range, while the control group mean score is in the ‘minimal’ 
range. On the HADS anxiety scale, the BDD group mean score falls between 
‘moderate’ and ‘severe’, while the control group mean score falls between ‘normal’ and 
‘borderline’. The BDD group mean score on the HADS depression scale is the 
‘borderline’ range, while the control group mean score is in the ‘normal’ range.
Independent samples T tests were conducted in order to compare the 2 groups on these 
measures. Assumptions regarding equality of variance were met for all self-report 
questionnaire variables, except for BDDQ-R, BSI and PSWQ scores, for which the 
‘equal variances not assumed’ statistics are reported. As outlined (see page 102), the 
modified Bonferroni procedure was used to adjust statistical significance cut-offs. The 
2 t tests on BDD-related measures were considered to constitute 1 family of tests, while 
tests on measures relating to other symptoms were treated as a separate family of tests. 
Using this method, the differences in mean scores on all measures were found to be 
statistically significant, with the BDD group scoring significantly higher across all 
measures (see table 2 below). In spite of these findings, it was deemed inappropriate to 
include any of these scores as covariates in later analyses10.
10 See page 173 for discussion o f this decision
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Table 2: Results of independent samples t-tests (BDD vs. control group) on self-report questionnaire 
measures
SCALE t
DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM
SIGNIFICANCE 
(2 - TAILED)
BDDQ-R 15.02 33.46 <0.001
BIQLI -8.42 42 <0.001
BDI-II 7.14 42 <0.001
HADS (anxiety) 6.38 42 <0.001
HADS (depression) 5.54 42 <0.001
PSWQ 4.27 37.32 <0.001
BSI 7.03 33.61 <0.001
110
3.2) Cognitive Processes and  M etacognition
3.2.1) Thought content
3.2.1 .i) Descriptive data
All participants reported experiencing thoughts about appearance. Responses to the 
open question regarding the content of those thoughts were coded according to a coding 
grid developed by the researcher, after consulting clinicians working with people with 
BDD (see table 3 below). Some participants reported several different thoughts that 
were assigned to different thematic categories, while other participants reported several 
different thoughts belonging to the same category. Each thought was assigned to one 
category only, according to the researcher’s judgement, as the assigning of thoughts to 
multiple categories would be likely to result in unnecessary complexity. Comparative 
analyses were not performed on this data, as the number of thought categories reported 
by each participant is partly dependent on the wordiness and complexity of responses 
and the total number of thoughts reported. The numbers (and percentages) of 
participants in each group spontaneously reporting the different types of thought content 
are given in Table 3 below.
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Table 3: Number of participants (and percentages of each group) spontaneously reporting thoughts in each
category
THOUGHT
CATEGORY
BDD GROUP 
(N = 22)
CONTROL GROUP 
(N = 22)
BOTH GROUPS 
(N = 44)
Critical/self-attacking
thoughts 21 (95.45) 9(40.91) 30 (68.18)
Past-oriented thoughts 3(13.64) 8 (36.36) 11 (25.00)
Thoughts about what 
other people might 
think 13(59.09) 5 (22.73) 18(40.91)
Worries regarding the 
future 5 (22.73) 3(13.64) 8(18.18)
Comparing thoughts 4(18.18) 7(31.82) 11 (25.00)
Planning ways to 
change one’s 
appearance 5 (22.73) 6 (27.27) 11 (25.00)
Other 4(18.18) 0 (0.00) 4 (9.09)
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All participants reported at least 1 thought that was classifiable according to the coding 
grid. Of the 93 thoughts volunteered, only 4 thoughts, reported by 4 different 
participants with BDD, were not classified in any of the 6 predetermined categories. 
One of these thoughts was command-like thoughts in the second person (‘You must pick 
your skin’), while another related to uncertainty regarding appearance (‘1 just dwell for 
hours on the fact that I’m not sure how I look... the uncertainty is unbearable... it stays 
on my mind for hours... I ask myself constantly whether I look as bad as I sometimes 
think I do...’). The other 2 related to physical sensations (‘...a tingling in the left side 
of my face’ and ‘One side feels physically heavier and it’s so discomforting...’).
3.2.1 .ii) Quantitative data
Participants were asked to rate how often they experience each of the 6 types of 
thoughts about appearance11.
In order to test hypothesis 1 (that there would be no significant difference between 
people with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance with regard to 
whether they do or do not experience 6 predetermined content-related categories of 
thoughts about appearance), frequency ratings of the 6 thought categories were 
collapsed into binomial data (presence or absence of appearance-related thoughts in 
each category) (see Table 4 below)
11 The 6 types of thought were: self-critical/attacking, past-oriented, thoughts about what others might 
think, worries regarding the future, comparing thoughts and planning ways to change one's appearance.
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Table 4: Numbers of participants in each group reporting presence or absence of appearance-related
thoughts in each category.
BDD GROUP 
(N=22)
CONTROL GROUP 
(N=22)
BOTH GROUPS 
(N=44)
THOUGHT
TYPE PRESENT ABSENT PRESENT ABSENT PRESENT ABSENT
Critica l/self-
attacking
thoughts 21 1 22 0 43 1
Past-
oriented
thoughts 20 2 20 2 40 4
Thoughts 
about what 
other people 
might think 22 0 21 1 43 1
Worries 
regarding 
the future 22 0 16 6 38 6
Comparing
thoughts 22 0 21 1 43 1
Planning 
ways to 
change 
one’s
appearance 19 3 22 0 41 3
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After examining this data, Chi-squared tests were conducted for future-oriented thoughts 
and planning to change one’s appearance only. The results of these tests are displayed 
in table 5 below.
Table 5: Results o f chi-squared tests to compare the 2 groups with regard to presence or absence of 
appearance-related thoughts in each category
THOUGHT
CATEGORY CHI SQUARED
DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE
Future-oriented
thoughts 6.947 1 0.008
Planning ways to
change one’s
appearance 3.220 1 0.073
A statistically significant difference between the 2 groups was found for future oriented 
thoughts only, where participants in the BDD group were significantly more likely to 
report the presence of such thoughts than the control group (# (1) = 6.947, p = 0.008).
3.2.2) Frequency ratings o f thoughts about appearance
In order to test subsidiary hypothesis 6 (that people with BDD, compared to people with 
‘normal concerns’ about appearance, would report experiencing significantly more 
frequent thoughts in the 6 content-related categories of thoughts about appearance), 
mean ratings of frequency of thought type were compared using an ANCOVA.
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There was 1 between-participants factor (group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control 
group) and 1 within-participants factor (thought type) with 6 levels (critical/self- 
attacking thoughts; past-focussed thoughts; thoughts about what other people might 
think; future-oriented worries; comparing thoughts; and plans to change appearance). 
Covariates were education level (1-5) and age (years).
Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) 
for frequency of 6 predetermined thought types are given in table 6.
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Table 6: Table to show estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and 
age) for frequency o f 6 predetermined thought types
THOUGHT
CATEGORY BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Critical/self-attacking
thoughts
Past-oriented thoughts
Thoughts about what 
others might think
Future-oriented
thoughts
Comparing thoughts
Planning ways to 
change one’s 
appearance
3.203 (0.263) 
1.745 (0.258) 
2.666 (0.272)
2.914(0.229) 
2.957 (0.249)
2.237 (0.272)
1.570 (0.263) 
1.210(0.258) 
2.107 (0.272)
0.723 (0.229) 
2.089 (0.249)
1.627 (0.272)
2.386 (0.157) 
1.477 (0.153)
2.386 (0.162)
1.818(0.136) 
2.523 (0.148)
1.932 (0.162)
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After controlling for age and level of education, a significant main effect of group was 
found (F (1,40) = 25.052, p < 0.01), confirming a priori predictions, that people with 
BDD would report higher overall frequency of thoughts regarding appearance than 
control participants. A significant interaction between group and thought type was 
found (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.70, F (5, 36) = 3.13, p = 0.02). This was not predicted, and 
should therefore be considered cautiously. Nevertheless, consideration of the main 
effect of group in the context of an interaction can lead to a more specific interpretation 
of the main finding of higher frequency of thoughts about appearance in the BDD group.
Simple main effects of group were explored, by conducting uncorrected pairwise 
comparisons among estimated marginal means (after controlling for education and age), 
the results of which are reported in table 7 below. On average, the BDD group reported 
higher frequency of all types of appearance-related thoughts than the control group. 
After Bonferroni adjustments, only the group differences for critical/self-attacking 
thoughts and future-oriented thoughts reached statistical significance. The difference 
for critical/self-attacking thoughts was associated with a small effect size, while that for 
future-oriented thoughts was associated with a medium effect size (see Cohen, 1988).
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Table 7: Results of uncorrected pairwise comparisons among estimated marginal mean frequency ratings 
of different types of thoughts about appearance (after controlling for age and education)
THOUGHT TYPE
BDD group 
mean - 
Control 
group 
mean
Standa
-rd
Error t
Significan
-ce
(P)
Estimated 
effect size 
(partial eta 
squared)
Observed
power
Critical / self- 
attacking thoughts 1.632 0.423 3.855 <0.001 0.271 0.964
Past-oriented
thoughts 0.535 0.414 1.293 0.204 0.040 0.243
Thoughts about what 
other people might 
think 0.558 0.437 1.277 0.209 0.039 0.238
Future-oriented
thoughts 2.191 0.367 5.965 <0.001 0.471 1.000
Comparing thoughts 0.868 0.399 2.174 0.036 0.106 0.564
Thoughts about 
planning to change 
one’s appearance 0.609 0.438 1.392 0.172 0.046 0.274
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3.2.3) Meiacognitive beliefs
3.2.3.i) Descriptive Data
Responses to the open questions regarding beliefs about thoughts about appearance were 
thematically coded according to coding grids developed by the researcher, following 
consultation with clinicians working with people with BDD and examination of 
literature on metacognitive beliefs in other disorders. Each belief reported was assigned 
to just 1 category according to the researcher’s judgement, as the assigning of a single 
belief to multiple categories would be likely to result in unnecessary complexity. Some 
people reported a number of beliefs that were assigned to different categories, while 
others reported several beliefs that were assigned to one category. The numbers (and 
percentages) of participants in each group reporting the different types of thematic 
content are given in tables 11, 12, 13 and 14 below.
3.2.3.i.a) Advantages and gains of preoccupation with thoughts about 
appearance
Twelve of the 22 BDD group participants and 20 of the 22 control group participants 
reported advantages or gains of being preoccupied with appearance. Those that were 
classifiable according to the coding grid are included in table 11 below. One thematic 
category was found to be redundant (coming to terms with difficulties). Four 
advantages, reported by 4 different BDD group participants were deemed unclassifiable 
according to the scoring grid (2 participants spoke about being able to focus more on
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oneself, 1 participant said, ’I’ve got better at multi-tasking’ and 1 further participant 
reported, ‘It has made me pay more attention to detail generally’).
Table 11: Number of participants (and percentages of each group) reporting advantages, classifiable 
according to the coding grid, in response to the question ‘What are the advantages o f being preoccupied 
with thoughts about appearance? / What do you gain by being preoccupied with thoughts about 
appearance?’
THEMATIC BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
CATEGORY (N = 22) (N = 22) (N = 44)
Empathy for others 1 (4.55) 1 (4.55) 2 (4.55)
Insight / self- 
awareness 1 (4.55) 2 (9.09) 3(13.64)
Avoidance of other
worries or social
intimacy 5 (22.73) 0 (0.00) 5(11.36)
Motivation to improve 
appearance 4(18.18) 18(81.82) 22 (50.00)
Coming to terms with 
difficulties 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Other 4(18.18) 0 (0.00) 4 (9.09)
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3.2.3.i.b) Disadvantages o f preoccupation with appearance
All participants, except for 4 from the control group, reported disadvantages of being 
preoccupied with thoughts about appearance. All those disadvantages which were 
classifiable according to the scoring grid are included in table 12 below. Three 
participants with BDD and 2 control participants reported disadvantages pertaining to 
being unable to think about other issues, which had not been included as a coding grid 
category. One BDD participant reported a disadvantage which was deemed 
unclassifiable according to the coding grid: ‘Judging myself harshly all the time’. Four 
control participants reported unclassifiable disadvantages: ‘I miss out on eating what I 
want to’; ‘Paranoia’; ‘I think that by worrying about my skin... it makes the acne worse, 
because of the stress hormones’; and ‘Sometimes I become crazy with stress regiments, 
for example I decide to work out for 3 hours non stop and then I bum out completely’.
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Table 9: Number o f participants (and percentages o f each group) reporting disadvantages, classifiable
according to the thematic category coding grid, in response to the question, ‘What are the disadvantages
of being preoccupied with thoughts about appearance?’
THEMATIC
CATEGORY
BDD GROUP 
(N = 22)
CONTROL GROUP 
(N = 22)
BOTH GROUPS 
(N = 44)
Increases low mood 
and / or anxiety 4(18.18) 6 (27.27) 10(22.73)
Wastes time 4(18.18) 5 (22.73) 9 (20.45)
Negative impact on 
social life and 
relationships 13(59.09) 3(13.64) 16(36.36)
Negative impact on 
career 4(18.18) 0 (0.00) 4 (9.09)
Other 3(13.64) 6 (27.27) 9 (20.45)
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3.2.3.i.c) Negative consequences of giving up being preoccupied with 
thoughts about appearance
Four participants with BDD and 2 control participants reported that they could not 
imagine not being preoccupied with appearance and therefore did not know if anything 
bad could happen. Nineteen participants (9 from the control group and 10 from the 
BDD group said that nothing bad could happen if they gave up being preoccupied with 
appearance and/or gave positive outcomes only. All remaining participants (8 with 
BDD and 11 controls) reported negative consequences and those which were classifiable 
according to the scoring grid are included in table 13 below. Two participants with 
BDD gave responses which were deemed unclassifiable (T would be more arrogant if I 
wasn’t preoccupied’ and ‘I think I’d be very confused... I’ve developed an identity as an 
ugly man who is preoccupied with thoughts about appearance... I don’t know who I’d 
be’).
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Table 10: Number o f participants (and percentages of each group) reporting beliefs, classifiable according
to a category coding grid, in response to the question, ‘Could anything bad happen if you gave up being
preoccupied with appearance?’
THEMATIC BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
CATEGORY__________________(N = 22 )_______________ (N = 22)______________(N = 22)
Physical health would
suffer 0(0.00) 5(22.73) 5(11.36)
Appearance would
suffer 6(27.27) 5(22.73) 11 (25.00)
Become preoccupied 
with other concerns,
not related to 0 (0.00) 1 (4.55) 1 (2.27)
appearance
Other 2 (9.09) 0 (0.00) 2 (4.54)
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3.2.3.i.d) Consequences o f lack o f control over thoughts about appearance
All participants reported at least 1 belief regarding possible negative consequences of 
remaining preoccupied with or being unable to control thoughts about appearance. 
Those beliefs that were classifiable according to the coding grid are included in table 14 
below. One category was found to be redundant (negative impact on physical health). 
Nine beliefs were deemed unclassifiable (1 BDD group participant stated, ‘The marks 
would get worse, it I don’t worry about them constantly they will just get worse and 
worse’; another BDD group participant made a statement which was too vague to 
categorise, ‘It would be purgatory... very very difficult... unbearable’; 2 control group 
participants stated that they would resort to cosmetic surgery; 1 control group participant 
believed she would develop an eating disorder; 1 control group participant thought he 
would start eating too much and be unable to control his food intake; and 2 BDD group 
participants and 1 control group participant believed that the preoccupation would 
become worse).
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Table 11: Number o f participants (and percentages of each group) reporting beliefs, classifiable according
to the coding grid, in response to the question ‘What would happen if you were to let yourself remain
preoccupied with or were unable to control thoughts about appearance?’.
THEMATIC BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
CATEGORY__________________ (N = 22)______________ (N_= 22)______________(N - 4 4 ) ___
Go crazy / mad / end 
up in a psychiatric
hospital 6(27.27) 1 (4.55) 7(15.91)
Be housebound 4(18.18) 1 (4.55) 5(11.36)
Depression 4(18.18) 5(22.73) 9(20.45)
Try to kill self 4(18.18) 0(0.00) 4(9.09)
Job / career would
suffer 0(0.00) 7(31.82) 7(15.91)
Lose confidence / self
esteem 0(0.00) 7(31.82) 7(15.91)
Negative impact on 
social life /
relationships 2(9.09) 5(22.73) 7(15.91)
Negative impact on
physical health 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Other________________________4(18.18)______________ 5 (22.73)_______________9 (20.45)
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3.2.3.H) Quantitative data (MCQ)
In order to test hypothesis 2 (that people with BDD, compared to people with ‘normal 
concerns’ about appearance, will endorse both positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs significantly more strongly), mean ratings of strength of belief on MCQ 
subscales were compared using an ANCOVA. There was 1 between-participants factor 
(group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control group) and 1 within-participants factor 
(MCQ) with 5 levels (positive metacognitive beliefs, beliefs regarding the danger and 
uncontrollability of thoughts; beliefs about cognitive competence; metacognitive beliefs 
regarding punishment, superstition and responsibility; and cognitive self-consciousness). 
Covariates were education level (1-5) and age (years). Estimated marginal means (and 
standard error) (after partialling out education and age) for strength of belief in MCQ 
subscales are given in table 15.
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Table 12: Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) for 
strength o f belief on MCQ subscales
SUBSCALE BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Positive worry beliefs 1.763 (0.133) 1.914(0.133) 1.838(0.079)
Beliefs about 
uncontrollability & 
danger of thoughts 3.142 (0.174) 1.594(0.174) 2.368 (0.104)
Beliefs about cognitive
competence 2.061 (0.191) 1.603 (0.191) 1.832 (0.114)
Beliefs about 
responsibility, 
superstition & 
punishment 2.468(0.118) 1.396 (0.118) 1.932 (0.070)
Cognitive self-
consciousness 3.136 (0.176) 2.299 (0.176) 2.718(0.104)
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After controlling for age and education level, a significant main effect of group was 
found (F (1,40) = 17.126, p < 0.001), indicating that people with BDD reported higher 
overall belief in MCQ subscale items than control participants. A significant interaction 
between group and MCQ subscales was found (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.485, F (4,37) = 
9.837, p = <0.001). This was not predicted, and should therefore be considered 
cautiously. Nevertheless, consideration of the main effect of group in the context of an 
interaction can lead to a more specific interpretation of the overall finding of higher 
strength of belief in MCQ subscale items in the BDD group.
Simple main effects of group were explored, by conducting uncorrected pairwise 
comparisons among estimated marginal means (after controlling for education and age), 
the results of which are reported in table 16 below. Comparisons were conducted for 3 
of the 5 MCQ subscales only (positive worry beliefs, negative beliefs about 
uncontrollability and the danger of thoughts and negative beliefs about responsibility, 
superstition and punishment), in order to limit tests to a priori hypotheses. Although the 
other subscales are intended to measure metacognition, a critique of these subscales will 
follow12. In comparison with control group participants, the BDD group participants 
reported higher mean strength of belief on both negative belief subscales and lower 
mean strength of belief for positive beliefs about worry. After Bonferroni adjustments, 
differences between mean group ratings of strength of belief reached statistical 
significance for the 2 negative belief subscales (p < 0.001), but not for the positive belief 
subscale (p = 0.483). Both negative belief subscales were associated with effect sizes 
approaching medium (Cohen, 1988)
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Table 13: Results o f uncorrected pairwise comparisons among estimated marginal means for strength of 
belief (after controlling for age and education)
MCQ SUBSCALE
BDD group 
mean - 
Control 
group 
mean
Standa
rd
Error
Significan
ce
(P)
Estimated 
effect size 
(partial eta 
squared)
Positive worry beliefs -0.151 0.214 -0.708 0.483 0.012
Negative beliefs about 
uncontrollability &
danger of thoughts 1.548 0.280 5.519 <0.001 0.432
Negative beliefs about 
responsibility, 
superstition &
punishment 1.072 0.189 5.656 <0.001 0.444
Observed
power
0.106
1.000
1.000
12 See page 163
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3.2.4) Thought control strategies
3.2.4.i) Descriptive Data
All participants reported employing mental thought control strategies in response to 
thoughts about appearance. Responses to the ensuing open question asking participants 
to describe those strategies were coded according to a coding grid, developed by the 
researcher, after examination of relevant literature on other disorders and consultation 
with clinicians working with people with BDD. Some participants reported several 
strategies which were assigned to different categories, while other participants reported 
several strategies which were assigned to the same thematic category. Each 
spontaneously reported strategy was assigned to 1 category only, according to the 
judgement of the researcher, as the assigning of strategies to multiple categories would 
be likely to result in unnecessary complexity. The numbers (and percentages) of 
participants in each group spontaneously reporting the different types of thought control 
strategies are given in Table 17 below.
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Table 14: Number of participants (and percentages o f each group) spontaneously reporting thought 
control strategies that were classifiable according to the category coding grid
THOUGHT CONTROL 
STRATEGY CATEGORY
BDD GROUP 
 (N = 22 )__
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(N = 22)
BOTH GROUPS 
(N = 44)
Talk to other people about
unrelated topics 2 (9.09)
Mental cosmetic surgery
(imagining what would look like
without perceived defect) 0 (0.00)
Tell self not to be silly or stupid 2 (9.09)
Seek reassurance from other
people about appearance 1 (4.55)
Convincing self appearance is
unimportant 1 (4.55)
Analysing reasons for having the
thought 3(13.64)
Tell self to stop thinking about it 1 (4.55)
Think about something else 9(40.91)
Rationalise thoughts 9(40.91)
Review evidence 2 (9.09)
Planning for the future 1 (4.55)
Ask people if they have similar
thoughts 0 (0.00)
Other________________________________10(45.45)
2 (9.09)
4(18.18)
I (4.55)
1 (4.55) 
7(31.82) 
0 (0.00)
3 (13.64) 
9(40.91) 
13(59.09)
2 (9.09)
5 (22.73) 
0 (0.00) 
9(40.91)
4 (9.09)
4 (9.09)
3 (6.82)
2 (4.55) 
8(18.18)
3 (6.82)
4 (9.09) 
18(40.91) 
22 (50.00)
4 (9.09) 
6(13.64) 
0 (0.00) 
19(43.18)
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One coding category was found to be redundant (asking others if they have similar 
thoughts). Five mental thought control strategies were not classifiable in any of the 13 
categories of the coding grid. Three of these (reported by 3 different control group 
participants) involved telling oneself there is nothing one can do about the appearance 
feature. The remaining 2 were reported by the same BDD group participant: ‘I use 
physical compulsions to get rid of the thoughts about appearance’; and ‘I tell myself I 
must resist the compulsions again and again. Saying these words seems to fill up my 
mind for a while and I don’t have to think about the initial worry... until I give in of 
course’. Nine people with BDD and 6 control participants reported engaging in a 
physical activity. These were not judged to be mental thought control strategies and 
were therefore excluded.
3.2.4.ii) Quantitative Data
3.2.4.ii.a) TCQ
In order to test the hypothesis that there would be significant differences between people 
with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, with regard to 
frequency of use of different types of thought control strategy, mean ratings of 
frequency of strategy use on TCQ subscales were compared using an ANCOVA. There 
was 1 between-participants factor (group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control group) and 
1 within-participants factor (TCQ) with 5 levels (distraction; punishment; reappraisal; 
worry; and social control). Covariates were education level (1-5) and age (years).
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Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) 
for frequency of strategy use on TCQ subscales are given in table 18.
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Table 15: Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) for 
frequency o f strategy use on TCQ subscales
TCQ SUBSCALE BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Distraction
Punishment
Reappraisal
Worry
Social Control
1.926 (0.135) 
1.834 (0.117) 
2.313(0.143) 
1.720(0.100) 
1.517(0.169)
2.286 (0.135) 
1.302 (0.117) 
1.823(0.143) 
1.371 (0.100) 
2.414(0.169)
2.106(0.080) 
1.568 (0.070) 
2.068 (0.085) 
1.546 (0.060) 
1.966(0.100)
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After controlling for age and education level, a significant interaction between group 
and TCQ subscale was found (Wilk’s Lambda = 1.008, F (4,37) = 9.322, p = <0.001) 
confirming a priori predictions that there would be significant differences between 
people with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, with regard to 
frequency of use of different types of thought control strategy. In order to explore 
simple main effects, uncorrected pairwise comparisons were conducted among 
estimated marginal means (after controlling for education and age), the results of which 
are reported in table 19 below. In comparison to the control group, the BDD group 
participants reported higher mean frequency of strategy use on all TCQ subscales, 
except for distraction and social control. After Bonferroni adjustments, differences in 
group mean ratings of frequency of strategy use reached statistical significance for 
social control (p = 0.002) and punishment (p = 0.007) subscales only. Differences on 
both social control and punishment subscales are associated with small effect sizes 
(Cohen, 1988).
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Table 16: Results o f unconnected pairwise comparisons among estimated marginal means for frequency of 
strategy use on TCQ subscales (after controlling for age and education)
TCQ SUBSCALE
Distraction
Punishment
Reappraisal
Worry
Social Control
BDD group 
mean -
Control Standa
group rd
mean Error t
-0.360 0.217 -1.662
0.532 0.188 2.831
0.450 0.230 2.136
0.349 0.162 2.162
-0.897 0.271 -3.304
Estimated 
Significan effect size
-ce (partial eta Observed
(p) squared) power
0.104 0.065 0.368
0.007 0.167 0.789
0.039 0.102 0.550
0.037 0.105 0.559
0.002 0.214 0.897
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3.2.4.ii.b) Effectiveness of most frequently employed engagement and avoidance 
thought control strategies
Professionals working in BDD and anxiety disorders were consulted in order to arrive at 
a classification of TCQ items and the researcher’s 4 predetermined strategies as either 
‘enagagement’ (the strategy employed engages with the thought or image) or 
‘avoidance’ (the strategy employed avoids the thought or image). The list of strategies 
categorised as engagement and avoidance by professionals working in BDD and anxiety 
disorders is included in Appendix 6. The most frequent ‘engagement’ and ‘avoidance’ 
strategies for each participant were identified (see tables 20 and 21 below).
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Table 17: Number (and percentage) o f participants in each group whose most frequently employed
avoidance strategy was classified in each strategy category
Thought Control
Strategy C a te g o r y  ________ BDD_________________ Control_______  Both groups
Dwell on other worries 
/ worry about more
minor things 10(45.45) 8(36.36) 18(81.82)
Think pleasant
thoughts instead 2(9.09) 11 (50.00) 13(29.55)
Focus on different 
negative thoughts / 
replace the thought 
with a more trivial
bad thought 3(13.64) 0(0.00) 3(6.82)
Talk to people about 
topics unrelated to
appearance 3(13.64) 0(0.00) 3(6.82)
Call to mind positive
images instead________________4(18.18)_______________3(13.64)_______________ 7(15.91)
TOTAL_____________________ 22 (100.00)_____________22 (100.00) 44 (100.00)
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Table 18: Numbers (and percentage) o f participants in each group whose most frequently employed
engagement strategy was classified in each strategy category
Thought Control 
Strategy BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Challenge the 
thought’s validity 4(18.18) 2 (9.09) 6(13.64)
Ouestion the reasons 
for having the thought 5 (22.73) 3(13.64) 8(18.18)
Review evidence 2 (9.09) 2 (9.09) 4 (9.09)
Analvse the thought 
rationally 3(13.64) 12 (54.55) 15(34.09)
Reinterpret the 
thought 3(13.64) 0 (0.00) 3 (6.82)
I try a different way of 
thinking about it 1 (4.55) 0 (0.00) 1 (2.27)
Mental cosmetic 
surgery 2 (9.09) 1 (4.55) 3 (6.82)
Planning 2 (9.09) 2 (9.09) 4(18.18)
TOTAL 22(100.00) 22(100.00) 44(100.00)
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Mean group ratings of the effectiveness of each participant’s most frequently employed 
avoidance and engagement thought control strategies on dimensions of thoughts about 
appearance were compared using an ANCOVA, in order to test the following 
hypotheses:
4) that, compared to people with ‘normal concerns’, people with BDD would report 
significantly lower effectiveness of their 2 most frequently employed strategies (1 
involving avoidance of thoughts and 1 involving engagement with thoughts) at reducing 
the frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance.
5) that the most frequently employed engagement strategy would be rated significantly 
more effective than the most frequently employed avoidance strategy, at reducing the 
frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance, regardless 
of group.
There was 1 between-participants factor (group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control 
group) and 2 within-participants factors (1 (strategy type) with 2 levels (avoidance; 
engagement) and 1 (thought dimension) with 3 levels (frequency; intensity; distress)). 
Co-variates were age (years) and level of education (1-5).
Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) 
are given in table 22 below.
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Table 19: Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) of 
ratings of effectiveness o f most frequently employed avoidance strategy and engagement strategy at 
reducing 3 dimensions of thoughts about appearance (frequency, intensity and distress)
THOUGHT
DIMENSION BDD GROUP
CONTROL
GROUP BOTH GROUPS
AVOIDANCF
STRATEGY Frequency 1.147 (0.269) 2.580 (0.269) 1.864 (0.160)
Intensity 1.544(0.271) 2.729 (0.271) 2.136 (0.161)
Distress 1.127 (0.299) 2.691 (0.299) 1.909 (0.178)
Overall
effectiveness 1.273 (0.242) 2.667 (0.242) 1.970(0.144)
ENGAGEMENT
STRATEGY Frequency 0.620 (0.263) 2.471 (0.263) 1.545 (0.156)
Intensity 1.200 (0.265) 2.754 (0.265) 1.977(0.158)
Distress 1.115(0.222) 2.931 (0.222) 2.023 (0.132)
Overall
effectiveness 0.978 (0.218) 2.719(0.218) 1.848(0.130)
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After controlling for age and level of education, a significant main effect of group was 
found (F (1,40) = 30.351, p < 0.01), confirming the a priori prediction (hypothesis 7), 
that people with BDD would report significantly lower overall effectiveness of their 
most frequently employed avoidance and engagement strategies, than control 
participants. After controlling for age and level of education, no significant main effect 
of strategy type was found (F (1,40) = 0.479, p = 0.493). Therefore, the a priori 
prediction (hypothesis 8), that the most frequently employed engagement strategy would 
be significantly more effective than the most frequently employed avoidance strategy, at 
reducing the frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance 
was not confirmed.
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3.2.5) Associated Affect
In order to test subsidiary hypothesis 7 (that people with BDD, compared to people with 
‘normal concerns’ about appearance, will report significantly greater negative affect 
associated with thoughts about appearance), mean group ratings of strength of negative 
affect were compared using an ANCOVA. There was 1 between-participants factor 
(group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control group) and 1 within-participants factor (type 
of negative affect) with 6 levels (sadness; anxiety; guilt; anger; fear; shame). Covariates 
were education level (1-5) and age (years). Estimated marginal means (and standard 
error) (after partialling out education and age) for strength of the 6 types of negative 
affect are given in table 8.
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Table 20: Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) for 
strength o f 6 types o f negative affect
TYPE OF
NEGATIVE AFFECT BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Sadness 3.306 (0.220) 1.058(0.220) 2.182(0.131)
Anxiety 2.997 (0.267) 1.023 (0.267) 2.000(0.159)
Guilt 1.973 (0.311) 1.027 (0.311) 1.500 (0.185)
Anger 2.254 (0.354) 0.837 (0.354) 1.545 (0.211)
Fear 2.552 (0.247) 0.160(0.247) 1.341 (0.147)
Shame 3.133(0.222) 0.548 (0.222) 1.841 (0.132)
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After controlling for age and education level, a significant main effect of group was 
found (F (1,40) = 41.447, p < 0.001), confirming a priori predictions, that people with 
BDD would report higher overall strength of negative affect than control participants. A 
significant interaction between group and type of negative affect was found (Wilk’s 
Lambda = 0.662, F (5, 36) = 3.674, p = 0.009). This was not predicted, and should 
therefore be considered cautiously. Nonetheless, consideration of the main effect of 
group in the context of an interaction can lead to a more specific interpretation of the 
overall finding of higher strength of negative affect associated with thoughts about 
appearance in the BDD group.
Simple main effects of group were explored, by conducting uncorrected pairwise 
comparisons among estimated marginal means (after controlling for education and age), 
the results of which are reported in table 9 below. On average, the BDD group reported 
higher strength of all types of negative affect associated with appearance-related 
thoughts than the control group. After Bonferroni adjustments, differences in group 
means for all types of negative affect reached statistical significance, except for guilt. 
The effect size for anger was small, that for anxiety was small to medium, while the 
effect sizes for sadness and fear were medium (Cohen, 1988).
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Table 21: Results o f uncorrected pairwise comparisons among estimated marginal means for strength of 
negative affect (after controlling for age and education)
NEGATIVE 
AFFECT TYPE
BDD group 
mean - 
Control 
group 
mean
Standa
rd
Error t
Significan
ce
(P)
Estimated 
efTect size 
(partial eta 
sqaured)
Observed
power
Sadness 2.248 0.353 6.371 <0.001 0.504 1.000
Anxiety 1.954 0.429 4.556 <0.001 0.342 0.994
Guilt 0.945 0.500 1.893 0.066 0.082 0.455
Anger 1.417 0.569 2.491 0.017 0.134 0.681
Fear 2.362 0.397 5.946 <0.001 0.469 1.000
Shame 2.585 0.356 7.254 <0.001 0.568 1.000
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3.2.6) Impact on functioning
In order to test subsidiary hypothesis 8 (that people with BDD, compared to people with 
‘normal concerns’ about appearance, will report that thoughts about appearance have a 
significantly greater impact on functioning), mean group ratings of impact of thoughts 
on functioning were compared using an ANCOVA. There was 1 between-participants 
factor (group) with 2 levels (BDD group; control group) and 1 within-participants factor 
(aspect of functioning) with 4 levels (family life; school/study/work; intimate 
relationships; and social life and leisure activities). Covariates were education level (1-
5) and age (years). Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out 
education and age) for impact of thoughts about appearance on 4 aspects of functioning 
are given in table 10.
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Table 22: Estimated marginal means (and standard error) (after partialling out education and age) for 
impact of thoughts about appearance on 4 aspects of functioning
ASPECT OF 
FUNCTIONING BDD GROUP CONTROL GROUP BOTH GROUPS
Family life 1.741 (0.262) 0.259 (0.262) 1.000 (0.156)
School / study / work 2.285 (0.231) 0.488 (0.231) 1.386 (0.137)
Intimate relationships 3.057 (0.255) 0.716(0.255) 1.886 (0.152)
Social life and leisure 
activities 2.508 (0.216) 0.719(0.216) 1.614(0.129)
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After controlling for age and education level, a significant main effect of group was 
found (F (1,40) = 44.78, p < 0.001), confirming a priori predictions, that people with 
BDD would report higher impact of thoughts about appearance on functioning than 
control participants. No significant interaction between group and impact of thoughts 
about appearance on aspect of functioning was found (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.948, F (3, 38) 
= 0.698, p = 0.559), indicating that it is not appropriate to explore simple main effects.
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4) Discussion
4.1) Sum m ary o f key findings
This study aimed to investigate the content of appearance-related thoughts and 
associated metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies in people with BDD and 
people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance. The main findings of the study 
were:
1) As predicted, the content of thoughts about appearance was broadly similar in people 
with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance, apart from the fact 
that people with BDD were significantly more likely to report experiencing future- 
oriented thoughts than people with ‘normal concerns4.
2) As predicted, people with BDD endorsed negative metacognitive beliefs (regarding 
both the uncontrollability and danger and the responsibility, superstition and punishment 
associated with thoughts about appearance) more strongly than people with ‘normal 
concerns’. There was no such significant difference with regard to positive 
metacognitive beliefs, however.
3) People with BDD reported employing more punishment, reappraisal and worry
strategies, while the ‘normal concerns’ group employed more distraction and social 
control strategies. Only the differences for social control and punishment reached
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statistical significance, but this nevertheless provides support for the hypothesis that 
there would be significant differences between the 2 groups, with regard to frequency of 
use of different types of thought control strategy.
4) As predicted, compared to people with ‘normal concerns’, people with BDD reported 
significantly lower effectiveness of their 2 most frequently employed strategies (1 
involving avoidance of thoughts and 1 involving engagement with thoughts) at reducing 
the frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance.
5) Contrary to predictions, the most frequently employed engagement strategy was not 
significantly more effective than the most frequently employed avoidance strategy, at 
reducing the frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about 
appearance, regardless of group.
6) Compared to people with ‘normal concerns’, people with BDD reported significantly 
higher frequency of appearance-related thoughts pertaining to self-criticism and the 
future, but there were no significant differences with regard to the 4 other types of 
thoughts about appearance.
7) As predicted, people with BDD reported significantly higher levels of negative affect 
associated with thoughts about appearance than people with ‘normal concerns’. When 
examined more closely, this significant difference between the groups applied for 5 of 6 
types of negative affect.
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8) Compared to people with normal concerns regarding appearance, people with BDD 
reported that thoughts about appearance were associated with significantly greater 
impact on functioning, as predicted.
4.2) Interpretation of findings and relationship to existing literature
4.2.1) Content o f  appearance-related thoughts
Both descriptive and quantitative data were used to investigate thought content 
similarities and differences between people with BDD and people with ‘normal 
concerns’ regarding appearance. Together, these 2 types of data constitute preliminary 
evidence that the content of thoughts about appearance is broadly similar in people with 
BDD and people with normal concerns about appearance. This is in line with findings 
relating to obsessive thoughts (Rachman and De Silva, 1978), worry (Craske et al., 
1989) and appearance related thoughts and images (Cash et al., 1986; Osman et al., 
2004).
4.2.1 .i) Descriptive data
All 44 participants spontaneously reported at least 1 appearance-related thought which 
was classifiable according to a coding grid with 6 predetermined thought categories'J.
13 The 6 categories are: critical/self-attacking thoughts, past-oriented thoughts, thoughts about what others 
might think, future-oriented thoughts, comparing thoughts, planning to change one’s appearance.
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For both groups, critical/self-attacking thoughts were most frequently reported, followed 
by thinking about what others might think for the BDD group, and past-oriented 
thoughts for the control group.
It was intended that by posing an open question, thought content beyond the a priori 
categories would be captured, but almost all spontaneously mentioned thoughts were 
accommodated by the grid (only 4 participants reported unclassifiable thoughts). All 6 
thought categories were assigned thoughts volunteered by participants in both of the 
groups. This would suggest that the 6 categories are face valid, appropriate and 
sufficient for investigating the appearance-related thoughts of both people with BDD 
and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance. The use of these categories in 
the ‘quantitative data’ section on thought content would therefore seem justified, 
although one should remain open to the possibility that additional categories might 
emerge in future research with a larger sample and that the thought content category list 
would then need to be expanded.
4.2.1.ii) Quantitative data
The hypothesis (1) that there would be no significant difference between the 2 groups, 
with regard to whether or not they report experiencing 6 different types of thoughts 
about appearance when prompted, was mostly supported.
When asked about each of the thought types in turn (regardless of whether or not the
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thought type had been mentioned in response to the open question), people with BDD 
were no more or less likely to report experiencing 5 of the 6 different categories of 
thoughts about appearance than people with ‘normal concerns’. Participants with BDD 
were, however, significantly more likely to report experiencing future-oriented thoughts 
(worrying about how they will look in the future, for example) than people with ‘normal 
concerns’. It is difficult to make further interpretation of these findings, other than to 
say that they require replication, ideally with larger samples.
4.2.2) Frequency o f appearance-related thoughts
As predicted (hypothesis 6), participants with BDD reported significantly higher overall 
frequency of thoughts regarding appearance, compared to the ‘normal concerns’ group. 
Although no specific predictions were made regarding individual thought types, closer 
examination of the different thought types was nonetheless informative. The difference 
between the 2 groups was only significant for self-attacking thoughts and future- 
oriented thoughts, but not past-oriented thoughts, comparing thoughts, thoughts about 
what others might think and planning to change one’s appearance.
It is possible that the non-significant differences between the groups for 4 of 6 thought 
category types could be partly explained by the conservative choice of control group and 
increased Type II error rate owing to the adjustment of statistical significance cut-offs, 
using the modified Bonferroni procedure. Examination of the associated p values 
indicates, however, that only 1 further thought type (comparing) would have been
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associated with a statistically significant difference, if no adjustments had been made for 
multiple tests. Replication with larger sample sizes would certainly be informative.
Examination of the wording of the interview questions also raises a potential problem 
with the interpretation of these findings. Participants were asked ‘When you are 
thinking about or preoccupied with your appearance, how often do you experience 
thoughts about....?’. Discussion after the interview revealed that some participants had 
reported how often they experience each type of thought as a proportion of total time 
spent preoccupied with appearance, while other participants had reported frequency as a 
proportion of all time available. It is likely that the former strategy would result in 
smaller differences between the groups. The wording of these questions would require 
refinement for future research.
The verbal labels attached to the rating scale also warrant discussion. The inclusion 
criteria for the control group stated that no more than 1 hour per day should be spent 
dwelling on thoughts about appearance. For those control group participants reporting 
frequency of the various thoughts as a proportion of all time available, one would not 
therefore expect responses higher than ‘sometimes’ (the following scale point was ‘half 
the time’, suggesting that people were spending half their waking hours preoccupied 
with a particular type of appearance-related thought). Revision of the rating scale labels 
and perhaps extension of the scale itself seem desirable for future research.
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4.2.3) Metacognitive beliefs
Both descriptive and quantitative data were used to explore metacognitive beliefs.
4.2.3.i) Descriptive data
4.2.3.i.a) Advantages/gains of being preoccupied with thoughts about appearance
In response to an open question regarding advantages/gains of being preoccupied with 
appearance, 12 of 22 BDD group participants and 20 of 22 control group participants 
spontaneously reported advantages/gains. Motivation to improve appearance was the 
advantage most frequently reported by participants in the control group, while BDD 
group participants reported avoidance of other worries or social intimacy and motivation 
to improve appearance most frequently, compared to other advantages.
It was intended that by posing an open question, advantages and gains beyond the a 
priori categories would be captured, but almost all spontaneously mentioned advantages 
were accommodated by 4 of the 5 a priori coding grid categories: empathy for others, 
insight/self-awareness, avoidance (either of other worries or social intimacy) and 
motivation to improve appearance (only 4 participants reported unclassifiable thoughts). 
One category was found to be redundant: coming to terms with difficulties. It would 
seem that the remaining 4 coding grid categories are face valid, appropriate and
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sufficient for exploring advantages/gains of being preoccupied with appearance. The 
categories could serve as a basis for further research comparing the 2 groups with regard 
to strength of BDD-specific metacognitive belief perhaps.
4.2.3.i.b) Disadvantages of being preoccupied with thoughts about appearance
All participants, except for 4 from the control group, spontaneously reported 
disadvantages associated with being preoccupied with appearance, in response to an 
open question. Negative impact on social life and relationships was the disadvantage 
most often reported by the BDD group, while the control participants reported increase 
in low mood and/or anxiety most frequently, compared to other disadvantages. This 
may reflect the fact that the preoccupation of the control group is less severe and 
therefore less likely to impact on social functioning.
Contrary to expectations of capturing novel material, all but 9 spontaneously mentioned 
disadvantages were accommodated by the 4 predetermined categories: increase of low 
mood and/or anxiety, wastes time, negative impact on social life and relationships and 
negative impact on career. It would be helpful to add a further category to the coding 
grid for future research: being unable to think about other issues. Otherwise, it would 
seem that the coding grid is appropriate for categorising disadvantages associated with 
thoughts about appearance and could be used as a basis for further research on this topic 
or as a guide for assessment.
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4.2.3.i.c) Negative consequences o f giving up being preoccupied with
appearance
In response to an open question regarding possible negative consequences of giving up 
being preoccupied with appearance, 14 BDD group participants and 11 control group 
participants reported either that nothing bad could happen or that they did not know 
what would happen. All but 2 spontaneously mentioned consequences were 
accommodated by the 3 predetermined categories: physical health would suffer, 
appearance would suffer and preoccupation would shift to other issues, not related to 
appearance, suggesting that this coding grid would serve as a useful guide for both 
clinical assessment and further research.
Concern that the preoccupation might shift to other issues was mentioned by only 1 
control group participant and by none of the BDD group participants, indicating perhaps 
that it could be excluded from future coding grids. Further investigation using a larger 
sample might help to verify this. Furthermore, it is of interest that all classifiable BDD 
group consequences were categorised within the ‘appearance would suffer’ category, 
while control group participants’ responses fell in all 3 categories. This suggests 
potential differences between the precise content of BDD and control group 
participants’ ideas of possible negative consequences if they were to give up being 
preoccupied with appearance. This hypothesis would of course require empirical 
validation, using quantitative data to assess strength of belief, for example.
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4.2.3.i.d) Negative consequences o f remaining preoccupied or being unable to
control thoughts about appearance
All participants spontaneously reported at least 1 belief regarding the possible negative 
consequences of remaining preoccupied with or being unable to control thoughts about 
appearance. Consequences most frequently reported by BDD group participants 
concerned becoming crazy/mad or being admitted to a psychiatric hospital, becoming 
housebound, becoming depressed and trying to kill oneself. The negative consequences 
most frequently mentioned by control group participants pertained to losing confidence 
and self esteem, negative impact on job or career, negative impact on social life and 
relationships and becoming depressed.
According to the coding grid categories, 9 beliefs were unclassifiable, although the 
addition of 2 further categories (resorting to cosmetic surgery and worsening 
preoccupation) would accommodate 5 of these. As intended, the open question captured 
consequences beyond the a priori categories, although all but 1 (negative impact on 
physical health) of the original categories were found to be appropriate.
It is of interest that no BDD participants endorsed either negative impact on social 
life/relationships or loss of confidence or self-esteem. It is likely that this is because 
they are already suffering these consequences as a result of the BDD and do not 
therefore fear them as possible negative consequences of increased preoccupation. 
Furthermore, several of the consequences mentioned most frequently by people with
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BDD (becoming housebound, trying to kill oneself and going crazy) were only 
mentioned by a maximum of 1 person from the control group. It is possible that this can 
be explained in part by the fact that many of the participants with BDD had read about 
people in such predicaments on internet self-help sites, while people with normal 
concerns found it hard to conceive of worries about appearance becoming so extreme. 
This hypothesis requires further investigation.
4.2.3.ii) Quantitative data (MCQ)
The hypothesis (2) that people with BDD would endorse both positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs significantly more strongly than people with ‘normal concerns’ 
regarding appearance was partly supported by analysis of MCQ scores. Certainly, 
people with BDD endorsed both types of negative metacognitive beliefs (regarding the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts about appearance and the responsibility, 
superstition and punishment associated with thoughts about appearance) significantly 
more strongly than the control group, but the same was not found to be the case for 
positive metacognitive beliefs.
Before discussing these findings in more detail, it is useful to briefly consider the MCQ 
itself. It is questionable whether 2 of the scales on the MCQ actually relate to 
metacognitive beliefs (the cognitive competence subscale, which mainly comprises 
items regarding confidence in memory, and the cognitive self-consciousness scale, 
which pertains to monitoring of thoughts). It was felt that the cognitive competence
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subscale has little relevance to BDD, as, unlike in OCD, thoughts do not centre so much 
around whether or not one has performed particular actions. It could be argued that 
people with BDD are by definition more cognitively self-conscious, given that BDD is a 
disorder of preoccupation with particular thoughts. For these reasons, it was decided to 
disregard these 2 subscales from comparative analyses.
In the absence of a BDD-specific measure of metacognitive beliefs, the MCQ was 
selected as the most suitable measure, partly because of its psychometric properties and 
partly because most of the questions could be interpreted to refer to thoughts and worry 
about appearance, rather than to general intrusive thoughts or worries, without re­
wording individual items. Participants were instructed at the beginning to interpret all 
items as referring to thoughts about appearance only and not to other thoughts, but it is 
difficult to assess how successful people were in following these instructions, especially 
given the length of the measure (65 items). Given the fact that the descriptive data 
indicates the existence of appearance-specific metacognitive beliefs and that research on 
hypochondriasis (Emmelkamp and Aardema, 1999) pointed towards the necessity of 
investigating health-related metacognitions, it would seem reasonable to advocate the 
construction of a measure of appearance-specific metacognitive beliefs, to complement 
more general measures, such as the MCQ. The coding grids used for the descriptive 
data in the current study could be used for this purpose.
Interestingly, the control group endorsed positive beliefs regarding thinking about 
appearance more strongly than the BDD group, but this difference did not reach
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statistical significance. This finding (that people with BDD did not report significantly 
more positive metacognitive beliefs on the MCQ than the control group) contradicted 
predictions made on the basis of research on other disorders and is complemented by the 
aforementioned findings from descriptive data, that considerably fewer people in the 
BDD group, than in the control group, spontaneously reported advantages associated 
with being preoccupied about appearance. Furthermore, over 50 percent of the BDD 
group reported that nothing bad could happen if they gave up being preoccupied with 
appearance. These findings, taken together, suggest that positive metacognitive beliefs 
are potentially less relevant to BDD than they are to other disorders such as OCD (e.g. 
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997), GAD (e.g. Wells, 2000) and depression (e.g. 
Watkins and Baracaia, 2001). It should be noted, however, that appearance-specific 
metacognitive beliefs are not included in the MCQ. The descriptive data suggest that 
appearance-specific positive beliefs regarding the positive impact of being preoccupied 
with appearance on appearance itself might well be of relevance to understanding 
appearance concerns. This hypothesis could be empirically evaluated if a measure of 
appearance-specific metacognitive beliefs were developed.
BDD group participants endorsed negative metacognitive beliefs regarding the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts about appearance and regarding responsibility, 
superstition and punishment significantly more strongly than participants with ‘normal 
concerns’. The former subscale includes items regarding the potential negative 
consequences of particular thoughts on mental health, physical health, ability to control 
thoughts and ability to attend and concentrate. The descriptive data discussed above
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complements this finding, particularly with regard to beliefs regarding impact on mental 
health (compared to participants with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance, 
considerably more BDD group participants spontaneously reported potential negative 
consequences of thinking about appearance for mental health (e.g. becoming crazy and 
trying to kill oneself)).
The findings for both negative metacognitive belief subscales corresponds to literature 
on other disorders, such as OCD (e.g. Wells and Papageorgiou, 1998), GAD (e.g. 
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997) and depression (e.g. Papageorgiou and Wells, 
2001), for which such beliefs have been found to distinguish clinical and non-clinical 
participants.
As new measures of metacognitive beliefs become available, this line of research should 
be repeated with larger samples, in order to replicate and extend the current findings.
4.2.4) Thought control strategies
Again, descriptive and quantitative data were used to explore strategies employed to 
control thoughts about appearance.
4.2.4.i) Descriptive data
All participants spontaneously reported employing thought control strategies in response
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to thoughts about appearance when asked an open question, which is consistent with 
existing research findings that 92 percent of non-clinical participants employ effortful 
strategies in response to intrusive thoughts (Freeston et al., 1991)
The 2 strategies most frequently reported by both participants with BDD and 
participants with ‘normal concerns’ were thinking about something else and 
rationalising thoughts. Interestingly, convincing oneself that appearance is unimportant 
was commonly used by control group participants, but not BDD group participants (7 
control group participants spontaneously mentioned this strategy, compared to just 1 
BDD group participant). Given that the belief that appearance is an important self- 
defining characteristic is posited as 1 of the defining features of BDD (see Veale et al., 
1996), it comes as little surprise that BDD group participants did not select a cognitively 
dissonant strategy.
Almost all of the coding categories were found to be appropriate and were assigned 
strategies mentioned by at least 2 participants. Just 1 category was found to be 
redundant and should probably be excluded from any future research using this coding 
grid: asking people if they have similar thoughts. Twenty strategies were deemed 
unclassifiable according to the coding grid, but 15 of these were not strictly speaking 
mental thought control strategies (they pertained instead to engaging in a distracting 
activity). The inclusion of an additional category (telling oneself there is nothing one 
can do about the feature) would accommodate 3 further strategies. The remaining 2 
strategies were reported by the same BDD participant and referred to compulsions.
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Given that these were not mentioned by other participants, if is probable that it would 
not be appropriate to include these as a category in the coding grid. Further research 
with a larger sample would verify this.
In summary, it would seem that most of the strategy categories in the coding grid are 
face valid and appropriate for exploring thought control strategy use in people with 
BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance. The adapted coding 
grid (including the proposed additional category (telling oneself there is nothing one can 
do about the feature)) could therefore be used as a guide for examining the differences 
between the 2 groups further, looking at frequency of use of the various strategy types, 
for example.
4.2.4.ii) Quantitative data
4.2.4.ii.a) TCQ
The hypothesis (3), that there would be significant differences between people with 
BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, regarding frequency of use 
of different strategies was supported by analysis of TCQ scores. The BDD group 
reported using more punishment, reappraisal and worry strategies, while the ‘normal 
concerns’ group employed more distraction and social control strategies. Only the 
differences for social control and punishment reached statistical significance, however.
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Before reviewing these findings further, it is useful to briefly discuss the TCQ itself. 
Like the MCQ, the TCQ was selected as the most appropriate measure of metacognitive 
strategies of thought control, in the absence of a BDD-specific measure. Again this 
decision was made partly because of the measure’s psychometric properties and partly 
because most items could be interpreted to refer to thoughts and worry about appearance 
without rewording. Participants were instructed at the beginning to interpret all items as 
referring to thoughts about appearance only and not other thoughts, but again it is 
difficult to assess to what extent people were able to adhere to these instructions. In 
spite of these problems, the TCQ is well-validated and is 1 of very few measures of 
thought control strategy
The finding regarding punishment strategies (getting angry and shouting at oneself for 
having particular thoughts, for example) is consistent with the findings of Wells and 
Davies (1994), who found that punishment strategies were associated with neuroticism, 
public self-consciousness and trait anxiety. Furthermore, Amir et al. (1997) found that 
people with OCD or another anxiety disorder reported employing strategies involving 
punishment significantly more frequently than non-clinical control participants and 
Reynolds and Wells (1999) found that use of punishment strategies was predictive of 
depression scores in people with depression.
The significant finding regarding social control (people who scored higher on this 
subscale reported that they more frequently talked to other people about the thought) 
contradicts Amir et al.’s (1997) finding that people with OCD reported employing
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strategies involving social control significantly more frequently than non-clinical control 
participants. It is possible that social control as a thought control strategy is less 
available to people with BDD, because many of them are socially isolated, sometimes to 
the point of being housebound (Phillips et al., 1993). The shame associated with BDD 
might further contribute to people preferring not to talk about the thoughts.
4.2.4.ii.b) Effectiveness of thought control strategies
As predicted (hypothesis 4), compared with people to normal concerns regarding 
appearance, participants with BDD reported significantly lower overall effectiveness of 
their 2 most frequently employed strategies (avoidance and engagement) at reducing the 
frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts about appearance. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Ladouceur et al. (2000), that people with OCD 
or other anxiety disorders reported significantly lower efficiency of thought control 
strategies in general, than non-clinical participants. It also makes intuitive sense, for if 
people with BDD had found effective strategies, they would presumably be less troubled 
by the preoccupation (and therefore perhaps not meet the diagnostic criteria for BDD).
Hypothesis 5 predicted that, compared to the most frequently employed avoidance 
strategy, the most frequently employed engagement strategy would be significantly 
more effective at reducing the frequency, intensity and distress associated with thoughts 
about appearance, regardless of group. This hypothesis was not supported (neither type 
of strategy was significantly more or less effective than the other), which is somewhat
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surprising, given Matthew’s (1990) ideas regarding avoidance techniques reducing 
exposure to thoughts and therefore rendering extinction less likely. The current finding 
is in line with Freeston et al.’s (1995) findings, however; that all strategies used in 
response to intrusive thoughts were equally efficient.
It is important to note, that no distinction was made in the interview questions between 
long and short-term effectiveness, however, and it is likely that this may have affected 
the reliability of the ratings. It is possible that avoidance strategies may be immediately 
effective, but counter-productive in the longer-term, while engagement strategies might 
seem less effective in the short-term. This could be explored in future research.
If one examines the list of strategies categorised as ‘engagement’ strategies, it is likely 
that many of these are in fact aimed at ultimate avoidance of thoughts about appearance, 
rendering the distinction between the 2 categories somewhat unreliable. Freeston and 
Ladouceur (1997) discuss cases where strategies taught in cognitive therapy (e.g. 
thought challenging) can become so-called ‘neutralising strategies4, which avoid 
exposure to the thought. Many of the participants with BDD in the current study had 
learned cognitive therapy techniques and it is possible that these had inadvertently 
become ways of avoiding appearance-related thoughts. Those strategies would then 
have been incorrectly classified as engagement strategies. Freeston et al. (1991) argue 
for a distinction, within Salkovskis’ notion of neutralising activity as any intentional, 
effortful strategy employed in response to intrusive thoughts, between escape/avoidance 
and sustained attention (engagement) strategies. They posit that sustained attention
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strategies do not actually seek to terminate exposure to the thought. It would seem more 
reasonable to argue that careful analysis is required on an individual basis regarding 
whether sustained attention (engagement) strategies aim to terminate exposure to the 
thought or not. This viewpoint is supported by Freeston and Ladouceur’s (1997) 
emphasis on the difficulty in reliably distinguishing strategies that should be targeted for 
response prevention in interventions for OCD. The heterogeneity of strategies within 
each group in the current study also renders the engagement versus avoidance 
distinction questionable and points towards the need for closer examination of each 
individual strategy prior to any classification in both therapy and future research.
4.2.5) Negative affect associated with thoughts about appearance.
Participants with BDD reported significantly higher overall negative affect associated 
with thoughts about appearance than people with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, 
as predicted (subsidiary hypothesis 7). Although not predicted specifically, it is of 
interest that the difference between the groups was significant for sadness, worry, anger, 
fear, shame, but not for guilt.
The main finding that compared to people with ‘normal concerns’ regarding appearance, 
people with BDD experience higher negative affect associated with thoughts about 
appearance confirms intuitive expectations, in light of the BDD diagnostic criterion of 
significant distress and the limited research already conducted on mood changes in BDD 
(e.g. Phillips, Siniscalchi and McElroy, 2004). It is difficult to make sense of the non­
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significant finding for guilt. A number of participants with BDD said they were being 
encouraged to abandon guilt in therapy and that being given a diagnostic label was 
helping them to feel less guilty. This explanation is somewhat anecdotal however and 
future research aiming to replicate and extend these findings on negative affect is clearly 
necessary, ideally using larger samples.
4.2.6) Impact on functioning
Compared to participants with ‘normal concerns’ about appearance, participants with 
BDD reported that thoughts about appearance have a significantly greater impact on 
functioning, confirming predictions (subsidiary hypothesis 8). This is in line with 
expectations, given the findings of Phillips (2000) on the poor quality of life associated 
with BDD and the fact that impairment in social and occupational functioning 
constitutes a diagnostic criterion for BDD. Replication with larger sample sizes is 
necessary.
4.2.7) General issues
It should be noted that age was controlled for in all analyses. The mean age of control 
participants was 25.55 years and considerably closer to adolescence than that of the 
participants with BDD (33.91 years). Concerns regarding physical development peak in 
adolescence (see Biby, 1998) and it is possible that the younger mean age of control 
participants might have decreased differences between the 2 groups. Given the already
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conservative choice of control group, it was felt that some balance should be aimed for, 
by controlling for age. Education level was also controlled for in all analyses, although 
one should perhaps bear in mind that education was measured by highest educational 
qualification. Given the fact that many participants reported suffering from BDD since 
adolescence, it is highly likely that their educational achievements might have suffered. 
Therefore, the difference between the 2 groups in terms of education does not 
necessarily reflect a difference in IQ. Ethnicity was not controlled for. Although it is 
clear from existing research that ethnicity could influence concerns about appearance 
(see Cash and Pruzinsky, 2002), the differences in ethnicity between the 2 groups in the 
current study were minimal.
At a time when research on BDD is in its infancy and clinically-relevant findings are 
urgently needed, it did not seem appropriate to include depression, anxiety or worry as 
co-variates in statistical analyses, in spite of the existence of significant differences 
between the 2 groups. This decision could be criticised, but given that clinically 
significant distress constitutes a diagnostic criterion for BDD and that empirical 
evidence suggests that up to 80 percent of people with BDD also suffer from clinical 
depression (Cororve and Gleaves, 2001), one might question whether it is possible to 
conceive of BDD without depressed mood. Consideration of rates of co-morbidity with 
other anxiety disorders and the integral nature of worry to BDD can be used to justify 
the decision not to control for anxiety or worry in analyses.
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4 3 ) T heoretical and  clinical im plications of the findings
In summary, it would seem that the content of thoughts about appearance is similar in 
people with BDD and people with normal concerns regarding appearance. People with 
BDD endorse negative metacognitive beliefs significantly more strongly, however. 
Descriptive data suggest that appearance-specific positive metacognitive beliefs might 
be of relevance to BDD, but this requires confirmation in future research. The 2 most 
frequently employed thought control strategies used by participants with BDD were 
significantly less effective than those used by participants with ‘normal concerns’ 
regarding appearance. Strategies involving avoidance of the thoughts about appearance 
were not found to be significantly less effective than those involving engagement with 
the thoughts.
These findings have implications for cognitive-behavioural models of BDD and possible 
maintenance mechanisms. Veale’s (2004) model, outlined above, needs to be modified 
to include metacognitive beliefs and mental strategies of thought control. A proposed 
revised model would begin with a trigger (the sight of oneself in a mirror, for example). 
This would activate a distorted internal image, which in turn would activate beliefs 
about oneself as an aesthetic object, the importance of appearance itself and the possible 
advantages of worrying about appearance (positive metacognitive beliefs). These 
beliefs would increase the attention to the internal image (thereby distorting it further) 
and also activate appearance-related thoughts pertaining to self-criticism, comparing, the 
future, the past, planning to change appearance and others’ views of one’s appearance.
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These thoughts would in turn trigger cognitions about the possible negative 
consequences of remaining preoccupied with thoughts about appearance (negative 
metacognitive beliefs). Mental strategies of thought control (particularly involving 
punishment), safety behaviours/avoidance and negative affect (sadness, anxiety, fear, 
anger, shame) would ensue and would inadvertently reinforce both the original thoughts 
and the negative metacognitive beliefs, thereby maintaining the preoccupation.
An idiosyncratic example of this revised model might involve someone catching sight of 
their reflection while walking past a shop window, at which point a distorted internal 
image of flawed skin becomes activated. This internal image would activate beliefs, 
such as, ‘If I keep thinking about my skin, it will stop it from getting any worse’ 
(positive metacognitive belief) and ‘I must look perfect, otherwise people will reject 
me’. These beliefs would increase the attention to the internal image distorting it further 
and also activate thoughts, such as ‘I’m ugly’ (self-attacking thought), ‘Her skin is so 
much better than mine’ (comparing thought), ‘What if my skin gets worse?’ (future- 
oriented thought), ‘If only I’d remembered to take my make-up off before I went to bed 
last night’ (past-oriented thought), ‘She must think I don’t take care of myself at all’ 
(thought about what others might think) and ‘I wonder how I can get laser treatment’ 
(thought about planning to change one’s appearance). These thoughts would in turn 
trigger beliefs, such as ‘If I keep worrying about my skin, I’m going to end up going 
crazy and killing myself (negative metacognitive belief). Attempts would be made to 
control all these thoughts, by checking in the mirror numerous times and applying thick 
layers of foundation (safety behaviours) or by getting angry at oneself or punishing
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oneself in one’s head (mental strategy of thought control). The person would feel 
ashamed and anxious (negative affect), but this, together with the safety behaviours and 
mental strategies of thought control would only serve to maintain the thoughts, beliefs, 
distorted image and self-focussed attention.
These findings also have implications for the assessment of BDD. At assessment, 
people should be routinely asked about metacognitive beliefs, in addition to thoughts 
and images pertaining to appearance. For the meantime, existing measures of 
metacognitive beliefs should be used (e.g. the MCQ), with particular attention to the 2 
negative belief subscales. Such measures should be supplemented with questions about 
appearance-specific metacognitive beliefs, such as the idea that worrying about 
appearance can improve appearance. The coding grids from the current study have been 
shown to be potentially robust assessment tools and should certainly be used as guides 
for assessment. Once an appearance-specific measure of metacognitive beliefs has been 
developed, this should be administered routinely. Aswell as asking about safety 
behaviours, the assessor should also enquire about mental strategies of thought control 
(perhaps using measures such as the TCQ), being particularly attentive to strategies 
involving punishment.
These findings inevitably have implications for cognitive-behavioural interventions for 
people with BDD. The fact that the content of thoughts about appearance is similar in 
both groups suggests that little would be gained by challenging the content of the 
thoughts in the first instance. The sometimes delusional nature of the appearance-
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related thoughts in BDD also renders direct content challenging counter-productive and 
unacceptable to many people with BDD. Rather, metacognitive beliefs should be 
targetted, in addition to beliefs about the importance of appearance itself. In addition to 
working to reduce safety behaviours and avoidance, mental strategies of thought control 
that might be preventing exposure and inadvertently maintaining the preoccupation 
should be abandoned, particularly those involving punishment. It is important to 
explore the thought control strategy repertoire of each individual in great detail, to 
establish to what extent the strategies involve avoidance. It should not be assumed that 
classic cognitive therapy techniques such as thought challenging are exempt from this, 
as they too may have become avoidance techniques. Research into the effectiveness of 
therapy incorporating these additional elements should be begun at the earliest 
opportunity to ensure evidence-based practice.
4.4) Limitations of the study
The current study has a clinical sample size, considerably larger than many of the BDD 
outcome research studies (e.g. Wilhelm, et al., 1999). As indicated in existing research 
(e.g. Veale et al., 1996), it is difficult to engage people with BDD in assessment and 
research, perhaps because of the associated shame and social isolation. Many 
participants reported feeling anxious about the interview, because it involved meeting 
someone new and disclosing information they found shameful. A larger sample should 
be recruited for future research, but a lengthier time-frame would be required.
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As mentioned above, there is little precedent in the BDD literature for devising inclusion 
and exclusion criteria for control groups. It was hoped that people who regularly attend 
gyms or beauty salons would have sufficient concerns about appearance to be able to 
respond to interview questions. The downside of this approach was that some control 
participants (despite meeting inclusion criteria according to BDDQ-R rating scales) had 
concerns which seemed to lie very close to the aforementioned indistinct boundary 
between BDD and normal concerns regarding appearance. Therefore, the comparison 
group may have been overly conservative, thereby reducing the power of the study. 
Comparison groups of people with other disorders were not included, limiting the scope 
of interpretation.
Finding a compromise between wanting to access novel information and wanting to 
capture breadth of experience was challenging. It is hoped that the combination of open 
questions and rating scale items (and the ensuing descriptive and quantitative data) 
maintained this balance, but one should nonetheless be aware of the potentially 
restrictive influence of predetermined items.
As mentioned above, the wording of selected items in the interview schedule (e.g. the 
questions about frequency of particular thought types) could have resulted in quite 
differing interpretations of those items. The reliability of the ensuing data is therefore 
questionable. Furthermore, participants’ ratings on selected scales seemed to evidence 
ceiling effects. This would need to be addressed in future research.
As discussed above, the ‘avoidance’ versus ‘engagement’ distinction regarding thought
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control strategies is problematic'**. More careful categorisation of strategies should be 
aimed for in future research. Furthermore, a considerable number of the BDD 
participants had experience of cognitive-behavioural therapy (either past or present) and 
it is possible that the strategies they reported had been learned in therapy. This might 
have affected the differences between the 2 groups with regard to strategy use.
The number of research hypotheses and ensuing statistical analyses could be viewed as a 
weakness of this study. Given that research on BDD is in its infancy, however, it was 
felt that an exploratory design of this nature was wholly appropriate. Furthermore, prior 
hypotheses were formed, the temptation to explore data post hoc was resisted and the 
approach to statistical analysis was carefully designed to compensate for the multiple 
tests15.
The current study does not address questions of causality, which could also be viewed as 
a weakness. Given that this study is the first systematic investigation of metacognition 
in BDD, however, associative hypotheses are wholly appropriate.
4.5) Suggestions for further research
One line of future research would be to replicate this study with a larger sample. As 
mentioned above, a lengthy time-frame would need to be planned for this. The 
aforementioned problems with the wording and rating scales of selected interview items
14 See page 170
15 See page 201-202 (Critical Appraisal) for further discussion o f this point
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would need to be addressed.
Future research should include comparison groups consisting of people with other 
disorders. The most appropriate inclusion and exclusion criteria for non-clinical 
comparison groups should be investigated.
An appearance-specific measure of metacognitive beliefs should be designed, perhaps 
using the coding grids from this study as a guide. This should be tested for reliability 
and validity on as large a sample as possible. Such a measure would have the advantage 
of being phenomenologically derived. Correlational studies on strength of belief in 
metacognitive beliefs and symptom severity would be informative. Longitudinal studies 
and experimental manipulation of metacognitive beliefs are required to capture any 
causal relationship between metacognitive beliefs and thoughts about appearance.
The current work on thought control strategies requires extension. Future studies could 
focus on strategies elicited by specific thoughts, long-term and short-term effectiveness 
of strategies, the usefulness of categorising strategies and the link between thought 
appraisal and strategy selection. Again, longitudinal and experimental studies are 
needed to address questions of causality.
The inclusion of metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies as targets for 
cognitive-behavioural intervention requires empirical validation. Randomised 
controlled trials are needed, comparing standard CBT, CBT with an additional focus on
180
References
Altamura, C., Paluello, M., Mundo, E., Medda, S. and Mannu, P. (2001). Clinical and 
subclinical body dysmorphic disorder. European Archive o f Psychiatry and Clinical 
Neuroscience, 251, 105-108.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental 
Disorders, (4th ed.). Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Amir, N., Cashman, L. and Foa, E. B. (1997). Strategies of thought control in obsessive- 
compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 775-777.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression 
Inventory. San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.
Biby, E. L. (1998). The Relationship between Body Dysmorphic Disorder and 
Depression, Self-Esteem, Somatization, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 54(4), 489-499.
Borkovec, T. D. and Roemer, L. (1995). Perceived functions of worry among 
generalised anxiety subjects: distraction from more emotionally distressing topics? 
Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 25-30.
182
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T. and DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary 
Exploration of Worry: Some Characteristics and Processes. Behavior Research and 
Therapy, 21(1), 9-16.
Brown, T. A., Antony, M. M. and Barlow, D. H. (1992). Psychometric properties of the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire in a clinical anxiety disorders sample. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 30(1), 33-37.
Cartwright-Hatton, S. and Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about worry and intrusions: the 
metacognitions questionnaire and its correlated. Journal o f Anxiety Disorders, 11, 279- 
296.
Cash, T. F. and Fleming, E. C. (2002). The impact of body-image experiences: 
Development of the Body Image Quality of Life Inventory. International Journal of 
Eating Disorders, 31, 455-460.
Cash, T. F. and Pruzinsky, T. (2002). Body Image. A Handbook o f Theory, Research and 
Clinical Practice. London: The Guildford Press.
Cash, T. F., Winstead, B. A., & Janda, L. H. (1986). The great American shape-up. 
Psychology Today, 30-37.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.).
183
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.
Cororve, M. B. and Gleaves, D. H. (2001). Body Dysmorphic Disorder: A Review of 
Conceptualisations, Assessment, and Treatment Strategies. Clinical Psychology Review, 
21(6), 949-970.
Craske, M. G., Rapee, R. M., Jackel, L., Barlow, D. H. (1989). Qualitative Dimensions 
of Worry in DSM-I1I-R Generalised Anxiety Disorder Subjects and Nonanxious 
Controls. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27(4), 397-402.
Derogatis, L. (1975). Brief symptom inventory. Baltimore: Clinical Psychometric 
Research.
Dunn, O. J. (1961). Multiple Comparisons among Means. Journal o f American Statistics 
Association, 56, 52-64.
Emmelkamp, P. M. G. and Aardema, A. (1999). Metacognitive, specific obsessive 
compulsive beliefs and obsessive compulsive behaviour. Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 6, 139-146.
Feise, R. J. (2002). Do multiple outcome measures require p-value adjustment? BMC 
Med Res Methodol, 2(1), 8.
184
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive- 
developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911.
Freeston, M. H. and Ladouceur, R. (1997). What do patients do with their obsessive 
thoughts? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 335-348.
Freeston, M. H., Ladouceur, R., Provencher, M. and Blais, F. (1995). Strategies used 
with intrusive thoughts: context, appraisal, mood and efficacy. Journal o f Anxiety 
Disorders, 9,201-215.
Freeston, M. H., Ladouceur, R., Thibodeau, N. and Gagnon, F. (1991). Cognitive 
intrusions in a non-clinical population. I. Response style, subjective experience and 
appraisal. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 585-597.
Freeston, M. H., Rheaume, J. and Ladouceur, R. (1996). Correcting Faulty Appraisals of 
Obsessional Thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34,433-446.
Freeston, M. H., Rheaume, J., Letorte, H., Dugas, M. J. and Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why 
do people worry? Journal o f Personality and Individual Difference, 17(6), 791-802.
Gunstad, J. and Phillips, K. A. (2003). Axis I Comorbidity in Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44(4), 270-276.
185
Hollander, E., Cohen, L. J. and Simeon, D. (1993). Body dysmorphic disorder. 
Psychiatric-Annals, 23(7), 359-364.
Jaccard, J., & Wan, C. K. (1996). Liseral approaches to interaction effects in multiple 
regression. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Ladouceur, R., Freeston, M. H., Rheaume, J., Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Thibodeau, N. 
and Fournier, S. (2000). Strategies used with intrusive thoughts: a comparison of OCD 
patients with anxious and community controls. Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 
109(2), 179-187.
Howell, D. C. (1997). Statistical methods for psychology. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth.
Matthews, M. (1990). Why Worry? The Cognitive Function of Anxiety Disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 455-468.
McMillan, D. and Fisher, P. (2004). Cognitive Therapy for Depressive Thinking. In C. 
Papgeorgiou and A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive Rumination. Nature, Theory and 
Treatment, (pp. 241-258). London: Wiley.
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., and Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development
186
and Validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 28, 487-495.
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (2005). Draft NICE guideline for interventions 
for BDD and OCD. Retrieved 31/05/2005 from www.nice.org.uk
Neziroglu, F., McKay, D., Todaro, J. and Yaryura-Tobias, J. A. (1996). Effect of 
cognitive behaviour therapy on persons with Body Dysmorphic Disorder and co morbid 
Axis II Diagnoses. Behaviour Therapy, 27, 67-77.
Neziroglu, F. A. and Yaryura-Tobias, J. A. (1997).Body Dysmorphic Disorder: 
Phenomenology and Case Descriptions. Behavioural Psychotherapy, 21, 27-36.
Noelen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J. and Fredrickson, B. L. (1993). Response styles and 
the duration of episodes of depressed mood. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 561-570.
Oosthuizen, P., Lambert, T. and Castle, D. J. (1998). Dysmorphic concern: prevalence 
and associations with clinical variables. Australian and New Zealand Journal of  
Psychiatry, 32, 129-132.
Osman, S., Cooper, M., Hackmann, A. and Veale, D. (2004). Spontaneously occurring 
images and early memories in people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder. Memory, 12(4), 
428-436.
187
Otto, M. W., Wilhelm, S., Cohen, L. S. and Harlow, B. L. (2001). Prevalence of Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder in a Community Sample of Women. American Journal of  
Psychiatry, 158(12), 2061 -2063.
Papageorgiou, C. and Wells (1999) Process and Meta-cognitive Dimensions of 
Depressive and Anxious Thoughts and Relationships with Emotional Intensity. Clinical 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 6, 156-162.
Papageorgiou, C. and Wells, A. (2001). Positive Beliefs about Depressive Rumination: 
Development and Preliminary Validation of a Self-Report Scale. Behavior Therapy, 32, 
13-26.
Papageorgiou, C. & Wells, A. (2004). Depressive Rumination. Nature, Theory and 
Treatment. London: Wiley.
Pearson Assessments (2005) Brief Symptom Inventory. Retrieved 28/06/2004 from 
www.pearsonassessments.co.uk
Perugi, G., Akiskal, H. S., Giannotti, D., Frare, F., Di Vaio, S. and Cassano, G. B. 
(1997). Gender-related differences in body dysmorphic disorder (dysmorphophobia). 
Journal o f Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(9), 578-582.
188
Phillips, K. A. (1986). The Broken Mirror. Understanding and Treating Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phillips, K. A. (1991). Body Dysmorphic Disorder: The Distress of Imagined Ugliness. 
American Journal o f  Psychiatry, 148(9), 1138-1149.
Phillips, K. A. (1998). Body dysmorphic disorder: Clinical aspects and treatment 
strategies. Bulletin o f the Menninger Clinic, 62(4), 33-48.
Phillips, K. A. (2000). Quality of Life for Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder. The 
Journal o f Nervous and Mental Disease, 188(3), 170-175.
Phillips, K. A. and Diaz, S. F. (1997). Gender Differences in Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder. The Journal o f  Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(9), 570-577.
Phillips, K. A. and Duffesne, R. G. (2000). Body Dysmorphic Disorder: A Guide for 
Dermatologists and Cosmetic Surgeons. American Journal o f Dermatology, 1(4), 235- 
243.
Phillips, K. A., McElroy, S. L., Keck, P. E., Pope, H. G. and Hudson, J. I. (1993). Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder: 30 Cases of Imagined Ugliness. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 
150(2), 302-308.
189
Phillips, K. A., Atala, K. D. and Pope, H. G. (1995). Diagnostic instruments for Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder. New Research Program and Abstracts. American Psychiatric 
Association 148111 annual meeting. In K. A. Phillips and S. F. Diaz (1997). Gender 
Differences in Body Dysmorphic Disorder. The Journal o f Nervous and Mental Disease, 
185(9), 570-577.
Phillips, K. A., Grant, J., Sinisalchi, J. and Albertini, R. S. (2001). Surgical and 
nonpsychiatric medical treatment of patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder. 
Psychosomatics, 42, 504-510.
Phillips, K. A., Siniscalchi, J. M. and McElroy, S. L. (2004). Depression, Anxiety, 
Anger and Somatic Symptoms in Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder. Psychiatric 
Quarterly, 75(4), 309-320.
Purdon, C. and Clark, D. A. (1999). Meta-cognition and Obsessions. Clinical 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 6, 102-111.
Purdon, C. and Clark, D. A. (1993). Obsessive Intrusive Thoughts in Nonclinical 
Subjects: Part I. Content and Relation with Depressive, Anxious and Obsessional 
Symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(8), 713-720.
Rachman, S. and De Silva, P. (1978). Abnormal and Normal Obsessions. Behaviour
190
Research and Therapy, 16, 233-248.
Reynolds, M. and Brewin, C. (1998). Intrusive cognitions in depression and
posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37(3), 201-215.
Reynolds, M. and Wells, A. (1999). The Thought Control Questionnaire - psychometric 
properties in a clinical sample, and relationships with PTSD and depression.
Psychological Medicine, 29, 1089-1099.
Rosen, J. C., Reiter, J. and Orosan, P. (1995). Cognitive-Behavioural Body Image 
Therapy for Body Dysmorphic Disorder. Journal o f Clinical and Consulting
Psychology, 63(2), 263-269.
Roth, A. and Fonagy, P. (1996). What works for whom? A critical review of  
psychotherapy
research. Guildford: New York.
Salkovskis, P. (1999). Understanding and treating obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 29-52.
Simes, R. J. (1986). An improved Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of
significance. Biometrika, 73, 751-754.
191
Spitzer, R. L., Williams, J. B. W. and Gibbon, M. (1996). Instruction Manual for the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV. New York: New York State Psychiatric 
Institute.
Tallis, F. and De Silva, P. (1992). Worry and Obsessional Symptoms: A Correlational 
Analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30(2), 103-105.
Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C. & Stanley, M. A. (1992). Are obsessional thoughts and 
worry different cognitive phenomena? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 12, 257-270.
Veale, D. (2004). Advances in a cognitive-behavioural model of body dysmorphic 
disorder. Body Image, 1, 113-125.
Veale, D. and Riley, S. (2001). Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the ugliest of them 
all? The psychopathology of mirror gazing in body dysmorphic disorder. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 39, 1381-1393.
Veale, D., Goumay, K., Dryden, W., Boocock, A., Shah, F., Willson, R. and Walbum, J. 
(1996). Body Dysmorphic Disorder: A cognitive behavioural model and pilot 
randomised trial. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 717-729.
Watkins, E. and Baracaia, S. (2001). Why do people ruminate in dysphoric moods?
192
Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 723-734.
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic Processes of Mental Control. Psychological Review, 101, 
34-52.
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R. and White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical 
effects of thought suppression. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 5-13.
Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: a cognitive model for Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301-320.
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive Therapy o f Anxiety Disorders. A Practice Manual and 
Conceptual Guide. Chichester: John Wiley.
Wells, A. (1999). A metacognitive model and therapy for Generalised Anxiety Disorder. 
Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 6, 86-96.
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional Disorders and Metacognition. Innovative Cognitive 
Therapy. Chichester: John Wiley.
Wells, A. and Carter, K. (1999). Preliminary tests of a cognitive model of GAD. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 585-594.
193
Wells, A. and Davies, M. I. (1994). The Thought Control Questionnaire: A Measure of 
Individual Differences in the Control of Unwanted Thoughts. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 32(8), 871-878.
Wells, A. and Morrison, A. P. (1994). Qualitative Dimensions of Normal Worry and 
Normal Obsessions: A Comparative Study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(8), 
867-870.
Wells, A. and Papageorgiou, C. (1998). Relationships between worry, obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms and meta-cognitive beliefs. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 
899-913.
Wells, A. and Papageorgiou, C. (2004). Metacognitive Therapy for Depressive 
Rumination. In C. Papgeorgiou and A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive Rumination. Nature, 
Theory and Treatment, (pp. 259-274). London: Wiley.
Wenzlaff, R. M., Rude, S. S., Taylor, C. J., Stultz, C. H. and Sweatt, R. A. (2001). 
Beneath the veil of thought suppression: Attentional bias and depression risk. Cognition 
and Emotion, 5, 435-452.
Wilhelm, S., Otto, M. W., Lohr, B. & Deckersbach, T. (1999). Cognitive behaviour 
group therapy for body dysmorphic disorder: a case series. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 37, 71-75.
194
Zigmund, A. and Snaith, R. P. (1983). The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Acta 
Psychiatr Scand, 67(6), 361-370.
195
PART 3
CRITICAL APPRAISAL
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1) O utcom e and  expectations
The findings of this research were mostly consistent with the researcher’s expectations.
The content of thoughts about appearance was found to be broadly similar in people 
with BDD and people with ‘normal concerns’ (supported by descriptive and quantitative 
data). The researcher’s awareness both of research findings on cognitive process 
content in other disorders, such as OCD (Rachman and De Silva, 1978) and GAD 
(Craske, Rapee, Jackel and Barlow, 1989), and of the general emphasis on appearance in 
modem society contributed to a feeling of relative confidence regarding this hypothesis.
It is of interest that participants with BDD were significantly more likely to report 
thoughts pertaining to the future, than participants with normal concerns. This 
difference was not expected and is somewhat surprising given that concern regarding 
future ageing, for example, would seem to be highly prevalent in today’s society. It is 
possible that the younger mean age of the control group participants meant that many 
participants had not yet reached an age where the potential impact of age on appearance 
becomes a reality.
The fact that the difference in frequency of the various thoughts about appearance was 
statistically significant for only 2 of the 6 thought types (future-oriented thoughts and 
self-critical thoughts) was wholly unexpected. One might hypothesise that the 
conservative nature of the control group contributed to this lack of difference between
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the 2 groups, but no member of the control group reported spending longer than 1 hour 
per day preoccupied, while all participants with BDD reported dwelling on thoughts 
about appearance for at least 4 hours each day. One would therefore expect significant 
differences in frequency across all thought types. There are a number of explanations 
for this finding10. Examination of the mean group frequencies for each thought type 
reveal that control group means for the non-significant thought types are surprisingly 
high (for comparing thoughts and thoughts about what others might think, for example, 
control group participants indicated that they spend over half the time preoccupied with 
this type of thoughts about appearance). This indicates that many of the control group 
participants may well have been indicating for what proportion of the total time spent 
preoccupied with appearance they experience the individual thoughts types, rather than 
for what proportion of time generally. The confusing wording of these items seems to 
be a likely explanation for these findings, but the fact that the non-significant finding 
was not evidenced accross all 6 thought types is somewhat puzzling. A further 
possibility is that people with BDD spend most of their preoccupied time focussing on 
these 2 thought types and that the other thought types occur relatively infrequently. 
Certainly, of the 6 thought types, the 2 thought types associated with significant 
differences were rated most frequent by people with BDD, but without further empirical 
investigation, it is difficult to make definitive statements about this hypothesis.
The findings on associated negative affect and impact on functioning were as predicted. 
The researcher felt relatively confident regarding these hypotheses, given the fact the 2
16 See page 156
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phenomena in question (negative impact on functioning and associated negative affect) 
correspond closely to diagnostic criteria for BDD and have already been validated in 
existing research (e.g. Phillips, 2000). The non-significant finding for guilt was 
unexpected and indicates that more detailed research on the precise nature of negative 
affect in BDD needs to be undertaken. Possible explanations of this finding have 
already been discussed''.
In light of the lack of previous research on metacognition in BDD, the researcher felt 
somewhat less confident regarding the metacognitive belief hypotheses. Participants 
with BDD endorsed negative metacognitive beliefs, but not positive metacognitive 
beliefs, significantly more strongly than people with ‘normal concerns’. It was 
expected, given empirical evidence for the role of positive metacognitive beliefs in 
models of other disorders such as GAD (e.g. Wells, 1995) and OCD (e.g. Salkovskis, 
1999), that the current study might have evidenced significant differences for strength of 
positive metacognitive beliefs. This can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that 
the MCQ does not include appearance-specific metacognitive beliefs16. Advantages 
spontaneously mentioned by people with BDD in response to an open question included 
motivation to improve appearance and all participants with BDD who reported negative 
consequences of giving up being preoccupied with appearance mentioned negative 
impact on appearance. It is likely therefore that these appearance-specific metacognitive 
beliefs are associated with increased preoccupation with appearance, rather than more 
general positive metacognitive beliefs captured by the MCQ.
17 See page 171
18 See page 163
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With regard to thought control strategies, the significant difference between the groups 
with regard to frequency of use of punishment strategies was expected. It was difficult 
to know what to expect for the other strategy types, given the limited and sometimes 
contradictory literature for other disorders"', hence the rather general hypothesis of 
differences in strategy use. It was predictable that participants with BDD would report 
lower effectiveness of strategies, given the fact that they continue to suffer from BDD. 
The problematic nature of the avoidance versus engagement distinction^ became clear 
to the researcher as the study progressed, so therefore the lack of a significant difference 
between the effectiveness of engagement and avoidance strategies was not altogether 
surprising.
Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that the content of thoughts 
about appearance is broadly similar in people with BDD and people with ‘normal 
concerns’ regarding appearance. Evidence has also been found of an association 
between certain aspects of metacognition (negative metacognitive beliefs and thought 
control strategies involving punishment) and increased preoccupation with appearance 
(BDD). The expectation of such associations provided the initial impetus for this study 
and it is therefore rewarding that, for the most part at least, predictions have received 
confirmation.
19 See page 80
20 See page 170
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2) S trengths and  lim itations
The potential limitations of this study are discussed abovez‘ and include sample size, the 
conservative nature of the control group, the wording of selected interview items, the 
problematic nature of the avoidance versus engagement distinction and the number of 
hypotheses and associated statistical tests.
In many ways the highly conservative approach adopted in this study (including the 
criteria for the comparison group, the use of co-variates in all analyses and the 
adjustments made to statistical significance cut-offs) can be viewed as a strength of this 
study. One might question, however, whether this approach was in fact overly 
conservative.
The decision to include education and age as co-variates can be debated, for example. 
The fact that the control group were significantly younger on average can be seen as 
contributing to the conservative nature of the control group (people closer to 
adolescence in age might well be more concerned about appearance than older people). 
It should be acknowledged that the inclusion of education level as a co-variate might 
have been overly conservative. Education level was measured according to highest 
qualification. Many of the participants with BDD reported having being preoccupied 
with appearance since their teenage years and it could be argued that this may have 
impacted on their educational achievements. Therefore, lower educational achievement 
would not necessarily indicate lower IQ. Measuring the IQ of all participants would
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have been extremely time-consuming, but would nonetheless have been highly 
informative.
The decision to use the modified Bonferroni procedure to adjust statistical significance 
levels can also be debated. The researcher was aware of the dangers of multiple 
hypothesis testing, but in retrospect the use of the modified Bonferroni procedure could 
be regarded as over cautious, given that only a priori hypotheses were tested. It is 
possible that Type II error rates might have been increased, because of the researcher’s 
concerns about Type I error rates. Balancing the 2 types of error rate is always 
challenging, but it could be argued that the approach to Type I error was overly 
conservative, especially given the exploratory nature of the current study.
The breadth of this study is most certainly one of its strengths, as is the level of detail 
captured by the combination of descriptive and quantitative date. Forty-four interviews 
(lasting between 30 minutes and 1 hour 50 minutes) are inevitably associated with very 
large quantities of data and the researcher experienced considerable disappointment that 
it was well beyond the scope of the current study to analyse all data collected. The 
remaining data will be written up for publication elsewhere, however.
3) Theoretical, clinical and professional implications
The main clinical implications of the findings are discussed abovezz. The fact that
21 See page 177
22 See page 174
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thought content seems to be broadly similar in participants with BDD and participants 
with ‘normal concerns’ gives rise to a question of why such thoughts develop into a 
time-consuming preoccupation for certain people. Similar questions have been posed 
with regard to other disorders and researchers have turned to exploration of 
metacognition in an attempt to explain the maintenance of the cognitive processes. The 
evidence in the current study for the potential importance of metacognition in 
understanding the maintenance of BDD should therefore be taken particularly seriously. 
The findings on metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies should be used to 
inform cognitive-behavioural models of BDD, assessment frameworks and intervention 
approaches, which will in turn require further empirical validation. The coding grids in 
the current study would serve as excellent guides for assessment and as a basis for 
measure development. These findings suggest that little would be gained from 
challenging the content of the thoughts about appearance directly and this information 
should be disseminated as soon as possible to clinicians working with people with BDD.
Therapy outcome research on BDD is in its infancy, so before large, costly randomised 
controlled trials are designed to compare standard cognitive-behavioural interventions 
against other therapy types or no treatment, consideration should be given to including 
metacognitive interventions in such trials. The difficulties of obtaining funding for such 
projects are well known to the researcher and the fact that there is at present no 
specialist NHS service for people with BDD makes the viability of such a trial in the 
near future less likely. It is hoped that a specialist service for BDD will be established 
later this year within the South London and Maudsley NHS trust, however, which might
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make outcome research easier.
4) Future directions for research
Although the current study has provided useful information, numerous unanswered 
questions remain. These include whether the maintenance of the preoccupation in BDD 
can be explained at least in part by metacognition (i.e. whether or not the evidenced 
associations are can be interpreted as causal), whether or not increased strength of belief 
in appearance-related positive meta-cognitive beliefs is associated with increased 
preoccupation with thoughts about appearance, and whether or not meta-cognitive 
interventions for BDD might be advantageous over and above standard cognitive- 
behavioural therapy.
A number of suggestions were made above for future research^: replication of the 
current study with a larger sample, comparison with people with other disorders, 
metacognition measure development, longitudinal and experimental studies on 
metacognitive beliefs and strategies of thought control and randomised controlled 
therapy outcome trials.
There is also a need for more research on metacognition generally, particularly on 
metacognitive interventions for various disorders. Furthermore, increased 
communication is required between researchers, as there seem to be several research
23 See page 179
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groups exploring metacognition with very little cross-referencing.
Research on the aetiology, prevalence and co-morbidity in BDD should continue, 
although the consistency between studies needs to be improved, to ensure that future 
studies are more easily comparable than existing research papers. It should be ensured 
that studies on model validation and intervention outcome be given priority, however.
5) Process
The researcher was apprehensive about the possible impact of asking people to focus on 
their difficulties so intensely and whether or not participants with BDD would find the 
whole experience overwhelming and distressing. Many of the participants confessed to 
considerable anxiety prior to the interview appointment and the researcher was 
impressed by the attendance of several participants who were otherwise housebound. 
Many of the participants had only very recently received a diagnosis and were 
enthusiastic about research and trying to increase the profile of BDD, in the hope that 
other people would be diagnosed earlier. After being debriefed, almost all participants 
with BDD commented that it was useful to talk about their difficulties and to think about 
their thoughts in the ways encouraged by the interview questions. Several of the 
participants were seen after the interview appointment at a monthly support group co­
facilitated by the researcher and mentioned to the researcher that they had felt relieved 
and grateful to have been able to talk about their difficulties and to have felt understood. 
Although the interview was in no way intended as a therapeutic intervention, it is of
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interest that participants found discussing their difficulties so helpful. This may reflect a 
lack of service provision for people with BDD. This information might also be of 
assistance to researchers encountering resistance from ethics committees, claiming that 
asking people to talk about their difficulties might be too distressing.
The recruitment of people with BDD was considerably easier than expected, primarily 
owing to the enthusiasm of the Consultant Psychiatrist. As recruitment progressed, the 
researcher became increasingly aware of the need to be flexible with the interview 
appointment times. Many participants arrived late or re-scheduled shortly before the 
arranged time, because of appearance-related rituals and anxiety. With hindsight, a 
larger clinical sample might have been obtained, had the researcher approached 
charitable organisations such as OCD Action and/or placed advertisements on self-help 
websites for people with BDD. It is likely that this would have involved national travel 
on the part of the researcher to conduct interviews in participants’ homes, however, the 
funding of which might have proved difficult. Furthermore, the time-scale of the 
current study was relatively limited.
The recruitment of control group participants was rather more challenging than 
expected. The majority of people responding to the advertisements were female 
students and it was particularly difficult to recruit males. Handing out flyers in person 
was helpful but nevertheless recruitment of the control group participants was 
completed somewhat later than planned. It is difficult to identify factors that might have 
facilitated a faster recruitment rate; perhaps increased financial incentives or handing
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out flyers in person from the outset.
As recruitment progressed, the researcher became increasingly aware of a small sub­
group of participants who were not willing to entertain the possibility that their thoughts 
about their own appearance might be inaccurate. Their beliefs might well have 
warranted the label of delusions, but the current study did not assess for this in any way. 
Such participants sometimes became irritated by some of the thought control strategy 
questions, as they felt that certain items (such as ‘challenging one’s thoughts’) implied 
their concerns were not being taken seriously. Diplomacy and sensitivity on the part of 
the researcher was extremely important in regaining rapport for the remainder of the 
interview. It would have been interesting to look at whether the data for this sub-group 
differed in any way from that of those participants who were aware of the fact that their 
concerns might be inaccurate.
The researcher began this research endeavour with no first-hand experience of people 
with BDD. As the study progressed, she became increasingly aware of the discrepancy 
between the extreme distress and impairment associated with this disorder and the lack 
of existing research and of services and help available. Funding is often only granted 
for the establishment of services, if proposals are backed by substantial empirical 
evidence. While remaining very aware of the often minimal impact a single research 
study can have, it is hoped that this study will make a valuable contribution to a growing 
body of research on BDD and will inspire others considering research in this field.
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APPENDIX 1
Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire
Revised
BDDQ-R
This questionnaire assesses concerns about physical appearance. Please read each 
question carefully and circle the answer that best describes your experience. Also 
write in answers where indicated.
1) Are you concerned about the appearance of some part(s) of your body, which you 
consider especially unattractive (Circle the best answer)
1 2 3 4 5
 i_____________ i____________ i_____________ i____________ i _
Not at all Somewhat Moderately Very Extremely
concerned concerned concerned concerned concerned
What are these concerns? What specifically bothers you about the appearance of 
these body parts?
2) If you are at least somewhat concerned, do these concerns preoccupy you? That 
is, you think about them a lot and they’re hard to stop thinking about? (Circle the best 
answer)
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Somewhat Moderately Very Extremely
preoccupied preoccupied preoccupied preoccupied preoccupied
3) On an average day, how many minutes or hour(s) do you currently spend thinking 
about your feature(s)? Please add up all the time that your features are on your mind 
(including at the back of your mind) and make the best estimate.
minutes o r   hour(s) a day
2 ll
4) On an average day, how many times do you deliberately check your feature(s) (not 
accidentally catch sight of it)? Please add up all the times you check your feature, 
including looking at your feature in a mirror or other reflective surfaces like a shop 
window, looking at it directly or feeling it with your fingers.
times a day
5) Has your physical “defect” often caused you a lot of distress, torment or pain? 
How much? (Circle the best answer)
No distress Mild, and not 
too disturbing
Moderately and 
disturbing but 
still manageable
Severe, and 
very disturbing
Extreme and 
disabling
What effect has your preoccupation with your appearance had on your life? (Please 
describe)
6) Has your physical “defect” caused you impairment in social, occupational o r other 
important areas of functioning? How much? (Circle the best answer)
1No limitation Mild interference 
but overall 
performance not 
impaired
Moderately, definite 
interference, but 
still manageable
Severe, causes 
substantial 
impairment
Extreme,
incapacitating
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7) Has your physical “defect” significantly interfered with your social life? How 
much? (Circle the best answer)
1 2 3 4 5
_ i _____________ i_____________i_____________ i____________ i__
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Very Often
Often
If so, how?
8) Has your physical “defect” significantly interfered with your schoolwork, your job, 
or your ability to function in your role? How much? (Circle the best answer)
1 2 3 4 5
 i_____________ i_____________i_____________ i____________ i__
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Very Often
Often
If so, how?
9) Do you avoid things because of your physical “defect*’? How often? (Circle the best 
answer)
1 2 3 4 5
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Very Often
Often
If so, what do you avoid?
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Personal Details Questionnaire
Please ensure you answer all questions. Thank you.
1)Name:____ ______________________________________
2) Address: ______________________________________
3) Phone number:________________________________
4) Date of birth: ________________________________
5) Gender: Male / Female (please delete as appropriate)
6) Education
Please indicate all educational qualifications that you have by ticking as many boxes as apply
a GCSEs □ Bachelor Degree
a A-Levels □ Masters level qualification
□ BTEC □ PhD level qualification
a HND □ Other (please specify)
7) Ethnicity
Please tick one o f the boxes to indicate the category that you feel best describes your ethnicity.
a Asian or Asian British-Indian □ White - British
□ Asian or Asian British-Pakistani a White -  Irish
a Asian or Asian British - a White -  Scottish
Bangladeshi □ Other White background
□ Chinese a Black or Black British -
a Other Asian background Caribbean
a Mixed -  Wfliite and Black □ Black or Black British - African
Caribbean □ Other Black background
a Mixed -  Wfliite and Black a Other ethnic background (please
Caribbean specify
□ Mixed - White and Asian
a Other Mixed background
8) What is your first language / the language you speak most fluently?
9) Are you currently suffering from any mental health problem or have you ever 
been diagnosed with a mental health problem in the past? (Please give details)
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APPENDIX 3 
Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ)
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Read each statement carefully and tick the box which best describes how much that statement is true for you. 
Remember these statements are referring to your worries, thoughts and images about your appearance only.
Do not 
agree
Agree
slightly
Agree
moderately
Agree very 
much
1) Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future.
2) Worrying is dangerous for me.
3) I have difficulty knowing if I have actually done something or just imagined it.
4) I think a lot about my thoughts.
5) I could make myself sick with worrying.
6) I am aware of the way my mind works when I am thinking through a problem.
7) If I did not control a worrying thought, and then it happened, it would be my 
fault.
8) If I let my worrying thoughts get out of control, they will end up controlling 
me.
9) I need to worry in order to remain organised.
10) I have little confidence in my memory for words and names.
11) My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try to stop them.
12) Worrying helps me get things sorted in my mind.
13) I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts.
14) I monitor my thoughts.
15) I should be in control of my thoughts all of the time.
16) My memory can mislead me at times.
17) I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts.
18) My worrying could make me go mad.
19) If I do not stop my worrying thoughts they could come true.
20) I rarely question my thoughts.
Do not 
agree
Agree
slightly
Agree
moderately
Agree very 
much
21) Worrying puts my body under a lot of stress.
22) Worrying helps me avoid disastrous situations.
23) I am constantly aware of my thinking.
24) I have a poor memory.
25) I pay close attention to the way my mind works.
26) People who do not worry have no depth.
27) Worrying helps me cope.
28) I imagine having not done things and then doubt my memory for doing them.
29) Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness.
30) If I did not worry, I would make more mistakes.
31)1 find it difficult to control my thoughts.
32) Worrying is a sign of a good person.
33) Worrying thoughts enter my head against my will.
34) If I could not control my thoughts, I would go crazy.
35) I will lose out in life if I do not worry.
36) When I start worrying, I cannot stop.
37) Some thoughts will always need to be controlled.
38) I need to worry in order to get things done.
39) I could be punished for not having certain thoughts.
40) My thoughts interfere with my concentration.
41) It is alright to let my thoughts roam free.
42) I worry about my thoughts.
43) I am easily distracted.
44) My worrying thoughts are not productive.
45) Worry can stop me from seeing a situation clearly.
46) Worrying helps me to solve problems.
Do not 
agree
Agree
slightly
Agree
moderately
Agree very 
much
47) I have little confidence in my memory for places.
48) My worrying thoughts are uncontrollable.
49) It is bad to think certain thoughts.
50) If I do not control my thoughts, I may end up embarrassing myself.
51) I do not trust my memory.
52) I do my clearest thinking when I am worrying.
53) My worrying thoughts appear automatically.
54) I would be selfish if I never worried.
55) If I could not control my thoughts, I would not be able to function.
56) I need to worry in order to work well.
57) I have little confidence in my memory for actions.
58) I have difficulty in keeping my mind focussed on one thing for a long time.
59) If a bad thing happens which I have not worried about, I feel responsible.
60) It would not be normal if I did not worry.
61)1 constantly examine my thoughts.
62) If I stopped worrying, I would become glib, arrogant and offensive.
63) Worrying helps me to plan the future more effectively.
64) I would be a stronger person if I could worry less.
65) It would be stupid and complacent not to worry.
APPENDIX 4 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ)
&
List of Subscale Items
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Below are a number of things people do to try and control their thoughts. Please read each 
statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by ticking the appropriate 
box. Remember to think about the strategies and techniques you use in response to thoughts, 
images and worries about your appearance. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time thinking about each one.
When I experience thoughts, images or worries about my appearance....
Never Someti
mes
Often
Almost
always
1) I call to mind positive images instead
2) I tell myself not to be so stupid
3) I focus on the thought
4) I replace the thought with a more trivial bad 
thought
5) I don’t talk about the thought to anyone
6) I punish myself for thinking the thought
7) I dwell on other worries
8) I keep the thoughts to myself
9) I occupy myself with work instead
10) I challenge the thought’s validity
11) I get angry at myself for having the thought
12) I avoid discussing the thoughts
13) I shout at myself for having the thoughts
14) I analyse the thought rationally
15) I slap or pinch myself to stop myself having the 
thought
16) I think pleasant thoughts instead
17) I find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts
18) I worry about more minor things instead
19) 1 do something that I enjoy
20) I try to reinterpret the thought
21)1 think about something else
22) 1 think more about the minor problems I have
23) I try a different way of thinking about it
24) I think about past worries instead
25) I ask my friends if they have similar thoughts
26) I focus on different negative thoughts
27) I question the reasons for having the thoughts
28) I tell myself that something bad will happen if I 
think the thought
29) I talk to a friend about the thought
30) I keep myself busy
Distraction subscale: Items 1,9, 16, 19,21, 30 
Punishment subscale: Items 2, 6, 11, 13. 15,28 
Reappraisal subscale: Items 3, 10, 14,20,23,27 
Worry subscale: Items 4, 7, 18 ,22,24,26 
Social control subscale: Items 5, 8,12, 17,25,29
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Interview Schedule (abbreviated version)
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Sem i-structured interview (abbreviated version)
It seems from the questionnaire you completed that you like your_________ (insert
feature identified in BDDQ-R (= A)) least, because you feel it is______________
(insert aspect o f  A that participant identified in BDDQ-R (— B)).
When people are worrying, preoccupied or thinking a lot about something, a mixture of 
thoughts and images often goes through their mind. Thoughts are usually made up of 
words, but images can be pictures, sounds or sensations. I am interested in thoughts and
images you have which relate either to your____________(A) specifically or to your
appearance in general. Many people find such images and thoughts strange or odd, so 
please try not to feel embarrassed if this is the case for you.
I will ask you first for information about the thoughts and images you have about your
____________ (A) and your appearance in general. Then I will ask you some questions
about the extent to which you are troubled by those thoughts and images and also about 
how those thoughts and images cause you to think, feel and behave.
Do you have any questions about what I am suggesting?
Do you have any concerns before we begin?
Section 1: Content of thoughts and images
I would like you to think about some of the times when you were worrying or
preoccupied with your appearance in general or your___________ (A) specifically.
When I use the word ‘preoccupied’, I mean ‘thinking a lot about something’.
1.1) Can you think of any such times? Yes No
1.2) Have you ever experienced any thoughts and images that have popped into your 
mind when you were worrying or preoccupied with your appearance or your 
_____________ (A)?
Yes No
If yes: Can you tell me a little about these images and thoughts?
If no: Let’s try and think back to a specific time you were worrying or preoccupied with
your appearance in general or your_____________(A). Try to choose a typical time.
Prompts to be used as necessary:
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What was going through your mind when you were worrying about your appearance? 
What were you thinking about when you were worrying about your appearance?
Did you have any pictures in your mind when you were worrying about your 
appearance?
Did you notice any unusual sensations inside or on your body when you were worrying 
about your appearance?
Continue to ask the participant ‘Do you experience any other thoughts and images when
you are worrying or preoccupied with your appearance o r_____________ (A)T until
the participant says that there are no more.
1.3) Now I would like to ask you about some other kinds of thoughts that people have 
reported experiencing when they worry or are preoccupied with their appearance.
i) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________(A) or your
appearance in general, how often do you criticise or attack yourself?
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those self-critical thoughts?
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ii) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________ (A) or your
appearance in general, how often do you think about an embarrassing or humiliating 
experience in the past and/or what you could have done differently?
(Prompts: How often do you think ‘I should have done....’ or ask yourself ‘Why did. 
happen?’)
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those thoughts?
iii) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with (A) or your
appearance in general, how often do you think about what other people might think
about your appearance / (A)?
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those thoughts about what other people might
think?
iv) think about potential situations in the future or ask yourself ‘What if.. ..happens?’
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those thoughts about potential situations in the 
future?
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v) compare the image you have in your mind of the way you look now to the way other 
people look, the way you used to look or how you would like to look?
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those comparing thoughts?
vi) think about or plan ways you could change the way you look?
0 1 2 3 4
never sometimes half the time most of the time all of the time
If 1-4: Can you tell me a little about those thoughts about changing the way you look?
Section 2: Associated negative affect and impact on functioning
2.1) Associated negative affect
2.1.1) How sad or unhappy do you feel when these images and thoughts are on your 
mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
2.1.2) How worried do you feel when these thoughts and images are on your mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
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2.1.3) How guilty do you feel when these thoughts and images are on your mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
2.1.4) How angry do you feel when these thoughts and images are on your mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
2.1.5) How afraid do you feel when these images are on your mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
2.1.6) How ashamed do you feel when these images are on your mind?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all mild moderate severe extreme
2.2: Impact on functioning
Now we are going to talk about the effect of these thoughts and images on how you 
function.
2.2.1) To what extent does the presence of these thoughts and images about your 
appearance o r___________ (A) interfere with your family life?
0 1 2 3 4
no interference mild, slight moderate, definite severe, causes extreme,
interference interference, but still substantial incapacitating
manageable impairment
227
2.2.2) To what extent does the presence of these thoughts and images about your 
appearance o r___________ (A) interfere with school or work?
0 1 2 3 4
no interference mild, slight moderate, definite severe, causes extreme,
interference interference, but still substantial incapacitating
manageable impairment
2.3.3) To what extent does the presence of these thoughts and images about your 
appearance o r  (A) interfere with intimate relationships?
0 1 2 3 4
no interference mild, slight moderate, definite severe, causes extreme,
interference interference, but still substantial incapacitating
manageable impairment
2.3.4) To what extent does the presence of these thoughts and images about your 
appearance o r (A) interfere with your social life and leisure activities?
0 1 2 3 4
no interference mild, slight moderate, definite severe, causes extreme,
interference interference, but still substantial incapacitating
manageable impairment
Section 3: Meta-cognitive beliefs 
3.1: Open questions
3.1.1) What are the advantages of being preoccupied with thoughts and images about 
your appearance o r__________ (A)?
Prompts: What do you gain by being preoccupied?
3.1.2) What are the disadvantages of being preoccupied with thoughts and images 
about your appearance o r___________ (A)?
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Prompts'. What do you miss out on/lose because of being preoccupied?
3.1.3) Do you imagine anything bad would happen if you gave up being preoccupied 
by your appearance o r___________(A)?
3.1.4) Do you imagine anything bad would happen if you were to let yourself remain
preoccupied by your appearance o r___________ (A) or were unable to control
the preoccupation?
3.2: Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997)
Now I would like you to fill in a questionnaire. It contains statements that other people 
have given when asked about why they remain preoccupied with particular thoughts and 
images.
Remember to answer the questions with regard to your thoughts and images about
your appearance or your___________ (A) only, and not with regard to thoughts and
images you might experience about other things. When the word ‘worry’ is used, this 
means worrying or dwelling on thoughts and images about your appearance only and 
not general worry about other issues.
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Section 4; T hought control strategies
People who experience thoughts and images like those you have described often report 
that they use a wide range of strategies to try to cope with those thoughts and images. 
These strategies might be physical, for example engaging in a distracting activity, or 
they might involve doing something in one’s mind, like trying to think about something 
else. These strategies may or may not be helpful or they may be more or less helpful at 
different times and in different situations. I am interested in finding out about all the 
different mental strategies you use to try and cope with your thoughts and images, not 
just the ones that are helpful. Is that ok?
4.1: Open question
4.1.1) Sometimes people mentally do things in response to their worries, thoughts and 
images about their appearance. Do you mentally do things to deal with your 
thoughts about your appearance o r___________ (A f
If yes\ Can you tell me about the things you do mentally?
If no: Let’s try and think back to the last time you were worried about you appearance
and you experienced thoughts and images, like______________________________
(use example from earlier in the interview). What was the first thought or image you 
had? What did you do next? And then?
230
Continue to ask participant whether there are any other mental strategies he/she uses to 
try to cope with thoughts and images regarding appearance until the participant says 
there are no more.
4.2) Predetermined strategies
Now I would like to ask you about some other strategies that people use to try to control 
their thoughts and images about their appearance.
4.2.1) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________ (A) or your
appearance in general, and are trying to control your thoughts and images how often do 
you perform a kind of mental cosmetic surgery on the image you have of the way you 
look? (Explain that this involves altering the image one has o f oneself in one’s mind to 
make it more like how one would like to look)
I Never 1 Sometimes | Often | Almost always
4.2.2) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________(A) or your
appearance in general, and are trying to control your thoughts and images how often do 
you review evidence, for example trying to remember reactions from other people?
1 Never [ Sometimes | Often | Almost always
4.2.3) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________ (A) or your
appearance in general, and are trying to control your thoughts and images, how often do 
you plan for the future, for example planning where you will stand in a particular room?
I Never | Sometiies | Often | Almost always
4.2.4) When you are worrying about or preoccupied with____________ (A) or your
appearance in general, and are trying to control your thoughts and images how often do 
you talk to other people about other things in order to distract yourself?
| Never | Sometimes | Often | Almost always
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4 3 : T hought C ontro l Q uestionnaire (Wells & M atthews, 1994)
Now I would like you to complete a questionnaire about strategies and techniques 
people use to try and control unwanted and/or unpleasant thoughts. I am interested in 
the techniques you use to try to control thoughts, images and worries about your 
appearance o r__________ (A).
Remember to answer the questions with regard to strategies you use in response to your
thoughts and images about your appearance or your___________(A) only, and not
for thoughts and images you might experience about other things.
Administer Thought Control Questionnaire 
4.4: Effectiveness of strategies
So, it seems there are a number of things you do mentally to deal with your thoughts, 
images and worries about your appearance
Identify most frequently used avoidance strategy (=B)
Identify most frequently used engagement strategy (=C)
4.4.1) Most frequently used avoidance/suppression strategy
4.4.1 .i) How effective i s ____________ (B) at reducing how often your thoughts,
worries or images about your appearance o r______________(A) pop into your head?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
4.4.1 .ii) How effective i s ____________ (B) at reducing the intensity of your thoughts
about your appearance o r______________ (A)l
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
4.4.1 .ii) How effective is ____________ (B) at reducing the distress associated with
your thoughts about your appearance o r______________ (A)l
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
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4.4.2: M ost frequently  used engagement strategy
4.4.2.i) How effective i s ____________ (C) at reducing how often your thoughts,
worries or images about your appearance o r______________(A) pop into your head?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
4.4.2.ii) How effective is _____________ (C) at reducing the intensity of your thoughts
about your appearance o r______________ (A)?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
4.4.2.iii) How effective i s  (C) at reducing the distress associated with
your thoughts about your appearance o r______________ (A)?
0 1 2 3 4
not at all effective slightly effective moderately effective very effective extremely effective
Section 5: Interview Debrief
5.1) Is there anything else you would like to add?
5.2) Are there any comments you would like to make about the interview?
5.3) Do you have any further questions about this research? 
Thank you for taking part.
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Engagem ent Strategies
Mental cosmetic surgery; reviewing evidence; planning for the future (e.g. where v... 
stand in a room to get least light on feature); try a different way of thinking about it; 
reinterpret the thought; question the reasons for having the thought; challenge the 
thought’s validity; seeking reassurance from others about appearance; convincing self 
appearance is unimportant; rationalize thoughts; ask others if they have similar thoughts; 
tell self other people are worse off; focus on the thought; find out how my friends deal 
with these thoughts; try to reinterpret the thoughts; I talk to a friend about the thought.
Avoidance Strategies
Talk to other people about non-appearance topics; think about something else; call to 
mind positive images instead; replace the thought with a more trivial bad thought; dwell 
on other worries; occupy myself with work instead; think pleasant thoughts instead; 
worry about more minor things instead; think about something else; think about the 
minor problems I have; think about past worries instead; focus on different negative 
thoughts.
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T H E
15 July 2004
Dr David Veale
Priory Hospital North London
P^ICKY
H O S P I T A L  
N O R T H  L O N D O N
Dear David,
Re: Preoccupation  in Body D ysm orphic Disorder: a S ystem atic  
D escription
Am aryllis Holland & David V eale
I have reviewed the above protocol and ethical approval from Camden & 
Islington Ethics Committee and BE & H LREC. I am happy for the study to 
proceed.
Yours sincerely
M ed i cal^u i recto  r
THE PRIORY HOSPITAL N 
GROVELANDS H O U  
SOUTHGATE, LC 
TEL / 
emai l :   
P R I O R Y  H E A L T H C A R E  L IM IT E D  T R A D I N G  A S  T H E  P R I O R Y  H O S  
R E G I S T E R E D  O F F I C E  P R I O R Y  H O U S E .  R A N D A L L S  WAY,  L E A T H E R H E A D .  S U R R E Y  K T 2 2  7 T P  : R E G I S T E R E D  IN
A ME
Barnet, Enfield & Haringey Local 
Research Ethics Committee 
02 July 2004
Ms Amaryllis Holland 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Sub-department of Clinical Health 
Psychology, UCL 
Dear Ms Holland,
Full title of study: Preoccupation in Body Dysmorphic Disorder. A systematic 
Description
REC reference number: 04/Q0509/8
Thank you for your letter of 02 July 2004, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research.
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chairman 
Confirmation of ethical opinion
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation.
The favourable opinion applies to the following research site:
Site: Priory Hospital, North London
Principal Investigator: Ms Amaryllis Holland
Conditions c f approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the 
attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows:
• Application Form: dated 13.04.04
• Investigator CV: Dated: 08/04/2004
• Protocol :version 1 dated February 2004
• Peer Review: dated: 04/04/2004
• Details of DMC: dated: 13/04/2004
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An advisory com m ittee  to  North Central London Strategic H ealth A uthority
• Interview Schedules/Topic Guides: version: 3.1 Jan 5th 1993
• Copy of Questionnaire: version: 1 dated: 13/04/2004
• Copy of Advertisements: version 2 dated: 16/06/04
• Participant consent form dated 13/04/04
• Volunteer letter (control group) Version 2 dated 16/06/04
• Volunteer letter (BDD group) version 2 dated 16/06/04
Management approval
The study may not commence until final management approval has been confirmed by the 
organisation hosting the research.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research must 
obtain management approval from the relevant host organisation before commencing any 
research procedures. Where a substantive contract is not held with the host organisation, it 
may be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before approval for the research can 
be given.
Notification of other bodies
We shall notify the research sponsor, Priory Hospital, North London that the study has a 
favourable ethical opinion.
Statement of compliance (from 1 May 2004)
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
REC reference number: 04/Q0509/8 Please quote this number on all correspondence
Yours sincerely,
Chairman
Enc: Standard approval conditions [SL-AC1 or SL-AC2]
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List of variables showing significant skewness
and kurtosis
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For the self-report questionnaires, all variables were found to be normally distributed, 
with the exception of BDI (control group, significantly positively skewed and significant 
kurtosis), HADS - depression scale (control group, significantly positively skewed and 
significant kurtosis), BSI (control group, significantly positively skewed and significant 
kurtosis) and MCQ - factor 2 (negative metacognitive beliefs regarding the danger and 
uncontrollability of worrying about appearance) (control group, significantly positively 
skewed and significant kurtosis, and BDD group, significantly negatively skewed).
With regard to interview variables, all variables were found to be normally distributed, 
except for frequency of critical/self-attacking thoughts (control group, significantly 
positively skewed, and BDD group, significantly negatively skewed and significant 
kurtosis), frequency of past-oriented thoughts (control group, significantly positively 
skewed and significant kurtosis), impact of thoughts on family life (control group, 
significantly positively skewed and significant kurtosis), impact of thoughts on 
school/work/study (control group, significantly positively skewed), impact of thoughts 
on intimate relationships (BDD group, significantly negatively skewed), level of sadness 
associated with preoccupation (BDD group, significantly negatively skewed and 
significant kurtosis), level of anxiety associated with preoccupation (BDD group, 
significantly negatively skewed and significant kurtosis), level of fear associated with 
preoccupation (control group, significantly positively skewed and significant kurtosis), 
level of shame (control group, significantly positively skewed), effect of engagement 
strategy on thought intensity (BDD group, significantly positively skewed), effect of 
engagement strategy on associated distress (control group, significant kurtosis).
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.A, Sub-Department o f Clinical Health Psychology
UCL ER STREET LONDON WC1E6BT Ge
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Study title:
Preoccupation in Body Dysmorphic Disorder. A Systematic Description
Investigator Details:
Amaryllis Holland
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology
University College London
Telephone number: 
Email: 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact me if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like further information. Take time to consider whether or not you wish 
to take part.
Thank you for reading this.
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) is defined as a preoccupation with appearance or a 
particular feature of appearance. This means that people with BDD often find 
themselves thinking about their appearance or feature for long periods of time. This can 
cause distress and make it difficult for people to function as they might like to. 
Researchers have been working to understand Body Dysmorphic Disorder and to design 
treatment programs. Little research has been done on the preoccupation, however; what
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kinds of thoughts go through people’s minds and why these thoughts keep on returning 
time and time again.
This study aims to explore and describe the preoccupation (thoughts) in BDD by 
comparing a group of people with BDD with a group of people who have ‘normal 
concerns’ about their appearance. This will further understanding of the disorder itself 
and also the mechanisms that might be keeping the preoccupation going.
It is hoped that a total of 26 people with BDD and 26 people with ‘normal concerns’ 
about appearance will take part in the study.
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, you are 
still free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw or 
not take part will not affect the standard of any care you receive.
If you do decide to take part, you will be required to complete a number of 
questionnaires and you may be asked attend an interview. The completion of the 
questionnaires will take approximately half an hour and the interview will last around 
one hour. The interview will focus on your concerns regarding your appearance. It is 
possible that you may find some questions distressing. You will be free to stop the 
interview at any time and/or withdraw from the study. If you agree to take part, you will 
be reimbursed for travel expenses and also be paid 6 pounds per hour for your time.
While there are no immediate benefits for those taking part, it is hoped that people with 
BDD will benefit in the longer term. The findings of this research will be shared with 
other researchers and people working with people with BDD. It is hoped that the results 
will improve our understanding of BDD and contribute to more effective treatments.
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept strictly 
confidential. Questionnaires and audiocassettes will be numerically coded and stored in 
a locked filing cabinet. Your personal details will be stored separately.
The results from this research will be published in journals and also presented at 
relevant conferences.
This research is being organized by Amaryllis Holland (Trainee Clinical Psychologist), 
Dr. David Veale (Consultant Psychiatrist) and Dr. Tony Roth (University College 
London Joint Course Director). If you have any comments regarding this research, 
please direct correspondence to Dr. David Veale, Consultant Psychiatrist, The Priory 
The study has been reviewed by the University College London Sub-Department of 
Clinical Health Psychology Research Committee.
Thank you for reading this.
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Sub-Department o f Clinical Health Psychology
U N IV E R S IT Y  CO L L EG E  LONDON
CONSENT FORM
Study title:
Preoccupation in Body Dysmorphic Disorder. A Systematic Description 
Investigator Details: Supervisor Details:
Amaryllis Holland 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Sub-Dept o f Clinical Psychology 
University College London 
Telephone number: 
Email: 
Dr. A. Roth
Joint Course Director
Sub-Dept of Clinical Psychology
University College London
Telephone number: 
Email: 
Please read the following questions and circle the appropriate responses:
1) Have you read the Participant Information Sheet?
Yes No
2) Have you been given contact details o f someone you can approach if you have questions? 
Yes No
3) If you have asked questions, have you been given satisfactory answers? 
Yes No
4) Have you received sufficient information about the study? 
Yes No
5) Do you understand that your participation is voluntary and that you are free to withdraw 
from the study without penalty at any stage?
Yes No
6) Do you agree with the publication o f the results of this study in appropriate journals?
Yes No
Name o f participant Date Signature
Name o f researcher Date Signature
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